On Tue, Mar 20, 2012 at 12:15 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> On 20 Mar 2012, at 03:42, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
>     How is the notion of 
> space<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space#Philosophy_of_space>
>  coded in numbers? People argue that we can recover a notion of time from
> the well order of integers, but what about spaces? How do we get those?
>
>
> Stephen, here I suspect you are confusing comp with digital physics. There
> are no reason that space (nor God, nor souls, ...) can be encoded in
> numbers. On the contrary, arithmetic as seen by inside, and taking the
> 1-indeterminacy into account ('course) is full of things which will exists
> (from the machine's viewpoint) and which are not encodable with numbers.
> This comes from standard mathematical logical results. The 1-I is typical
> with that respect. defining it by "Bp & p" leads to a knowledge logic which
> can be proved to be not arithmetically definable, nor is truth, nor is
> sensible matter and most qualia, nor is consciousness itself, and very
> plausibly, nor are physical spaces and times.
> The self-referential logics makes possible to "meta-formalize" them,
> though, notably by those many typical things that the machine cannot
> formalize, yet can know about.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~​marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/>
>
>
> Bruno,

If you are familiar with the philosophy of Leibniz as stated in his
Monadology
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/leibniz.htm
I wish you to comment on its relationship to COMP if any.

My guess is that COMP is equivalent to the infinity of possible universes
in the ideas of god. But rather than all ideas being realized, god selects
only the best universe, e.g.:

*53.** Now as there are an infinity of possible universes in the ideas of
God, and but one of them can exist, there must be a sufficient reason' for
the choice of God which determines him to select one rather than another. *
*
*
Richard


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