On 21 Mar 2012, at 17:40, Craig Weinberg wrote (partially).
It's not just 'we' but our entire participation in the world that is
assumed to be digitally interchangeable. A digitizable body can only
exist within a digitizable universe.
False. The exact contrary has been proved.
How has it been proved? How can we be ourselves without a world to
Sure. What has been proved is that if comp is true we can only be in a
non digitizable world.
Digital physics is non sense, except as tool for building approximate
Comp is not digital physics.
If you negate this, it means that
you assume the level to be "infinitely low",
No, it means I understand that your assumption that description can be
quantified is simplistic and inaccurate.
Description of my (generalized) brain. With your theory we have
zombie. But that's OK. remember that when we assume something, it does
not mean that we believe it is true. I am not interested in doing
Just as these words seem word-
like enough to us doesn't mean that they can't be revealed as generic
pixels on closer inspection. There is no universal level of
description, it is entirely relative to the sensory capacities of the
audience - the qualitative capacities, not just the quantitative
You are talking in another theory. I work in the theory comp, that's
Read the paper to convince you that I do not put the 1p under the rug.
You stop at step zero. It is your right.
so that you need to
introduce actual infinity and non computability of all levels. It is
your right, but you fail to present a theory of this.
That has been your knock on me the whole time, but you aren't seeing
that my position is an order of magnitude more radical than that. I am
saying that finite and infinite qualities are not relevant at all. Not
even a little bit.
The uniqueness of the self and the indeterminacy of 1p are important
but nearly irrelevant compared to the presentational-participatory
aspects. It's not just that we feel different from other people or
that we can't predict how living things behave as well as we might
chemical or physical reactions. It makes sense that we would seize on
these aspects as important because we can work with them
arithmetically; they are the most quantitative functions of the self.
These are only the flattened shadows of selfness though. They mention
of the self but they don't actually use it. A picture of a bell, a
printout of a song, etc. That we feel unique or free is nothing
compared to the reality that we feel at all. This is the sticking
point. If we had reason to believe that programs or furniture could be
coaxed into feeling in the first place, we would not be having this
discussion. We would be talking instead about whether it is moral to
turn off our computers or to replace them when we get tired of them.
Comp exports inorganic naive realism to a
universal level and builds from there.
In particular it does
answer the question "where does the universe come from?". The
is, by the truth about addition and multiplication, and the
details are accessible to any universal machines.
You will ask: "where does addition and multiplication comes
This, in the comp theory can be answered: we will never know, at
in any publicly communicable way.
Why add the extra step of addition and multiplication?
To get a Turing complete ontology.
What does it further us though to have a Turing complete ontology
relate to the question in the first place? Instead of trying to make
it answer 'where does the universe come from?', why not 'where does
computing come from'?
Because it is provable that computing exists once the addition and
multiplication laws are assumed. Indeed computation has been
I have no problem with that, but what does that have to do with
computing becoming the universe?
Study the sane04 paper. Or search in the archive. It is a consequence
of comp that physics emerge from the way numbers can bet on
arithmetical relations. It is not entirely obvious.
The deus ex
mysterium of the latter answer nullifies any value of the former
answer, which now becomes:
"where does the universe come from?"
"we will never know, at least in any publicly communicable way. "
For the universe of number, or arithmetical truth, you are right.
But the rest becomes explainable for that, as interfering numbers
dreams, which are defined by sequences and subsequences of
arithmetic, or the UD*.
It seems to me that the idea of numbers dreams is a plug for the
gaping rift between the two. If we have numbers, we don't need
I can unplug the monitor and sound card of my computer and all
programs will function without them. Why would the programs (even uber
sophisticated meta programs) need to dream?
They don't need to dream. But they can (trivially with comp that I
assume all the time). Physics appears because deep linear dreams are
shared by relatively persistent universal numbers.
and if we have dreams we don't need numbers.
If our lives are being dreamed by Platonic universal principles, why
do we want to turn them into dust by seeking out the dreamers?
Because we are curious.
To me they have to be two
poles of a single continuum, neither of which can be explained in
terms of the other or expressed in terms other than their own.
Somewhere between the complete failure to answer universal
and the certainty of arithmetic lies the really important
I have no certainty. You are introducing it.
Isn't certainty what addition and multiplication are all about?
No, it is just a logical consequence.
Logic is also about certainty.
It is about relations between beliefs. The "certainty" is in the
sharable deduction, not in the content of the statements.
OK, I have few doubt that "17 is prime", or that phi_i(j) stops or
does not stops.
It's a distraction to insert arithmetic in the first place when it
could just as easily be the case that the universal colors and
give rise to the universe.
You abstract from the fact that with comp, all what is shown in
is that we *have to* explain how odor, color and physical realties
No, we can just say that " we will never know, at least in any
publicly communicable way". Once we have the primitives of odor and
color, we can arrive at arithmetic through chemistry and biology.
Those are not assumed, but have to be explained. That's the point.
I'm assuming them though. As you assume addition and multiplication, I
could assume odor and color and go from there.
Except that addition is far simpler than a notion of odor and color.
We need a big human brain to get easily the human color. It is simpler
to agree on the simple laws that I show in my post to Stephen. You
assume what I want to explain. You could say as well that the reason
why there is a moon, is that when we look at it we see it.
I could say arithmetic
is part of the dream of universal qualia.
Everybody agree and grasp arithmetic. for "qualia" I regularly met
people who don't grasp the notion.
All digital patterns could
be reduced to stereo distinctions of simpler whole qualia into which
complexity is injected as an afterthought.
Please do it.
We already need the numbers to give
sense to the question, and we can show that without assuming them
equivalent) we cannot recover them.
What sense do numbers give to the question?
With comp humans are examples of relative numbers, so you can take
sense *you* give to the question as an example.
I can already do that without numbers though. I don't see why
Because you assume non-comp and all the answers (on consciousness,
matter, ...) at the start.
I don't assume non-comp, I assumed comp for many years until I
eventually saw reason to stop assuming it.
All the reason you gave are more related to the reductionist
conception of nulbers and machine, which can no more be sustained
after Gödel's and Turing's discoveries.
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