On Mar 21, 3:23 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 21 Mar 2012, at 17:40, Craig Weinberg wrote (partially). > > > > >>> It's not just 'we' but our entire participation in the world that is > >>> assumed to be digitally interchangeable. A digitizable body can only > >>> exist within a digitizable universe. > > >> False. The exact contrary has been proved. > > > How has it been proved? How can we be ourselves without a world to > > exist in? > > Sure. What has been proved is that if comp is true we can only be in a > non digitizable world. > Digital physics is non sense, except as tool for building approximate > theory. > Comp is not digital physics.
How does a digital artificial intelligence make sense of it's world without converting or sampling every truth about that world available to it into digital? > > > > >> If you negate this, it means that > >> you assume the level to be "infinitely low", > > > No, it means I understand that your assumption that description can be > > quantified is simplistic and inaccurate. > > Description of my (generalized) brain. With your theory we have > zombie. Never zombie, only puppet. Zombie is like calling water 'wet fire'. > But that's OK. remember that when we assume something, it does > not mean that we believe it is true. I am not interested in doing > philosophy. > > > Just as these words seem word- > > like enough to us doesn't mean that they can't be revealed as generic > > pixels on closer inspection. There is no universal level of > > description, it is entirely relative to the sensory capacities of the > > audience - the qualitative capacities, not just the quantitative > > resolution. > > You are talking in another theory. I work in the theory comp, that's > all. > Read the paper to convince you that I do not put the 1p under the rug. It's not under the rug, it is showing the bottom of the rug and saying it's the floor. > > You stop at step zero. It is your right. > > > > > > > > > > > > >> so that you need to > >> introduce actual infinity and non computability of all levels. It is > >> your right, but you fail to present a theory of this. > > > That has been your knock on me the whole time, but you aren't seeing > > that my position is an order of magnitude more radical than that. I am > > saying that finite and infinite qualities are not relevant at all. Not > > even a little bit. > > > The uniqueness of the self and the indeterminacy of 1p are important > > but nearly irrelevant compared to the presentational-participatory > > aspects. It's not just that we feel different from other people or > > that we can't predict how living things behave as well as we might > > chemical or physical reactions. It makes sense that we would seize on > > these aspects as important because we can work with them > > arithmetically; they are the most quantitative functions of the self. > > > These are only the flattened shadows of selfness though. They mention > > of the self but they don't actually use it. A picture of a bell, a > > printout of a song, etc. That we feel unique or free is nothing > > compared to the reality that we feel at all. This is the sticking > > point. If we had reason to believe that programs or furniture could be > > coaxed into feeling in the first place, we would not be having this > > discussion. We would be talking instead about whether it is moral to > > turn off our computers or to replace them when we get tired of them. > > Nice. > > > > > > > > > > > > >>> Comp exports inorganic naive realism to a > >>> universal level and builds from there. > > >>>>>> In particular it does > >>>>>> answer the question "where does the universe come from?". The > >>>>>> answer > >>>>>> is, by the truth about addition and multiplication, and the > >>>>>> technical > >>>>>> details are accessible to any universal machines. > >>>>>> You will ask: "where does addition and multiplication comes > >>>>>> from". > >>>>>> This, in the comp theory can be answered: we will never know, at > >>>>>> least > >>>>>> in any publicly communicable way. > > >>>>> Why add the extra step of addition and multiplication? > > >>>> To get a Turing complete ontology. > > >>> What does it further us though to have a Turing complete ontology > >>> relate to the question in the first place? Instead of trying to make > >>> it answer 'where does the universe come from?', why not 'where does > >>> computing come from'? > > >> Because it is provable that computing exists once the addition and > >> multiplication laws are assumed. Indeed computation has been > >> discovered there. > > > I have no problem with that, but what does that have to do with > > computing becoming the universe? > > Study the sane04 paper. Or search in the archive. It is a consequence > of comp that physics emerge from the way numbers can bet on > arithmetical relations. It is not entirely obvious. I don't have a problem with physics emerging from comp, I have a problem with consciousness emerging from either one. > > > > > > > > > > > > >>>>> The deus ex > >>>>> mysterium of the latter answer nullifies any value of the former > >>>>> answer, which now becomes: > > >>>>> "where does the universe come from?" > >>>>> "we will never know, at least in any publicly communicable way. " > > >>>> For the universe of number, or arithmetical truth, you are right. > > >>>> But the rest becomes explainable for that, as interfering numbers > >>>> dreams, which are defined by sequences and