On 3/19/2012 3:16 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:
On Mon, Mar 19, 2012 at 12:20 AM, Stephen P. King
<stephe...@charter.net <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:
On 3/18/2012 11:49 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:
On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 10:38 PM, Stephen P. King
<stephe...@charter.net <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:
Could you elaborate exactly where this is covered in the
COMP hypothesis such that it (continuity) is not something
that is eliminated in UDA 8?
What do you mean by continuity here -- continuity of observer
Yes, the continuity of observer moments. What defines the
order of an arbitrary string of OMs? What topology do these
strings have? What about situations where we have many strings of
observer moments that connect laterally with other strings? You
are, after all, going to model multiple observer and interactions,
no? Bruno has repeatedly discussed how COMP reduces physics to a
computational many bodies problem. How do you propose to solve
this problem? I have a proposal in mind. ;-) But it only works in
a non-Platonic setting.
I agree that this is an important, and fascinating problem. As Bruno
says, COMP is a problem, not a solution. But from what I have seen of
your proposals (and I confess that I do not fully understand it/them),
they seem to ignore the non-physicalist conclusion of the UDA. Well,
something is wrong here.
Bruno argues that COMP proves that the physical world is "just a
dream of numbers", this is ideal monism ala Berkeley. I take COMP as a
proof that material monism is a false ontological theory, but this does
not take ideal monism off the hook, for it has a serious problem of its
own: It fails to allow for any explanations of the causal efficacy of
matter, the co-called "body problem". As a student of philosophy I find
that there always is a solution but we need to press harder and ask
If we admit a digital substitution, it follows that the "data"
for our generalized brains can be copied and pasted at will. In
fact, the latter is just a restatement of the former.
Iff a digital substitution is in principle even possible!
Bingo. We assume it is possible. If it's not, then COMP is false and
we can talk about something else. Your knowledge of mathematics is
impressive, but you have again failed to convince me of its relevance
here. I don't need to know about surgery on manifolds, or the surreal
numbers, to know that digital information can be duplicated.
We can duplicate classical digital information, yes indeed, but if
there is any thing at all that is quantum about consciousness then it
cannot be faithfully duplicated. There are many arguments about how the
brain is a classical machine and those are fine but if you examine them
they all seem to be narrowly focused on some particular aspect of brain
physiology. Max Tegmark's paper focused on ion transport. Resent
research has proven that quantum effects are indeed used by organic
systems to increase their efficiency in energy conversion processes, and
we have barely scratched the surface, so why are we so eager to go all
in with the assumptions about classicality? Maybe we just want a
solution that we can point to and say "aha, there it is, I don't need to
worry any more about that..."
Cutting and pasting at will requires the existence of a structure
to be acted upon and an action to carry out the cutting and
pasting. What defines the set or category or topos of the "data"?
Did you know that surgery - which is what cutting and pasting is -
violates a basic principle in topology, the invariance of genus of
a continuous manifold? Sure, we can define computations in terms
of functions in surgical quotient spaces, but where do we get the
spaces or the functions to perform these actions?
What is it mereology (whole-part relation of the manifold)?
What axioms does the data obey? What are its organizational
principles? You seem to just assume that such are already defined
by some fiat! What will not do, for you are just avoiding Leibniz'
question: "Why this and not some other?"
This is cheating since we have learned that one thing that
Nature is not is biased about any framing, basis or mereology. Why
Integers and not a large but finite field? Why not the P-adics?
Why not the surreals? Why not some form of non-standard numbers?
Each of these sets have different properties and computational
features, we should never be so anthropocentric to think that "Man
is the measure of all things!", which is exactly what we are
claiming when we say that "... our generalized brains ..." are
this and that, such as what is implied by "...the latter is just a
restatement of the former." The point is that we first need to dig
a bit deeper and establish by natural mathematical means that 1)
digital substitution is a sound mathematical concept and 2) that
it is possible. Surprisingly it can be easily argued that the
latter is just a restatement of the former. But is this done in
the discussion of COMP so far? I haven't seen it. So I ask again:
Why are we putting our selves through such convoluted abstractions
to talk about the simple idea of moving though space-time?
COMP is just a formal model of the a form of the relationships
between numbers and the content of observer moments, but it
assumes that some particular set of numbers are ontological
primitives and some idealization of actions that we only know to
occur when we run actual calculations on our computers of work out
in long form stuff on chalkboards of by the actions of the neurons
in our brains.
At least try to understand my point here. I am trying to
explain that there are things that numbers alone cannot do, they
cannot count themselves. They cannot perform any form of activity,
they are purely and perpetually static and fixed. Therefore any
talk that involves any kind of activity or change is nonsense in
Not from the perspective of conscious observers like you and I.
OK, but then we need a serious theory of time that explains how the
appearence of change and measures of change arise. I have only found one
attempt that seems to work, but it is hard to make sense of unless one
is well versed in scattering theory math. :-( See:
http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0212092 Here is an informal explanation by
the author that he wrote to me:
Everything is assumed to occur simultaneously as if the speed of
light where infinite,
Where is this assumption made?
Consider the implied "physics" of the Platonic Realm where in the
computational strings exists as "Forms". Every thing is given
simultaneously. All things such as factors of numbers are defined via
maps and so forth and nowhere is any hint of problems such as
computational complexity? It is as if the Platonic real is a Oracle
Computer <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oracle_Turing_machine> with
the laws of thermodynamics do not apply to information processing
Computations are being considered to run merely by the fact that a
string of numbers, representing the algorithm, is proven to exist within
the Integers. So why bother which any form of physical implementation
when we don't have to bother considering how much physical resources are
required for a computer to run a given computation. In the physical
world we have a rule: "There ain't no such thing as a free lunch",
computation when taken as Platonic is the ultimate free lunch. Consider
for a moment that our Platonic Turing machine is running an emulation of
Maxwell's Demon, would this not generate at least one violation of
and there is no such thing as a space or time.
How is the notion of space
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space#Philosophy_of_space> coded in
numbers? People argue that we can recover a notion of time from the well
order of integers, but what about spaces? How do we get those?
If we are going to invoke concepts of continuity and differential
mapping into continuities then we had better know what we are
talking about! Which infinity are you assuming? Are you assuming
the continuum hypothesis of Cantor to be true of false? So many
unanswered questions just being glossed over
COMP is an idealism, a beautiful fiction.
COMP is either true or false. I can only interpret this remark to mean
that you bet on its falsehood. Assuming of course, that you are using
the UDA definition of COMP: that some digital substitution of my
consciousness exists. If you are using some other definition, then we
have wasted a lot of time.
OK, but you are looking at COMP in a very narrow way. I am
considering it as one of many ontology theories. Your argument that it
is true or false tells me that you are looking at it as if a bivalent
truth value was the only possible truth valuation that exists. It is
not, there are consistent logics that have truth values that range over
the Complex numbers! Binary truth values logics are a tiny and special
set of logics that just happen to be "common sense" to us humans until
we start digging deeper into abstract ideas and trying to make sense out
of more and more experimental evidence about our physical world. I have
been reading math books since I figured out what they where for, they
give us a set of tools to understand things, things that would
ordinarily go completely unnoticed.
PS, I am a student of philosophy and in no way am any kind of expert nor
wish to be. I am maybe just too curious for my own good...
But is it what we actually experience as Reality? No, it is at
best some special representative power-set. But which one, as
there are unnameably many. I am just trying to point out that
there are some problems with the way that COMP is being
interpreted and not arguing that COMP is false or wrong. That's all.
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