On 3/20/2012 12:01 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Mar 2012, at 06:20, Stephen P. King wrote:

COMP is just a formal model of the a form of the relationships between numbers and the content of observer moments, but it assumes that some particular set of numbers are ontological primitives and some idealization of actions that we only know to occur when we run actual calculations on our computers of work out in long form stuff on chalkboards of by the actions of the neurons in our brains.

I don't think you can say that COMP is just a formal model. COMP is a crucial act of faith about your survival after an annihilation and a reconstitution. You don't ask the doctor for a model of a working brain in your skull, you are asking for the "real thing", which is not a formal thing (indeed it will be provably not formalizable, yet meta-formalisable by the "Bp & p", which *cannot* be translated in the language of the machine, and cannot be duplicated in any provable way by the machine or any machine that the initial machine can understand. That is one reason I insist saying that comp is a (quite strong) theological assumption.

Good Day Professor Marchal!

<genuflections> O:-)

I distinguish between an arbitrary physical implementation of the idea that we denote as "COMP", as for example in my print out of your paper SANE04, and a human being's idea of COMP. The former I consider to be the identity of an equivalence class and the latter is a particular member of said equivalence class. A "doctor" is a class of physical systems implementing a category of behaviors that may be represented by a finite list of enumerable recursive algorithms, but which one exactly gets matched up with the needs of a particular patient is not specified in advance nor should be considered to be specified in advance. The concept of Bp&p ("Belief that P and P is true") is a brilliant concept and should be part of every logician's lexicon, but I am trying to think of it in a wider context. For example, how does the "p" of Bp&p obtain its significance and how is it different from all other possible propositions.

Comp does not even assume that numbers are ontologically primitive. It just assumes that you agree with what has been taught to you in highschool (and the "yes doctor" act of faith).

Oh OK, then what is assumed to be ontologically primitive in your thinking? Your ontology theory seems to be a continuously mutating target... Is it ontologically neutral, ala Russell's neutral monism or not? I am trying to examine many possible ontological theories to see which works best with my metric being "explains the most with the least number of assumptions".

All scientific theories assume the numbers in this weak sense.

As they must to be said to be quantitatively predictive. But in philosophy we must consider more than just quantities, we need to examine qualitative relations and other organizational principles, just to start a very long list.

Numbers (or equivalent) become ontologically primitive only when we realize that the physical reality can no more be ontologically primitive. Indeed we have to assume at least one (Turing) universal entity. Which one is not relevant, except that we cannot use a "physical one" without taking the risk to loose the quanta/qualia distinction.

I agree, with your claim here. You have shown a sound argument as to how material monism is untenable as a ontological theory and have introduced a brilliant and sophisticated version of ideal monism. I critique it in the same way and for the same reason that I critique Berkeley's idealism. All forms of monistic ontologies suffer from incompleteness problems, in that there are always objects and processes that cannot be included for consistency reasons and must be hand waved away as "epiphenomena". It is for that reason that I argue for some form of rehabilitated dualism that does not have the epiphenomena problem. Leibniz proposed such an ontology but his idea had a problem of its own, which is, surprisingly, equivalent to a "many bodies problem": how it that the content of monads is coordinated and synchronized such that they appear internally to interact with each other without any actual "substance exchange" between them - "monads have no windows".

    COMP is an idealism, a beautiful fiction.

No, it is not. It can be false, and indeed my point is that we can experimentally refute it.

  Could you write up an example of such an experiment?

But it might be true. Joseph Knight is right, you can say that comp is true or false. The excluded middle can be applied in this highly classical theological theory. Comp just does not make sense in pure intuitionist philosophy, making such a philosopher forces to say "no" to the doctor, or to abandon momentarily intuitionist philosophy when in the hospital. We cannot construct provably our "3-I", we can only bet on them. "saying yes" to the doctor asks for a minimal amount of realism/platonism, but it is weaker than any physical realism, which, as you know, appears to be incompatible with the comp hypothesis.

