On 12 Mar 2012, at 08:04, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/12/2012 2:53 AM, acw wrote:
On 3/12/2012 05:43, Stephen P. King wrote:
Sure, given a mathematical ontology, "real" is just the structure
you exist in - an indexical. This real might be limited in some way
(for example in COMP, you cannot help but get some indeterminacy
like MW)- a newtonian physics simulation might be real for those
living in it and which are embedded in it, although if this would
really work without any indeterminacy, I'm skeptical of.
Could it be that we are tacitly assuming that our notion of
such that there always exists a standard what is the "Real"
it is not possible to tell if a given object of experience is real
virtual, why do we default to it being virtual, as if it was somehow
possible to compare the object in question with an unassailably
version? As I see it, if we can somehow show that a given object of
experience is the _best possible_ simulation (modulo available
resources) then it is "real", as a better or "more real"
it is impossible to generate. Our physical world is 'real' simply
because there does not exist a better simulation of it.
I should have been more precise, when I said VR, I didn't merely
mean a good digital physics simulation where the observer's entire
body+brain is contained within, I meant something more high-level,
think of "Second Life" or "Blocks World" or some other similar
simulation done 1000 years from now with much more computational
resources. The main difference between VR and physical-real is that
one contains a body+brain embedded in that physical-real world (as
matter), thus physical-real is also a self-contained consistent
mathematical structure, while VR has some external component which
prevents a form of physical self-awareness (you can't have brain
surgery in a VR, at least not in the sense we do have in the real
world). The main difference here is that the VR can be influenced
by a higher level at which the VR itself runs, while a physical-
real structure is completely self-contained.
I am mot exactly sure of what you mean by "indexical". As to
brain surgery in VR, why not? All that is needed is rules in the
program that control the 1p experience of content to some states in
game structures. The point is that if we are considering brains-in-
vasts problems we need to also consider the "other minds" problems.
We should not be analyzing this from a strict one person situation.
You and I have different experiences up to and including the
"something that is like being Stephen" as different from "something
that is like to being ACW". If we where internally identical minds
then why would be even be having this conversation? We would
literally "know" each others thought by merely having them. This is
why I argue that plural shared 1p is a weakness in COMP. We have to
have disjointness at least.
Comp is the problem, and the conceptual tool to formulate the problem,
not the solution. Comp reduces the mind-body problem to a body
problem. That's the main point. Comp gives only the general shape of
the solution, in the form of a MW interpretation by numbers of
arithmetic, and its measure problem on the first person plural
indeterminacy. Then if you accept the classical theory of knowledge,
you can already derived the propositional physics, and see the hints
for the "other minds" problem solution, and that solution is close to
Girard's linear logic, or some work of Abramski.
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