On Mon, Mar 19, 2012 at 9:42 PM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:

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> On 3/19/2012 3:16 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: > > > > On Mon, Mar 19, 2012 at 12:20 AM, Stephen P. King > <stephe...@charter.net>wrote: > >> On 3/18/2012 11:49 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 10:38 PM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net >> > wrote: >> >>> >>> Dear Joseph, >>> >>> Could you elaborate exactly where this is covered in the COMP >>> hypothesis such that it (continuity) is not something that is eliminated in >>> UDA 8? >>> >> >> What do you mean by continuity here -- continuity of observer moments? >> >> ** >> Dear Joseph, >> >> Yes, the continuity of observer moments. What defines the order of an >> arbitrary string of OMs? What topology do these strings have? What about >> situations where we have many strings of observer moments that connect >> laterally with other strings? You are, after all, going to model multiple >> observer and interactions, no? Bruno has repeatedly discussed how COMP >> reduces physics to a computational many bodies problem. How do you propose >> to solve this problem? I have a proposal in mind. ;-) But it only works in >> a non-Platonic setting. >> ** >> > > I agree that this is an important, and fascinating problem. As Bruno says, > COMP is a problem, not a solution. But from what I have seen of your > proposals (and I confess that I do not fully understand it/them), they seem > to ignore the non-physicalist conclusion of the UDA. Well, something is > wrong here. > > > Dear Joseph, > > Bruno argues that COMP proves that the physical world is "just a dream > of numbers", this is ideal monism ala Berkeley. > Could you explain to me what ideal monism is and why COMP leads to it? > I take COMP as a proof that material monism is a false ontological theory, > but this does not take ideal monism off the hook, for it has a serious > problem of its own: It fails to allow for any explanations of the causal > efficacy of matter, the co-called "body problem". > How do you know? On the contrary, if COMP really does lead to ideal monism, then indeed ideal monism *must *allow for explanations of the "causal efficacy of matter". > As a student of philosophy I find that there always is a solution but we > need to press harder and ask better questions. > > > > > > >> >> >> If we admit a digital substitution, it follows that the "data" for our >> generalized brains can be copied and pasted at will. In fact, the latter is >> just a restatement of the former. >> >> ** >> Iff a digital substitution is in principle even possible! >> > > Bingo. We assume it is possible. If it's not, then COMP is false and we > can talk about something else. Your knowledge of mathematics is impressive, > but you have again failed to convince me of its relevance here. I don't > need to know about surgery on manifolds, or the surreal numbers, to know > that digital information can be duplicated. > > > We can duplicate classical digital information, yes indeed, but if > there is any thing at all that is quantum about consciousness then it > cannot be faithfully duplicated. > The UDA does not depend on this. > There are many arguments about how the brain is a classical machine and > those are fine but if you examine them they all seem to be narrowly focused > on some particular aspect of brain physiology. Max Tegmark's paper focused > on ion transport. > Wrong. Tegmark's result is *very *general because it shows that decoherence timescales are *many *orders of magnitude smaller than those of brain functioning (neuron firing, etc.). > Resent research has proven that quantum effects are indeed used by organic > systems to increase their efficiency in energy conversion processes, > Indeed, for biophysical systems whose relevant timescales are comparable to those of decoherence. > and we have barely scratched the surface, so why are we so eager to go all > in with the assumptions about classicality? > I for one am not so eager. I am neutral on whether consciousness is related to quantum phenomena, in spite of the contravening evidence. In fact, I am probably more open to the idea than the average commentator. But it doesn't matter in this context. > Maybe we just want a solution that we can point to and say "aha, there it > is, I don't need to worry any more about that..." > > > > > >> Cutting and pasting at will requires the existence of a structure to be >> acted upon and an action to carry out the cutting and pasting. What defines >> the set or category or topos of the "data"? Did you know that surgery - >> which is what cutting and pasting is - violates a basic principle in >> topology, the invariance of genus of a continuous manifold? Sure, we can >> define computations in terms of functions in surgical quotient spaces, but >> where do we get the spaces or the functions to perform these actions? >> What is it mereology (whole-part relation of the manifold)? What >> axioms does the data obey? What are its organizational principles? You seem >> to just assume that such are already defined by some fiat! What will not >> do, for you are just avoiding Leibniz' question: "Why this and not some >> other?" >> This is cheating since we have learned that one thing that Nature is >> not is biased about any framing, basis or mereology. Why Integers and not a >> large but finite field? Why not the P-adics? Why not the surreals? Why not >> some form of non-standard numbers? Each of these sets have different >> properties and computational features, we should never be so >> anthropocentric to think that "Man is the measure of all things!", which is >> exactly what we are claiming when we say that "... our generalized brains >> ..." are this and that, such as what is implied by "...the latter is just a >> restatement of the former." The point is that we first need to dig a bit >> deeper and establish by natural mathematical means that 1) digital >> substitution is a sound mathematical concept and 2) that it is possible. >> Surprisingly it can be easily argued that the latter is just a restatement >> of the former. But is this done in the discussion of COMP so far? I haven't >> seen it. So I ask again: Why are we putting our selves through such >> convoluted abstractions to talk about the simple idea of moving though >> space-time? >> COMP is just a formal model of