I am distinguishing between theories as immaterial concepts of minds and the physical implementation of their objects and relations. Your example here, is of what actually happens in a physical and mental interaction between a patient seeking a brain hardware repalacement and a doctor with the skills and means to perform such a replacement. The patient must have a reasonable belief that the doctor is capable to performing such a procedure, which is a 3-p assumption as we are considering it, but what actually goes on "in the patient's head" is a 1-p. While the patient can be considered by us voyeuristic bystanders as making an informed decision that we can model as 3-p, as we can discuss among ourselves and within that particular discussion it is indeed a binary logical decision subject to "true or false" rules (excluded middle and bi-valence) but more generally, as we are discussing ontological theories here, there are more considerations involved that do not allow such a quick rule.

Comp is not proposed as a formal explanation of mind and matter. It is proposed as an hypothesis in cognitive science, which is really a theological belief akin to a form of reincarnation. The protocol assumes the doctor is choosing the right level of substitution, and that you will survive integrally. If we were allowing amnesia, we might accept other even stronger form of comp for which the excluded middle might no more be applicable, but this is not what we do to prove the reversal.

I understand that and am very interested in COMP for those (and other reasons). Please remember that I am a student (and thus not some expert) and I am asking questions because I am trying to understand the larger ramifications of COMP.

This is cheating since we have learned that one thing that Nature is not is biased about any framing, basis or mereology. Why Integers and not a large but finite field? Why not the P-adics? Why not the surreals?

Because comp is based on Church thesis which makes computation equivalent with (sigma_1) arithmetical proposition, roughly speaking. If the doctor uses a p-adic number system, by Church thesis, this will be equivalent to a standard arithmetical set-up. Nature *is* biased toward natural numbers (or equivalent) once you assume Church thesis. So if you assume comp, the good old natural numbers that everyone knows are quite good enough.

So would you agree that COMP is not specific to a particular Category of representational quantities? If it is biased toward some particular representation then it is not "truth", by definition.

Why not some form of non-standard numbers? Each of these sets have different properties and computational features, we should never be so anthropocentric to think that "Man is the measure of all things!",

But comp and computer science makes the Universal Turing Machine the measure of all things. We have no choice in that matter.

But this is just "not even wrong!"; UTMs do not define any kind of measure beyond that which is inherent in recursively enumerable functions (modulo isomorphisms). The many body problem requires considerations beyond that Category to find a solution as it is necessary, I claim, to model interactions that might not be faithfully represented in terms of recursively enumerable functions. Peter Wegner has written extensively <http://www.cs.brown.edu/%7Epw/>on this. You yourself have shown that there are problems that are not computable within COMP's implications and I need nothing more than your own result to show the proof of my claim. My personal problem is my disability to write up symbolic representations because of my dyslexia, but I try to work around this as best I can. If your complaint against me is that I am a pitiful agent to discuss these Ideas, then I plead guilty as charged, but does this prevent your consideration of the problems and Ideas themselves?

which is exactly what we are claiming when we say that "... our generalized brains ..." are this and that, such as what is implied by "...the latter is just a restatement of the former." The point is that we first need to dig a bit deeper and establish by natural mathematical means that 1) digital substitution is a sound mathematical concept and 2) that it is possible.

1) Yes, thanks to the notion of level, digital substitution is well defined, and sound (if the level is correctly chosen).

Yes, and this makes it "local" not "global" and thus is not consistent with a representation in Platonic terms.

2) That it is (in principle) possible *is* the comp assumption.

OK, but you are assuming more. You are assuming that computations have particular and definite properties merely because they are true, you are claiming implicitly that properties supervene on the soundness of the object having such properties. This is, I claim, equivalent to postulating the existence of a Universal Observer that can somehow percieve all UTM strings and define by fiat which are equivalent to which without having to actually implement all of them and doing the calculation of an infinite NP-Complete problem. Basically, I accuse you of claiming that not only P= NP but also that we do not even need to actually expend the physical resources to perform the computation of the Polynomial complete problem. This is simply a violation of the rule that "there is not such thing as a free lunch" as it allows for knowledge to occur without any work to gain it. Even God itself cannot perform a computation without actually implementing the computation in a physical form. It is because of this simple fact, I claim, that the physical world is both "real" and ontologically necessary, but it is not ontologically primitive. There is a difference here, it is the same kind of difference as between situations where "no implementation exists" and "no particular implementation is necessary".

So I ask again: Why are we putting our selves through such convoluted abstractions to talk about the simple idea of moving though space-time?

