I think (?) it is Bruno's sentece:
*"They can perceive the difference, not the duplication"  *
(if not, I apologize, but my remark is still on)
To perceive a difference goes with full knowledge of the comparison,
knowing the 'previous' format (existence). They (and I am indeed not for
the entire
thought-play) can notice *"a"* state - irrespectively from any former
history.

Sorry to embarge into this time- and energy wasting strawmanship.

John Mikes



On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 5:15 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
>  On 17 Mar 2012, at 05:05, John Clark wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>  >>If he knew he was duplicated both would mention it, if he didn't
>>> neither would.
>>>
>>
>> >The point is that he cannot perceive it. he can not known it by any
>> personal observation,
>>
>
> So you're saying that neither the original nor the copy can feel the
> duplication, it does not enter their consciousness, it does not change
> their consciousness, and so far I agree with you completely; but then in
> the next breath you say it DOES  change their consciousness and the change
> is about as dramatic as a change can get, it's so ENORMOUS that a new
> individual is created. So do you believe they can perceive the duplication
> or do you not?
>
>
> They can perceive the difference, not the duplication.
>
>
>
>
> > You misunderstand Everett. he said that we cannot feel the split ever
>> after the differentiation occurred.
>>
>
> Everett said they would not feel the split but they would certainly feel
> other things,
>
>
> Sure, me too.
>
>
>  and there would not even be a differentiation unless there was something
> different about them to differentiate. Everett would also say that talking
> about 2 absolutely identical points of view is silly, if there is no
> difference between them then there is only one point of view.
>
>
> Me too.
>
>
>
> > Now you come back to the idea that if I throw a dice, the notion of
>> probability does not apply because the guy looking at the dice is not the
>> same that the guy who threw it, which is straw man.
>>
>
> I know you like the phrase but when asked to calculate probabilities, or
> anything else for that matter, it is not a straw man to ask just what you
> want me to calculate; the probability that the guy who sees 12 on the dice
> will see 12 is 100%, the probability that the guy who does not see 12 on
> the dice will see 12 is 0%, the probability that right now John K Clark
> will see 12 when he throes the dice in his hand is 1 in 36.
>
> > So it looks you can give us an algorithm to predict what you will feel
>> with certainty the result of your future self-localization. But I have
>> already explain why it does not work.
>>
>
> I know that there is one chance in 36 that my future self (I don't see the
> need of the word "localization") will be certain the dice gave him a 12,
> and the algorithm to calculate this has been well known for centuries.
>
>
> I was illustrating a point. If the dices are medelt long enough the
> quantum uncertainties adds up and generates the 36 (* a continuum)
> possibilities, in which case quantum indeterminacy, which is different from
> the classical statistical one, and different from the comp 1-indeterminacy.
> The indeterminacies looks alike, but have different explanations, and
> different consequences.
>
>
>
>
> > *in both cities* he will feel to survive *one and entire in only one
>> city*.
>>
>
> Correct, therefore we can conclude that the Helsinki man will feel he has
> survived in both cities because HE HAS BEEN DUPLICATED and is now *in both
> cities*.
>
>
> But he feels he is in only one city.  He used your trick to predict that
> he will be in Moscow with 100%, but he woke in Washington.
> Ah! But you say he know that he has been duplicated and that he is in
> Washington AND in Moscow.
> But how could he *know* that? He can only *verifie* that. The presence, or
> not, or the other, the doppelganger, is like a scientific needing some
> confirmation. He can give a call to Moscow, to say hello to "himself", but
> bad luck, he just learned that the reconstitution machine failed in Moscow.
> This illustrates that each copies can know where they are, but can only
> believe the other copy is or not in the other city. They personal
> perspective are different, they knew this in advance, they perceive the
> difference, but they can only bet on the duplication, not experience them.
> The experiences they (can) get are only "I wake up in Moscow", OR "I wake
> up in Washington", and never "I wake up in washington and I wake in
> Moscow". The probability here on those future personal experiences.
>
>
>
>
> > But the obvious point here is that he will not FEEL having survived in
>> both cities.
>>
>
> Just ask them! Ask the Moscow man if he is the Helsinki man and if he is
> experiencing Moscow and he will answer "yes" to both questions. Ask the
> Washington man if he is the Helsinki man and if he is experiencing
> Washington and he will answer "yes" to both questions. Therefore it doesn't
> take rocket science to conclude that the Helsinki man experienced Moscow
> AND Washington.
>
>
> Then, given that you and me are already the result of the many duplication
> since the first amoeba, we have all the life "at once". I love the idea,
> and I think we might have a very deep common first person indeed, but this
> is not relevant for the question of predicting, for example the "movie" you
> will feel to see in the multiplication-movie thought experience. Here the
> answer is "white noise", because it will be lived by the vast majority of
> the copies.
>
>
>
>
> > Both copies will FEEL having survive in only one city,
>>
>
> Yes, but it doesn't matter because BOTH are the Helsinki man who just
> happens to be in another place, and we change our position all the time
> without loss of identity.
>
>
> You are incredible. Of course it does matter, given that the question is
> explicitly about those personal feelings.
>
> You look like "I don't want to talk about that".
>
>
>
> > Each of them cannot know what the other feels.
>>
>
> True, so the Washington man is not the Moscow man, although both are the
> Helsinki man. For some things like the integers H, M and W  if H=M and H= W
> then M=W, but that does not work for everything, for example a watermelon
