Hi,

To add to John Mikes' point, it is being assumed that there is an invariance of consiousness under the copy and paste operations. What is the nature of this continuity? It might help to keep in mind exactly what generates said continuity. This reminds me a lot of the notion of a connection that is used in presheaves and fiber bundles. The continuity in is induced to mappings to elements of a continuous index set. Does the UD provide such a base space? The difficulty is that there are no unique paths in the base space (assuming that it is the UD) unless we arbitrarily introduce a measure on the UD. Where does it come from? We seem to be making a bunch of distracting arguments and hand waving to distract that we are basically putting in by hand a continuity and yet claiming that there is none occurring naturally. If we just assume the set of the natural numbers (via Borel sets), isn't this just an arbitrary bias toward a particular measure and not something natural? Where is the transitivity or ordering of the numbers coming from? We could we be operating on a set of p-adic numbers of a very large prime... Put all the names of cities aside for a moment, we are really taking about movement in space-time. So my question is, why are we putting our selves through such convoluted abstractions to talk about the simple idea of moving though space-time?

Onward!

Stephen

On 3/18/2012 6:45 PM, John Mikes wrote:
I think (?) it is Bruno's sentece:
/*"They can perceive the difference, not the duplication" */
(if not, I apologize, but my remark is still on)
To perceive a difference goes with full knowledge of the comparison, knowing the 'previous' format (existence). They (and I am indeed not for the entire thought-play) can notice *_"a"_* state - irrespectively from any former history.
Sorry to embarge into this time- and energy wasting strawmanship.
John Mikes


On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 5:15 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:


    On 17 Mar 2012, at 05:05, John Clark wrote:

    Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:

            >>If he knew he was duplicated both would mention it, if
            he didn't neither would.


        >The point is that he cannot perceive it. he can not known it
        by any personal observation,


    So you're saying that neither the original nor the copy can feel
    the duplication, it does not enter their consciousness, it does
    not change their consciousness, and so far I agree with you
    completely; but then in the next breath you say it DOES  change
    their consciousness and the change is about as dramatic as a
    change can get, it's so ENORMOUS that a new individual is
    created. So do you believe they can perceive the duplication or
    do you not?

    They can perceive the difference, not the duplication.




        > You misunderstand Everett. he said that we cannot feel the
        split ever after the differentiation occurred.


    Everett said they would not feel the split but they would
    certainly feel other things,

    Sure, me too.


    and there would not even be a differentiation unless there was
    something different about them to differentiate. Everett would
    also say that talking about 2 absolutely identical points of view
    is silly, if there is no difference between them then there is
    only one point of view.

    Me too.



        > Now you come back to the idea that if I throw a dice, the
        notion of probability does not apply because the guy looking
        at the dice is not the same that the guy who threw it, which
        is straw man.


    I know you like the phrase but when asked to calculate
    probabilities, or anything else for that matter, it is not a
    straw man to ask just what you want me to calculate; the
    probability that the guy who sees 12 on the dice will see 12 is
    100%, the probability that the guy who does not see 12 on the
    dice will see 12 is 0%, the probability that right now John K
    Clark will see 12 when he throes the dice in his hand is 1 in 36.

        > So it looks you can give us an algorithm to predict what
        you will feel with certainty the result of your future
        self-localization. But I have already explain why it does not
        work.


    I know that there is one chance in 36 that my future self (I
    don't see the need of the word "localization") will be certain
    the dice gave him a 12, and the algorithm to calculate this has
    been well known for centuries.

    I was illustrating a point. If the dices are medelt long enough
    the quantum uncertainties adds up and generates the 36 (* a
    continuum) possibilities, in which case quantum indeterminacy,
    which is different from the classical statistical one, and
    different from the comp 1-indeterminacy.
    The indeterminacies looks alike, but have different explanations,
    and different consequences.




        > *in both cities* he will feel to survive *one and entire in
        only one city*.