Because we are interested in the comp mind body problem. Not in physics, per se. But with comp, to solve the mind-body problem we are OBLIGED to explain all the space-time feature from the "block-mindscape", which is itself entirely structured by the +/* number structure. That is the result: a reduction of the mind-body problem to a well defined body problem in arithmetic/machine-theology. AUDA gives already the propositional solution. To extend it to the whole physics of qualia and quanta, you need to extend AUDA at the first order logical level, which is not simple.

If you read Pratt's paper carefully you would see that he points out that there is no mind-body problem, there is only the problem of minds (or bodies) interact with each other. There is no dichotomy or gap between mind and body as they are just dual aspects (via Stone duality) of the same basic and neutral monad. We can model interactions via residuation or quantum games and gossiping graph models but only in a finite and local sense. There is no global pre-established harmony.

At least try to understand my point here. I am trying to explain that there are things that numbers alone cannot do, they cannot count themselves. They cannot perform any form of activity, they are purely and perpetually static and fixed. Therefore any talk that involves any kind of activity or change is nonsense in COMP. Everything is assumed to occur simultaneously as if the speed of light where infinite, the laws of thermodynamics do not apply to information processing and there is no such thing as a space or time.

But this critics works for any theory which does not assume a primitive "real time" (and what would that mean?). Any physics with a notion of block universe is criticized by your argument. If you believe that there is a primitive time, then UDA should convince you not only that COMP is false, but quantum mechanics (without collapse) too, and general relativity too.

The "block universe" idea does not work. I am not the first to point this out. John Longley's paper <http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/jrl/Research/laplace1.pdf> here is a good example of a deep examination of the problems it has and David Albert's papers on non-narratability <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=8&ved=0CGAQFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Fphilosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu%2Ffaculty%2Fwuthrich%2FPhilPhys%2FAlbertDavid2008Man_PhysicsNarrative.pdf&ei=7tJoT-HfG4nVsgKx9OCSCQ&usg=AFQjCNFWQ2JIqmbYhDLblXorqf7VHF8xFA&sig2=5BIG5Ti0sDaJI3BwFHycdA> is another. This paper <http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0105013> is another discussion of what I am refering to. I could point out more if necessary. That idea is a stinky red herring. I have argued against any thing like "primitive time" as such requires a measure to exist and such a measure is of the same kind as the one that you are looking for. As Hitoshi Kitada has pointed out <http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0410061>, the non-existence of global measures does not preclude the existence of local measures of changing quantities, so we can in fact have "local" times and can discuss notions of time, but again, I claim that there is no such thing as primitive time. Your ontology denies the existence of change itself and therefor precludes any possibility of time. (I apologize for the links to papers, ut those are for you and others should they seek to visit the discussion of others on the subject.)

Personally I find that assuming notion like space and time answer nothing, and that is what motivated me in showing that comp implies that such notion cannot be used to explain our perception of time and space.

The fact that you have no answer to questions as to the emergence of local time and notions of spaces is my complaint. You refuse to look at how this is a problem in your thinking because you will never address the concurrency issue.

If we are going to invoke concepts of continuity and differential mapping into continuities then we had better know what we are talking about! Which infinity are you assuming? Are you assuming the continuum hypothesis of Cantor to be true of false? So many unanswered questions just being glossed over.

But those questions have not yet appear. They are premature, and more complex than the technical question we can already formulated. You seem to continue to think that comp is a theory/model that we can used to explain things. But comp is a (scientific, modest) theology, in which we can "believe", hope, or fear, and which makes just many fundamental question technically formulable. In particular it does answer the question "where does the universe come from?". The answer is, by the truth about addition and multiplication, and the technical details are accessible to any universal machines. You will ask: "where does addition and multiplication comes from". This, in the comp theory can be answered: we will never know, at least in any publicly communicable way. We already need the numbers to give sense to the question, and we can show that without assuming them (or equivalent) we cannot recover them.

We can only examine an ontology theory by its long range implications. This is why philosophers are so repudiated by most scientists as the ideas of philosophers are almost always empty of physical implications and can and should be ignored as "mental masturbation". Again I ask you, exactly how do we test for the truth of COMP? One simple test would be to do an actual Yes Doctor and replace a portion of living human's brain with "functionally" equivalent hardware and test for changes in qualia.



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