On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 10:11 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:
No, my critique is that you seem to not see a problem with the fact > that COMP shows that the physical world is epiphenomena and thus > unnecessary. I see this as denying the mere possibility of observational > falsification. AS I have said before, you seem to reason as if the your > chalkboard (as the one in your picture > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/courses/Saturday_20070602_LNash/t_blackboard_1.png) > does not really exist. If you say that the physical world does exist but > only as a collective hallucination or dream, but if I understand the Bp&p > concept correctly, this is not quite right as it makes the possibility of > relationship between bodies epiphenomena. Ummm, I need to understand the > role of the "Girard-Abramski like theory" with COMP. > Stephen, I am starting to think that you have fundamentally misunderstood the UDA. You have repeatedly voiced this misconception, that COMP implies that the physical world does not exist. It exists, but it is not fundamental. It is still phenomenal. I will respond to your other message shortly, and discuss the issue of communicability and the need for physical instantiation a little more. > > > > > > > which is exactly what we are claiming when we say that "... our > generalized brains ..." are this and that, such as what is implied by > "...the latter is just a restatement of the former." The point is that we > first need to dig a bit deeper and establish by natural mathematical means > that 1) digital substitution is a sound mathematical concept and 2) that it > is possible. > > > 1) Yes, thanks to the notion of level, digital substitution is well > defined, and sound (if the level is correctly chosen). > > > Yes, and this makes it "local" not "global" and thus is not consistent > with a representation in Platonic terms. > > > UDA shows the passage from local to global. Why and how it occurs. You > lost me. > > > Could you be more specific? Are you thinking of UDA3? But is this > global plurality not collapsed in UDA4 and UDA5? Let me be clear about what > I am thinking with regards to the words local and global. By "Global" I > mean pertaining to all of a collection of many from any kind of > partitioning on the collection. By "local" I mean pertaining to a > collection from only one partitioning of the collection. For example, in > physics, an effect is global if it is invariant to shifts from one point of > view to another, the potential of the electromagnetic field is a good > example. In physics, an effect is local if it vanishes when one shifts to a > different point of view. > > > > > 2) That it is (in principle) possible *is* the comp assumption. > > > OK, but you are assuming more. You are assuming that computations have > particular and definite properties merely because they are true, > > > "true" does not apply to computations, but to proposition. > > > This does not change the implication of what I wrote. You are still > thinking that mere existence defines properties. My claim is that this is > ontologically and epistemologically incoherent as it implies that the > difference of the properties that one object X has from the properties that > another object Y has follows merely from the existence of X and Y. How does > the mere existence of X and Y require that X and Y are different at all? > > > > > > you are claiming implicitly that properties supervene on the soundness > of the object having such properties. > > > > "sound" applies to "theories", not to object. > > > OK. So we say that if there is a sound theory of an object then the > object must exist? I am just trying to be sure I understand. > > > > > This is, I claim, equivalent to postulating the existence of a Universal > Observer that can somehow percieve all UTM strings and define by fiat which > are equivalent to which > > > You miss the 1-indeterminacy here. We don't need to know which > computations are equivalent or not, because we live them. > > > No, I was considering how you assume that properties follow from mere > existence. You are thinking of theories as constructions to define the > existence of an object, say a computation, and then forgetting that you > constructed the theory that implied the properties of the object so that > you can claim "look it exists and has properties completely independent of > me". This is just the logical conclusion of thinking that computations are > independent of the necessity of any physical implementation. This is one > piece of your thinking that upsets me, you are taking the universality > concept too far. > > > > > without having to actually implement all of them > > > by step 8. > > > Again, just because a computation does not require a particular > physical implementation does not make it independent of the need for at > least one implementation. To claim the contrary is equivalent to talking > about things that you cannot even indirectly name or describe. You have > effectively severed all possibility of contact between the Platonic realm > and the world of you and me here talking in this List. This is the sine > qua non <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sine_qua_non> failure of ideal > monism. I pointed this out make when we where discussing Maudlin's paper. > Russell Standish pointed this out > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/e5fd5e2ade68df99/965a5002a0727ec6?lnk=gst&q=maudlin#965a5002a0727ec6 > . > > "AFAICT, *Maudlin's* argument only works in a single universe setting. > What is inert in one universe, is alive and kicking in other universes for > which the counterfactuals are true. So it seems that COMP and single world, > deterministic, materialism are incompatible, but COMP and many worlds > materialism is not (ie supervenience across parallel worlds whose histories > are compatible with our present). But then the UDA shows that parallel > realities must occur, and consciousness must supervene across all > consistent histories, and that the subjective future is indeterminate. " > Then the substitution level was wrong at the start. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.