On Mon, Mar 19, 2012 at 12:20 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:

>  On 3/18/2012 11:49 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 10:38 PM, Stephen P. King 
> <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:
>
>>
>>  Dear Joseph,
>>
>>     Could you elaborate exactly where this is covered in the COMP
>> hypothesis such that it (continuity) is not something that is eliminated in
>> UDA 8?
>>
>
>  What do you mean by continuity here -- continuity of observer moments?
>
> **
> Dear Joseph,
>
>     Yes, the continuity of observer moments. What defines the order of an
> arbitrary string of OMs? What topology do these strings have? What about
> situations where we have many strings of observer moments that connect
> laterally with other strings? You are, after all, going to model multiple
> observer and interactions, no? Bruno has repeatedly discussed how COMP
> reduces physics to a computational many bodies problem. How do you propose
> to solve this problem? I have a proposal in mind. ;-) But it only works in
> a non-Platonic setting.
> **
>

I agree that this is an important, and fascinating problem. As Bruno says,
COMP is a problem, not a solution. But from what I have seen of your
proposals (and I confess that I do not fully understand it/them), they seem
to ignore the non-physicalist conclusion of the UDA. Well, something is
wrong here.


>
>
>  If we admit a digital substitution, it follows that the "data" for our
> generalized brains can be copied and pasted at will. In fact, the latter is
> just a restatement of the former.
>
>  **
>     Iff a digital substitution is in principle even possible!
>

Bingo. We assume it is possible. If it's not, then COMP is false and we can
talk about something else. Your knowledge of mathematics is impressive, but
you have again failed to convince me of its relevance here. I don't need to
know about surgery on manifolds, or the surreal numbers, to know that
digital information can be duplicated.


> Cutting and pasting at will requires the existence of a structure to be
> acted upon and an action to carry out the cutting and pasting. What defines
> the set or category or topos of the "data"? Did you know that surgery -
> which is what cutting and pasting is - violates a basic principle in
> topology, the invariance of genus of a continuous manifold? Sure, we can
> define computations in terms of functions in surgical quotient spaces, but
> where do we get the spaces or the functions to perform these actions?
>     What is it mereology (whole-part relation of the manifold)? What
> axioms does the data obey? What are its organizational principles? You seem
> to just assume that such are already defined by some fiat! What will not
> do, for you are just avoiding Leibniz' question: "Why this and not some
> other?"
>     This is cheating since we have learned that one thing that Nature is
> not is biased about any framing, basis or mereology. Why Integers and not a
> large but finite field? Why not the P-adics? Why not the surreals? Why not
> some form of non-standard numbers? Each of these sets have different
> properties and computational features, we should never be so
> anthropocentric to think that "Man is the measure of all things!", which is
> exactly what we are claiming when we say that "... our generalized brains
> ..." are this and that, such as what is implied by "...the latter is just a
> restatement of the former." The point is that we first need to dig a bit
> deeper and establish by natural mathematical means that 1) digital
> substitution is a sound mathematical concept and 2) that it is possible.
> Surprisingly it can be easily argued that the latter is just a restatement
> of the former. But is this done in the discussion of COMP so far? I haven't
> seen it. So I ask again: Why are we putting our selves through such
> convoluted abstractions to talk about the simple idea of moving though
> space-time?
>     COMP is just a formal model of the a form of the relationships between
> numbers and the content of observer moments, but it assumes that some
> particular set of numbers are ontological primitives and some idealization
> of actions that we only know to occur when we run actual calculations on
> our computers of work out in long form stuff on chalkboards of by the
> actions of the neurons in our brains.
>
>     At least try to understand my point here. I am trying to explain that
> there are things that numbers alone cannot do, they cannot count
> themselves. They cannot perform any form of activity, they are purely and
> perpetually static and fixed. Therefore any talk that involves any kind of
> activity or change is nonsense in COMP.
>

Not from the perspective of conscious observers like you and I.


> Everything is assumed to occur simultaneously as if the speed of light
> where infinite,
>

Where is this assumption made?


> the laws of thermodynamics do not apply to information processing
>

Where?


> and there is no such thing as a space or time.
>

Where?


> If we are going to invoke concepts of continuity and differential mapping
> into continuities then we had better know what we are talking about! Which
> infinity are you assuming? Are you assuming the continuum hypothesis of
> Cantor to be true of false? So many unanswered questions just being glossed
> over
>     COMP is an idealism, a beautiful fiction.
>

COMP is either true or false. I can only interpret this remark to mean that
you bet on its falsehood. Assuming of course, that you are using the UDA
definition of COMP: that some digital substitution of my consciousness
exists. If you are using some other definition, then we have wasted a lot
of time.


> But is it what we actually experience as Reality? No, it is at best some
> special representative power-set. But which one, as there are unnameably
> many. I am just trying to point out that there are some problems with the
> way that COMP is being interpreted and not arguing that COMP is false or
> wrong. That's all.
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
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-- 
Joseph Knight

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