On 18 Mar 2012, at 18:25, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Mar 17, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>> we can conclude that the Helsinki man will feel he has survived in both cities because HE HAS BEEN DUPLICATED and is now *in both cities*.

> But he feels he is in only one city.


I said "he feels", so you can deduce that it must be the 1-I, attached to a copy in W or in M. Which one does not matter.

(meta-remark: you avoid answering the question).

> He used your trick to predict that he will be in Moscow with 100%, but he woke in Washington.



> Ah! But you say he know that he has been duplicated and that he is in Washington AND in Moscow. But how could he *know* that?

If the Helsinki man didn't know he (pronoun use OK here) was going to be duplicated then it can hardly be expected that the Helsinki man is going to be able to give probabilities based on that fact.

But it is part of the protocol that he has been told that he will be duplicated, so indeed the copy can believe he has been duplicated. The point was that he cannot feel or experience or know that he has been duplicated and that the doppelganger exist. You are confusing intellectual belief with knowledge. In AUDA term: you confuse provable(p) with "provable(p) and p is true". (BTW AUDA has been written notably for those who want skip the thought experiences, and get the way physics can be derive from machine's bio-psycho-theo-logy), so you might as well study it).

> He can only *verifie* that. The presence, or not, or the other, the doppelganger, is like a scientific needing some confirmation. He can give a call to Moscow, to say hello to "himself", but bad luck, he just learned that the reconstitution machine failed in Moscow. This illustrates that each copies can know where they are, but can only believe the other copy is or not in the other city.

It does not matter to the Helsinki man in Helsinki if the Helsinki man in Moscow (the Moscow man for short) or the Helsinki man in Washington (the Washington man for short) believe in the existence of each other or not, because by direct observation the Helsinki man knows he is in Moscow and by direct observation the Helsinki man knows he is in Washington.

It does matter for *your* assertion that he feels the duplication.

How can the Helsinki man be at 2 places at once? BECAUSE HE HAS BEEN DUPLICATED.

The 3-he. Not the 1-I of each copy.

But they now hold different views on where they are, what are the consequences of that? The Helsinki man differentiates into two, the Moscow man and the Washington man; although both are still the Helsinki man, at least in the same way that although you Bruno Marchal have changed from what you were yesterday, you Bruno Marchal of today are still the man you were yesterday. And the point in space your body was in yesterday or today is not relevant to the question at hand.

Of course it is. By definition of the protocol, the guy in helsinki is asked about his future 1-perception. And he is undeterminate about this because he beliefs that he will be duplicated. To say that there is determinacy is like pretending that a program can predict where some future backup will be implemented.

> you confuse an intellectual hybrid of your 1-you with the set {3- you in M, 3-you in W},

The only thing this homemade gobbledegook achieves is confusion, mostly to yourself.

Not at all. It is intended to make you realize that your "he is in two places" confuses the 1-view and the 3-view.

> By definition of first person (content or sequence of content of the diary)

Then I (the original John K Clark or the copy, there is no way for me to tell the difference) share the same "first person" (whatever the hell that is)

It is simply the content of a personal diary or memory. That's a partial definition of the 1-I, which is quite enough to get the point.

with the person who just materialized in front of me in the duplicating chamber, because the diary I'm holding looks just like the one that other fellow is holding, and I can vividly remember writing every single line of that diary and he says he remembers doing that exact same thing too.

He is never reconstituted in front of himself, but in two different cities.

> You seem to continue to oscillate between there is no 1- indeterminacy, because ... 100% for Moscow, and there is an indeterminacy (but it is trivial, nothing new).

There is rock stability and no oscillation whatsoever;

You did acknowledge it in a previous post. So now you oscillate between the fact that you oscillate or not.

Indeterminacy is always with us,

This is a strong philosophical statement. "Indeterminacy", or many kind are usually hotly debated.

in the real world thanks to deterministic chaos,

We cannot take the notion of "real world" fro granted when working on a big fundamental open problem like the mind-body problem. The deterministic chaos is another form of indetermination. With deterministic chaos we have a local determinacy (we can predict "next steps"). This is not the case with the QM indeterminacy (based on QM), and with the comp-indeterminacy (based on comp).

in physics thanks to Heisenberg and even in pure mathematics thanks to Godel and Turing,

Those are quite different indeterminacy. With comp we will see at step 7 that the first one should be a particular case of the comp)indeterminacy, and the second one is completely different, but is used in AUDA to bring some link indeed, but they remains conceptually completely different.

but your complications do not add any more because no matter how convoluted you make them as long as you make clear who "I" and "you" and "he" is your additional probabilities always boil down to 0% or 100%.

Only because you confuse 1-views and 3-views.

And if you don't make it clear then everything is meaningless.

It is made clear, but you never address the question asked in the step 3. You avoid answering the paragraphs of my reply to you, notably with the movie-multiplication experiment. In french we say that no one is more deaf than those who does not want to listen. You just avoid systematically to answer the question asked. You seem to avoid the idea that your copies in the movie-multiplication (say) all agree that they have seen only one movie, and that almost all agree that they were unable to predict which one, and that this indeterminacy should have been expected from comp. You avoid any talk on your future 1-I experiences. You restrict yourself to talks about the 3-views on the 1-view, without addressing the 1-views.



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