> is green and a pea is green but a watermelon is not a pea; it doesn't work
> for personal identity either.
>
> > You know perfectly well who you are, and the duplication will not change
>> this.
>>
>
> Yes I will always know who I am, I will know I am in Moscow and only
> Moscow and I will know I am in Washington and only Washington and I will
> know I am in Helsinki and only Helsinki. Odd yes, contradictory no because
> there are 3 I's.
>
> > You are back to the confusion between a 3-view on 1-views and the
>> 1-views themselves.
>>
>
> One of us is very confused indeed over this point, but I don't believe its
> me.
>
>
> This is equivalent with saying "I am right".
>
>
>
> > Ask them if they have seen, from their own eyes, Washington AND Moscow.
>> They will deny this,
>>
>
> Sure, but each has seen one of those cities and both are the Helsinki man
> (although they are not each other), therefore the Helsinki man saw
> Washington AND Moscow; the Washington man didn't and the Moscow man didn't
> but the Helsinki man did.
>
>
> Lol
>
>
>
>
> > unless you introduce magical telepathy between them.
>>
>
> Now THAT is a straw man! Telepathy has nothing to due with it.
>
>
> Then you avoid the necessary ignorance of most copies, ignorance on which
> experience they will "actually" live and have lived. Think about the
> multiplication movie experience. You predict that you will see all movie,
> and I agree if "you" means the 1-you that you can attribute to those
> people, but I disagree if by "you" you mean each of those persons as they
> will experience. They discourse is simple, formally, because those
> experience are given by *each* movie (not *all* movie).
>
>
>
>
> > You are just avoiding putting yourself at the place of each copies
>>
>
> I the Helsinki man walk into the duplicating chamber and walk right out
> and find that I the Helsinki man am now in Moscow, and I the Helsinki man
> walk into the duplicating chamber and walk right out and find that I the
> Helsinki man is now in Washington, and I the Helsinki man walk into the
> duplicating chamber and walk right out and find that I the Helsinki man am
> still right here in Helsinki and wonder if the duplicating chamber has
> malfunctioned. All three are me the Helsinki man and there is a 100% chance
> I will go to Moscow only and a 100% chance I will go to Washington only and
> a 100% chance I will remain in Helsinki. There is a 0% chance that I the
> Helsinki man in Moscow will see Washington and there is a 0% chance that I
> the Helsinki man in Washington will see Moscow. What have I avoided?
>
>
> First, that in the protocol you are annihilated in Helsinki, so there is
> 0% you will wake up in Helsinki. Then you confuse an intellectual hybrid of
> your 1-you with the set {3-you in M, 3-you in W},  to be able to predict
> that you will be in both city. You avoid the question which concerns your
> present feeling as anticipated by your older Helsinki. If he predicted 100%
> for Moscow, then he was wrong for the guy who feel to be in Washington, and
> why not to listen to him?
>
> The repetition of the experiences explains that the majority of W-M
> strings will be random, even incompressible. So the bet on the actual lived
> futures, in that multiplication-movie experience, is white noise.
> With this protocol, seeing Flying circus is a white rabbit phenomenon.
>
>
>
>
> > You forget to say that neither the W-man nor the M-man could have guess
>> in advance to be those one, from the complete protocol information he got
>> in Helsinki.
>>
>
> Guessing is not necessary,
>
>
> Well, this is what is asked!!!
>
>
>
>  the Helsinki man could have assigned a probability of 100% that if he
> sees Moscow then he will become the Moscow
>
>
>
> But that is not the question!!!
>
>
>
>  man because that's what the Moscow man is, the Helsinki man who saw
> Moscow. And what is the probability that the Helsinki man will actually see
> Moscow? 100% of course.
>
>
> By definition of first person (content or sequence of content of the
> diary), if you say 100% for each step of the duplication experience, then
> you are predicting that you will see "flying circus", and the 2^(16180 *
> 10000) * (90 * 60) * 24 other copies will laugh at you. Ok, you will have
> some neighbors who saw "Flying circus" with (correct, wrong) subtitles, and
> those who say the beginning, or the movie, or the trailer in Chinese with
> Korean subtitles, etc.
> Don't count on it!
>
> You avoid to answer the question which concerns the futures 1-view on the
> 1-view, by avoiding doing the experience, and defining an abstract notion
> of person distributed in the copies to avoid the simple fact that we will
> just look at the diaries which describe the experiences, and that with the
> movie-multiplication protocol, they almost all describes "white noise". The
> number of "senseful movie grows linearly", the number of white noise movie
> grows exponentially.
>
> I said it precisely in the protocol, you have to bet which movie you will
> describe in the diary after the experience. Obviously after the experience
> they have all view ONE movie. OK, there is one "winner", having seen a
> perfect version of "flying circus", but the vast majority have not. In
> those thought experiments, you have to put yourself coldly at the place of
> some sample of those person.
>
> With the quantum multiplication movie experience, the pixels are in
> quantum superposition which contagiate to the spectator, so that the
> quantum wave describes the spectator seeing all the movies, but again, the
> spectators does not feel the split nor the superposition, and see only
> *one* movie, and most of them will see white noise, for the same reason
> that beam splitters split  the intensity into 1/2.
>
> So logically, it is just plausible that the quantum indeterminacy might be
> an instance of the comp first person plural (with duplication of
> populations) indeterminacy. But we are not yet there.
>
> You seem to continue to oscillate between there is no 1-indeterminacy,
> because ... 100% for Moscow, and there is an indeterminacy (but it is
> trivial, nothing new).
>
> Let us assume you accept the 1-indeterminacy (trivial or not might be just
> another topic), might we move to step 4? Hint: revise step 0, 1, 2. Step
> zero is the definition of comp.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to