the a form of the relationships >> between numbers and the content of observer moments, but it assumes that >> some particular set of numbers are ontological primitives and some >> idealization of actions that we only know to occur when we run actual >> calculations on our computers of work out in long form stuff on chalkboards >> of by the actions of the neurons in our brains. >> >> At least try to understand my point here. I am trying to explain that >> there are things that numbers alone cannot do, they cannot count >> themselves. They cannot perform any form of activity, they are purely and >> perpetually static and fixed. Therefore any talk that involves any kind of >> activity or change is nonsense in COMP. >> > > Not from the perspective of conscious observers like you and I. > > > OK, but then we need a serious theory of time that explains how the > appearence of change and measures of change arise. I have only found one > attempt that seems to work, but it is hard to make sense of unless one is > well versed in scattering theory math. :-( See: > http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0212092 Here is an informal explanation by > the author that he wrote to me: > http://lists.metasciences.ac/pipermail/mirai/2011-June/000108.html > > > > >> Everything is assumed to occur simultaneously as if the speed of light >> where infinite, >> > > Where is this assumption made? > > > Consider the implied "physics" of the Platonic Realm > I can't fathom what you mean by this. > where in the computational strings exists as "Forms". Every thing is given > simultaneously. All things such as factors of numbers are defined via maps > and so forth and nowhere is any hint of problems such as computational > complexity? It is as if the Platonic real is a Oracle > Computer<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oracle_Turing_machine>with infinite > memory. > > > > >> the laws of thermodynamics do not apply to information processing >> > > Where? > > > Computations are being considered to run merely by the fact that a > string of numbers, representing the algorithm, is proven to exist within > the Integers. So why bother which any form of physical implementation when > we don't have to bother considering how much physical resources are > required for a computer to run a given computation. In the physical world > we have a rule: "There ain't no such thing as a free lunch", computation > when taken as Platonic is the ultimate free lunch. Consider for a moment > that our Platonic Turing machine is running an emulation of Maxwell's > Demon, would this not generate at least one violation of thermodynamics? > You are confusing Platonia with the physical universe we observe. > > > > >> and there is no such thing as a space or time. >> > > Where? > > > How is the notion of > space<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space#Philosophy_of_space>coded in > numbers? People argue that we can recover a notion of time from > the well order of integers, but what about spaces? How do we get those? > I don't think you are going to derive the subjective experience of time from the well-ordering of integers. We agree that we have a many-body problem here, although not the ordinary one. It is the problem of how, if you and I are just tiny slivers of Platonia experiencing itself, we can still interact with one another in the stable, well-behaved physical universe we observe. It's a staggeringly beautiful fact that this happens. Whence Time? Whence Space? It would take an incredible effort to come close to an answer here. It may or may not be worth it. The point here is that COMP ensures that this is true. (Brent commented a while back that it is not very hard to envisage a physics TOE arising from something like number theory, because of how close we are already. Witness the intensely mathematical nature of cutting-edge theoretical physics today.) > > > >> If we are going to invoke concepts of continuity and differential mapping >> into continuities then we had better know what we are talking about! Which >> infinity are you assuming? Are you assuming the continuum hypothesis of >> Cantor to be true of false? So many unanswered questions just being glossed >> over >> COMP is an idealism, a beautiful fiction. >> > > COMP is either true or false. I can only interpret this remark to mean > that you bet on its falsehood. Assuming of course, that you are using the > UDA definition of COMP: that some digital substitution of my consciousness > exists. If you are using some other definition, then we have wasted a lot > of time. > > > OK, but you are looking at COMP in a very narrow way. > I am using the UDA definition. The one that has been used on this list for over a decade. > I am considering it as one of many ontology theories. > Your argument that it is true or false tells me that you are looking at it > as if a bivalent truth value was the only possible truth valuation that > exists. > It is not, there are consistent logics that have truth values that range > over the Complex numbers! > I know. Please convince me of the relevance. Please describe for me how the truth value of the proposition "There exists a digital substitution of my consciousness such that...." can take some non-Boolean truth value. is the law of the excluded middle violated? I can't imagine how. At any rate, I am not even sure why we are talking about this (for the second time). > Binary truth values logics are a tiny and special set of logics that just > happen to be "common sense" to us humans until we start digging deeper into > abstract ideas and trying to make sense out of more and more experimental > evidence about our physical world. I have been reading math books since I > figured out what they where for, they give us a set of tools to understand > things, things that would ordinarily go completely unnoticed. > > Onward! > > Stephen > > PS, I am a student of philosophy and in no way am any kind of expert nor > wish to be. I am maybe just too curious for my own good... > > > > >> But is it what we actually experience as Reality? No, it is at best some >> special representative power-set. But which one, as there are unnameably >> many. I am just trying to point out that there are some problems with the >> way that COMP is being interpreted and not arguing that COMP is false or >> wrong. That's all. >> >> Onward! >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.