On 19 Mar 2012, at 18:32, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Mar 19, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> you never address the question asked in the step 3.

I never got beyond step 0, or maybe it was step -1, the idea that 2 identical consciousnesses are not identical.

Where would I say the contrary? You attribute to me something I have never said.

Step 0 is the definition of comp (a more precise and more weaker version that the one usually found in the literature) Step 1 is the proposition that comp implies that we survive (with probability one) the classical teleportation experience, where you are read and cut in Sidney and paste in London (say). Step 2 is the proposition that if a delay of reconstitution is introduced, and if the reconstitution has no mean third person time- clue (like a three in its environment) then he cannot be aware of that delay. It provides the first case where the third person dairy is different from from the first person diary.
It looks like you don't read the paper, nor the posts.

> you seem to avoid the idea that your copies in the movie- multiplication (say) all agree that they have seen only one movie, and that almost all agree that they were unable to predict which one,

Been there done that. Indeterminacy exists, and if the screen is truly random

? Well, all screens are produced. It is a matter of an exercise in combinatorial analysis to understand than most are truly random.

then the most likely thing I will see is white noise, other than that no good predictions can be made no matter how many John K Clarks there are because that is what "random" means. All this has been known for over 80 years.

The comp 1-indeterminacy is known since 80 years? Give me the reference then.

But now, it looks like you get it.  We can move to step 4.

So, do you agree with step 4?

Step 4 says that if we introduce an asymmetrical delay of reconstitution in the duplication Helsinki ==> {Washington, Moscow}, this will not change to evaluation of the indeterminacy on the future first person experience, in particular P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. For example, you are told in Helsinki that you will be duplicated in W and M, and annihilate in Helsinki, but you are told that in W you will be reconstituted more or less directly as usual, but that in Moscow, the reconstitution will be delayed for three years. The question is asked to you in Helsinki, and is how you evaluate the chance of living the experience of being the one awakened in M (resp. W). The real question which matters for the rest of the reasoning is not really if that probability is 1/2, but if that uncertainty evaluation is changed from the symmetrical duplication (without delays) and the asymmetrical duplication, with one delay added to one branch of the duplication fork.

What do you think?



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