On 3/19/2012 3:16 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:

On Mon, Mar 19, 2012 at 12:20 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:

    On 3/18/2012 11:49 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:

    On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 10:38 PM, Stephen P. King
    <stephe...@charter.net <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:

        Dear Joseph,

            Could you elaborate exactly where this is covered in the
        COMP hypothesis such that it (continuity) is not something
        that is eliminated in UDA 8?

    What do you mean by continuity here -- continuity of observer
    Dear Joseph,

        Yes, the continuity of observer moments. What defines the
    order of an arbitrary string of OMs? What topology do these
    strings have? What about situations where we have many strings of
    observer moments that connect laterally with other strings? You
    are, after all, going to model multiple observer and interactions,
    no? Bruno has repeatedly discussed how COMP reduces physics to a
    computational many bodies problem. How do you propose to solve
    this problem? I have a proposal in mind. ;-) But it only works in
    a non-Platonic setting.

I agree that this is an important, and fascinating problem. As Bruno says, COMP is a problem, not a solution. But from what I have seen of your proposals (and I confess that I do not fully understand it/them), they seem to ignore the non-physicalist conclusion of the UDA. Well, something is wrong here.

Dear Joseph,

Bruno argues that COMP proves that the physical world is "just a dream of numbers", this is ideal monism ala Berkeley. I take COMP as a proof that material monism is a false ontological theory, but this does not take ideal monism off the hook, for it has a serious problem of its own: It fails to allow for any explanations of the causal efficacy of matter, the co-called "body problem". As a student of philosophy I find that there always is a solution but we need to press harder and ask better questions.

    If we admit a digital substitution, it follows that the "data"
    for our generalized brains can be copied and pasted at will. In
    fact, the latter is just a restatement of the former.

        Iff a digital substitution is in principle even possible!

Bingo. We assume it is possible. If it's not, then COMP is false and we can talk about something else. Your knowledge of mathematics is impressive, but you have again failed to convince me of its relevance here. I don't need to know about surgery on manifolds, or the surreal numbers, to know that digital information can be duplicated.

We can duplicate classical digital information, yes indeed, but if there is any thing at all that is quantum about consciousness then it cannot be faithfully duplicated. There are many arguments about how the brain is a classical machine and those are fine but if you examine them they all seem to be narrowly focused on some particular aspect of brain physiology. Max Tegmark's paper focused on ion transport. Resent research has proven that quantum effects are indeed used by organic systems to increase their efficiency in energy conversion processes, and we have barely scratched the surface, so why are we so eager to go all in with the assumptions about classicality? Maybe we just want a solution that we can point to and say "aha, there it is, I don't need to worry any more about that..."

    Cutting and pasting at will requires the existence of a structure
    to be acted upon and an action to carry out the cutting and
    pasting. What defines the set or category or topos of the "data"?
    Did you know that surgery - which is what cutting and pasting is -
    violates a basic principle in topology, the invariance of genus of
    a continuous manifold? Sure, we can define computations in terms
    of functions in surgical quotient spaces, but where do we get the
    spaces or the functions to perform these actions?
        What is it mereology (whole-part relation of the manifold)?
    What axioms does the data obey? What are its organizational
    principles? You seem to just assume that such are already defined
    by some fiat! What will not do, for you are just avoiding Leibniz'
    question: "Why this and not some other?"
        This is cheating since we have learned that one thing that
    Nature is not is biased about any framing, basis or mereology. Why
    Integers and not a large but finite field? Why not the P-adics?
    Why not the surreals? Why not some form of non-standard numbers?
    Each of these sets have different properties and computational
    features, we should never be so anthropocentric to think that "Man
    is the measure of all things!", which is exactly what we are
    claiming when we say that "... our generalized brains  ..." are
    this and that, such as what is implied by "...the latter is just a
    restatement of the former." The point is that we first need to dig
    a bit deeper and establish by natural mathematical means that 1)
    digital substitution is a sound mathematical concept and 2) that
    it is possible. Surprisingly it can be easily argued that the
    latter is just a restatement of the former. But is this done in
    the discussion of COMP so far? I haven't seen it. So I ask again:
    Why are we putting our selves through such convoluted abstractions
    to talk about the simple idea of moving though space-time?
        COMP is just a formal model of the a form of the relationships
    between numbers and the content of observer moments, but it
    assumes that some particular set of numbers are ontological
    primitives and some idealization of actions that we only know to
    occur when we run actual calculations on our computers of work out
    in long form stuff on chalkboards of by the actions of the neurons
    in our brains.

