On 20 Mar 2012, at 17:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Mar 20, 12:01 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
to explain things. But comp is a (scientific, modest) theology, in
which we can "believe", hope, or fear, and which makes just many
fundamental question technically formulable.
There is no consideration that the very act of technical formulation
could have an effect on the answer. As the Tao Te Ching begins: "The
name that can be named is not the enduring and unchanging name." This
is not modest at all, it is in fact a reckless and arrogant
No, because it is presented as an assumption, not as a truth (like you
Then comp agree with the TAO, the "real thing" cannot be named.
But once you accept an assumption, if only for the sake of an
argument, you can derive conclusion.
Comp assumes that its own framework can accommodate all
things and that no framework can reduce it to another, while further
assuming that this assumption is irrelevant or unavoidable. It may be
useful to think of it that way for specific purposes, but as a bet of
universal significance, it seems to me an obvious catastrophe.
Not at all. That is what we can partially test. Comp assumes only we
can survive with a digitalizable body.
In particular it does
answer the question "where does the universe come from?". The answer
is, by the truth about addition and multiplication, and the technical
details are accessible to any universal machines.
You will ask: "where does addition and multiplication comes from".
This, in the comp theory can be answered: we will never know, at
in any publicly communicable way.
Why add the extra step of addition and multiplication?
To get a Turing complete ontology.
The deus ex
mysterium of the latter answer nullifies any value of the former
answer, which now becomes:
"where does the universe come from?"
"we will never know, at least in any publicly communicable way. "
For the universe of number, or arithmetical truth, you are right.
But the rest becomes explainable for that, as interfering numbers
dreams, which are defined by sequences and subsequences of numbers in
arithmetic, or the UD*.
Somewhere between the complete failure to answer universal questions
and the certainty of arithmetic lies the really important questions.
I have no certainty. You are introducing it.
OK, I have few doubt that "17 is prime", or that phi_i(j) stops or
does not stops.
It's a distraction to insert arithmetic in the first place when it
could just as easily be the case that the universal colors and odors
give rise to the universe.
You abstract from the fact that with comp, all what is shown in UDA,
is that we *have to* explain how odor, color and physical realties
emerge. It gives the shape of the solution, and produces already the
testable propositional parts. It also reminds us that the genuine
theological debate is the question of who is closer to the truth:
Plato or Aristotle.
We already need the numbers to give
sense to the question, and we can show that without assuming them (or
equivalent) we cannot recover them.
What sense do numbers give to the question?
With comp humans are examples of relative numbers, so you can take the
sense *you* give to the question as an example.
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