On 3/19/2012 2:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But they now hold different views on where they are, what are the consequences of that? The Helsinki man differentiates into two, the Moscow man and the Washington man; although both are still the Helsinki man, at least in the same way that although you Bruno Marchal have changed from what you were yesterday, you Bruno Marchal of today are still the man you were yesterday. And the point in space your body was in yesterday or today is not relevant to the question at hand.

Of course it is. By definition of the protocol, the guy in helsinki is asked about his future 1-perception. And he is undeterminate about this because he beliefs that he will be duplicated. To say that there is determinacy is like pretending that a program can predict where some future backup will be implemented.

The problem is that, having been duplicated, one copy will see Washington and one will see Moscow. So the indeterminacy is in who is referred to when you ask what the Helsinki guy will see - not in what is seen or who sees it. It's the same as the problem of justifying the Born rule in Everett's relative state. But I don't think this is fatal to your argument because operationally Born's rule is tested by repetitions. If you repeat the thought experiment recursively then you get two guys with M and W in their diaries, and then four guys with MM, MW, WM, and WW in their diaries, etc. And in the long run most guys have roughly equal numbers of M and W in their diaries - so the probability being 1/2 is empirically supported.


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to