    Correct, therefore we can conclude that the Helsinki man will
    feel he has survived in both cities because HE HAS BEEN
    DUPLICATED and is now *in both cities*.

    But he feels he is in only one city.  He used your trick to
    predict that he will be in Moscow with 100%, but he woke in
    Washington.
    Ah! But you say he know that he has been duplicated and that he is
    in Washington AND in Moscow.
    But how could he *know* that? He can only *verifie* that. The
    presence, or not, or the other, the doppelganger, is like a
    scientific needing some confirmation. He can give a call to
    Moscow, to say hello to "himself", but bad luck, he just learned
    that the reconstitution machine failed in Moscow. This illustrates
    that each copies can know where they are, but can only believe the
    other copy is or not in the other city. They personal perspective
    are different, they knew this in advance, they perceive the
    difference, but they can only bet on the duplication, not
    experience them. The experiences they (can) get are only "I wake
    up in Moscow", OR "I wake up in Washington", and never "I wake up
    in washington and I wake in Moscow". The probability here on those
    future personal experiences.




        > But the obvious point here is that he will not FEEL having
        survived in both cities.


    Just ask them! Ask the Moscow man if he is the Helsinki man and
    if he is experiencing Moscow and he will answer "yes" to both
    questions. Ask the Washington man if he is the Helsinki man and
    if he is experiencing Washington and he will answer "yes" to both
    questions. Therefore it doesn't take rocket science to conclude
    that the Helsinki man experienced Moscow AND Washington.

    Then, given that you and me are already the result of the many
    duplication since the first amoeba, we have all the life "at
    once". I love the idea, and I think we might have a very deep
    common first person indeed, but this is not relevant for the
    question of predicting, for example the "movie" you will feel to
    see in the multiplication-movie thought experience. Here the
    answer is "white noise", because it will be lived by the vast
    majority of the copies.




        > Both copies will FEEL having survive in only one city,


    Yes, but it doesn't matter because BOTH are the Helsinki man who
    just happens to be in another place, and we change our position
    all the time without loss of identity.

    You are incredible. Of course it does matter, given that the
    question is explicitly about those personal feelings.

    You look like "I don't want to talk about that".



        > Each of them cannot know what the other feels.


    True, so the Washington man is not the Moscow man, although both
    are the Helsinki man. For some things like the integers H, M and
    W  if H=M and H= W then M=W, but that does not work for
    everything, for example a watermelon is green and a pea is green
    but a watermelon is not a pea; it doesn't work for personal
    identity either.

        > You know perfectly well who you are, and the duplication
        will not change this.


    Yes I will always know who I am, I will know I am in Moscow and
    only Moscow and I will know I am in Washington and only
    Washington and I will know I am in Helsinki and only Helsinki.
    Odd yes, contradictory no because there are 3 I's.

        > You are back to the confusion between a 3-view on 1-views
        and the 1-views themselves.


    One of us is very confused indeed over this point, but I don't
    believe its me.

    This is equivalent with saying "I am right".



        > Ask them if they have seen, from their own eyes, Washington
        AND Moscow. They will deny this,


    Sure, but each has seen one of those cities and both are the
    Helsinki man (although they are not each other), therefore the
    Helsinki man saw Washington AND Moscow; the Washington man didn't
    and the Moscow man didn't but the Helsinki man did.

    Lol




        > unless you introduce magical telepathy between them.


    Now THAT is a straw man! Telepathy has nothing to due with it.

    Then you avoid the necessary ignorance of most copies, ignorance
    on which experience they will "actually" live and have lived.
    Think about the multiplication movie experience. You predict that
    you will see all movie, and I agree if "you" means the 1-you that
    you can attribute to those people, but I disagree if by "you" you
    mean each of those persons as they will experience. They discourse
    is simple, formally, because those experience are given by *each*
    movie (not *all* movie).