        At least try to understand my point here. I am trying to
    explain that there are things that numbers alone cannot do, they
    cannot count themselves. They cannot perform any form of activity,
    they are purely and perpetually static and fixed. Therefore any
    talk that involves any kind of activity or change is nonsense in

Not from the perspective of conscious observers like you and I.

OK, but then we need a serious theory of time that explains how the appearence of change and measures of change arise. I have only found one attempt that seems to work, but it is hard to make sense of unless one is well versed in scattering theory math. :-( See: http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0212092 Here is an informal explanation by the author that he wrote to me: http://lists.metasciences.ac/pipermail/mirai/2011-June/000108.html

    Everything is assumed to occur simultaneously as if the speed of
    light where infinite,

Where is this assumption made?

Consider the implied "physics" of the Platonic Realm where in the computational strings exists as "Forms". Every thing is given simultaneously. All things such as factors of numbers are defined via maps and so forth and nowhere is any hint of problems such as computational complexity? It is as if the Platonic real is a Oracle Computer <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oracle_Turing_machine> with infinite memory.

    the laws of thermodynamics do not apply to information processing


Computations are being considered to run merely by the fact that a string of numbers, representing the algorithm, is proven to exist within the Integers. So why bother which any form of physical implementation when we don't have to bother considering how much physical resources are required for a computer to run a given computation. In the physical world we have a rule: "There ain't no such thing as a free lunch", computation when taken as Platonic is the ultimate free lunch. Consider for a moment that our Platonic Turing machine is running an emulation of Maxwell's Demon, would this not generate at least one violation of thermodynamics?

    and there is no such thing as a space or time.


How is the notion of space <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space#Philosophy_of_space> coded in numbers? People argue that we can recover a notion of time from the well order of integers, but what about spaces? How do we get those?

    If we are going to invoke concepts of continuity and differential
    mapping into continuities then we had better know what we are
    talking about! Which infinity are you assuming? Are you assuming
    the continuum hypothesis of Cantor to be true of false? So many
    unanswered questions just being glossed over
        COMP is an idealism, a beautiful fiction.

COMP is either true or false. I can only interpret this remark to mean that you bet on its falsehood. Assuming of course, that you are using the UDA definition of COMP: that some digital substitution of my consciousness exists. If you are using some other definition, then we have wasted a lot of time.

OK, but you are looking at COMP in a very narrow way. I am considering it as one of many ontology theories. Your argument that it is true or false tells me that you are looking at it as if a bivalent truth value was the only possible truth valuation that exists. It is not, there are consistent logics that have truth values that range over the Complex numbers! Binary truth values logics are a tiny and special set of logics that just happen to be "common sense" to us humans until we start digging deeper into abstract ideas and trying to make sense out of more and more experimental evidence about our physical world. I have been reading math books since I figured out what they where for, they give us a set of tools to understand things, things that would ordinarily go completely unnoticed.



PS, I am a student of philosophy and in no way am any kind of expert nor wish to be. I am maybe just too curious for my own good...

    But is it what we actually experience as Reality? No, it is at
    best some special representative power-set. But which one, as
    there are unnameably many. I am just trying to point out that
    there are some problems with the way that COMP is being
    interpreted and not arguing that COMP is false or wrong. That's all.


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