        > You are just avoiding putting yourself at the place of each
        copies


    I the Helsinki man walk into the duplicating chamber and walk
    right out and find that I the Helsinki man am now in Moscow, and
    I the Helsinki man walk into the duplicating chamber and walk
    right out and find that I the Helsinki man is now in Washington,
    and I the Helsinki man walk into the duplicating chamber and walk
    right out and find that I the Helsinki man am still right here in
    Helsinki and wonder if the duplicating chamber has malfunctioned.
    All three are me the Helsinki man and there is a 100% chance I
    will go to Moscow only and a 100% chance I will go to Washington
    only and a 100% chance I will remain in Helsinki. There is a 0%
    chance that I the Helsinki man in Moscow will see Washington and
    there is a 0% chance that I the Helsinki man in Washington will
    see Moscow. What have I avoided?

    First, that in the protocol you are annihilated in Helsinki, so
    there is 0% you will wake up in Helsinki. Then you confuse an
    intellectual hybrid of your 1-you with the set {3-you in M, 3-you
    in W},  to be able to predict that you will be in both city. You
    avoid the question which concerns your present feeling as
    anticipated by your older Helsinki. If he predicted 100% for
    Moscow, then he was wrong for the guy who feel to be in
    Washington, and why not to listen to him?

    The repetition of the experiences explains that the majority of
    W-M strings will be random, even incompressible. So the bet on the
    actual lived futures, in that multiplication-movie experience, is
    white noise.
    With this protocol, seeing Flying circus is a white rabbit
    phenomenon.




        > You forget to say that neither the W-man nor the M-man
        could have guess in advance to be those one, from the
        complete protocol information he got in Helsinki.


    Guessing is not necessary,

    Well, this is what is asked!!!



    the Helsinki man could have assigned a probability of 100% that
    if he sees Moscow then he will become the Moscow


    But that is not the question!!!



    man because that's what the Moscow man is, the Helsinki man who
    saw Moscow. And what is the probability that the Helsinki man
    will actually see Moscow? 100% of course.

    By definition of first person (content or sequence of content of
    the diary), if you say 100% for each step of the duplication
    experience, then you are predicting that you will see "flying
    circus", and the 2^(16180 * 10000) * (90 * 60) * 24 other copies
    will laugh at you. Ok, you will have some neighbors who saw
    "Flying circus" with (correct, wrong) subtitles, and those who say
    the beginning, or the movie, or the trailer in Chinese with Korean
    subtitles, etc.
    Don't count on it!

    You avoid to answer the question which concerns the futures 1-view
    on the 1-view, by avoiding doing the experience, and defining an
    abstract notion of person distributed in the copies to avoid the
    simple fact that we will just look at the diaries which describe
    the experiences, and that with the movie-multiplication protocol,
    they almost all describes "white noise". The number of "senseful
    movie grows linearly", the number of white noise movie grows
    exponentially.

    I said it precisely in the protocol, you have to bet which movie
    you will describe in the diary after the experience. Obviously
    after the experience they have all view ONE movie. OK, there is
    one "winner", having seen a perfect version of "flying circus",
    but the vast majority have not. In those thought experiments, you
    have to put yourself coldly at the place of some sample of those
    person.

    With the quantum multiplication movie experience, the pixels are
    in quantum superposition which contagiate to the spectator, so
    that the quantum wave describes the spectator seeing all the
    movies, but again, the spectators does not feel the split nor the
    superposition, and see only *one* movie, and most of them will see
    white noise, for the same reason that beam splitters split  the
    intensity into 1/2.

    So logically, it is just plausible that the quantum indeterminacy
    might be an instance of the comp first person plural (with
    duplication of populations) indeterminacy. But we are not yet there.

    You seem to continue to oscillate between there is no
    1-indeterminacy, because ... 100% for Moscow, and there is an
    indeterminacy (but it is trivial, nothing new).

    Let us assume you accept the 1-indeterminacy (trivial or not might
    be just another topic), might we move to step 4? Hint: revise step
    0, 1, 2. Step zero is the definition of comp.

    Bruno


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