subsequences of > >>>> numbers in > >>>> arithmetic, or the UD*. > > >>> It seems to me that the idea of numbers dreams is a plug for the > >>> gaping rift between the two. If we have numbers, we don't need > >>> dreams, > > >> ? > > > I can unplug the monitor and sound card of my computer and all > > programs will function without them. Why would the programs (even uber > > sophisticated meta programs) need to dream? > > They don't need to dream. But they can (trivially with comp that I > assume all the time). Physics appears because deep linear dreams are > shared by relatively persistent universal numbers. Couldn't physics still theoretically appear without anything dreaming anything? Isn't that the point of physics, to explain the world as a structured relation which makes sense entirely in physical terms? > > > > >>> and if we have dreams we don't need numbers. > > >> ? > > > If our lives are being dreamed by Platonic universal principles, why > > do we want to turn them into dust by seeking out the dreamers? > > Because we are curious. In Comp that can make sense that we would be curious about what can only reveal our own lives meaningless data. In a sense realism, we are only likely to be curious because on some level we already know that comp is just another new dimension of meaning to explore and create in. We know, on some level, that we don't really have to worry about computers coming to life or developing feelings. > > > > > > > > > > > > >>> To me they have to be two > >>> poles of a single continuum, neither of which can be explained in > >>> terms of the other or expressed in terms other than their own. > > >>>>> Somewhere between the complete failure to answer universal > >>>>> questions > >>>>> and the certainty of arithmetic lies the really important > >>>>> questions. > > >>>> I have no certainty. You are introducing it. > > >>> Isn't certainty what addition and multiplication are all about? > > >> No, it is just a logical consequence. > > > Logic is also about certainty. > > It is about relations between beliefs. The "certainty" is in the > sharable deduction, not in the content of the statements. Isn't all certainty in the sharable deduction? > > > > > > > > > > > > >>>> OK, I have few doubt that "17 is prime", or that phi_i(j) stops or > >>>> does not stops. > > >>>>> It's a distraction to insert arithmetic in the first place when it > >>>>> could just as easily be the case that the universal colors and > >>>>> odors > >>>>> give rise to the universe. > > >>>> You abstract from the fact that with comp, all what is shown in > >>>> UDA, > >>>> is that we *have to* explain how odor, color and physical realties > >>>> emerge. > > >>> No, we can just say that " we will never know, at least in any > >>> publicly communicable way". Once we have the primitives of odor and > >>> color, we can arrive at arithmetic through chemistry and biology. > > >> Those are not assumed, but have to be explained. That's the point. > > > I'm assuming them though. As you assume addition and multiplication, I > > could assume odor and color and go from there. > > Except that addition is far simpler than a notion of odor and color. Tell that to a two year old. > We need a big human brain to get easily the human color. How do you know that the color we see isn't what the molecules in a cone cell see? > It is simpler > to agree on the simple laws that I show in my post to Stephen. You > assume what I want to explain. You could say as well that the reason > why there is a moon, is that when we look at it we see it. I would never say that the moon is there for us to see, only that the 'thereness' of the moon only exists as a function of things being similar enough to the moon to detect it but dissimilar enough not to be it. In the words of Ernst Mach (http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1259/1/ MachContributionToInertia.pdf): “the sensations are not representations of things, but on the contrary a thing is a mental representation of a set of relatively stable sensations” Mach E., Die Prinzipien der W¨armelehre historisch-kritisch dargestellt (Lipsia) 1896 I would make a couple of small but important changes: “a thing is THE mental PRESENTATION of a set of relatively stable sensations.” > > > I could say arithmetic > > is part of the dream of universal qualia. > > Everybody agree and grasp arithmetic. for "qualia" I regularly met > people who don't grasp the notion. That's what makes qualia the counter-intuitive universal truth. Of course we don't readily grasp ourselves in the world since the world is the reflection of exactly what we are not, not what we are. > > > All digital patterns could > > be reduced to stereo distinctions of simpler whole qualia into which > > complexity is injected as an afterthought. > > Please do it. 1 = feeling of flow 0 = feeling of holding back done > > > > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> We already need the numbers to give > >>>>>> sense to the question, and we can show that without assuming them > >>>>>> (or > >>>>>> equivalent) we cannot recover them. > > >>>>> What sense do numbers give to the question? > > >>>> With comp humans are examples of relative numbers, so you can take > >>>> the > >>>> sense *you* give to the question as an example. > > >>> I can already do that without numbers though. I don't see why > >>> numbers > >>> would help. > > >> Because you assume non-comp and all the answers (on consciousness, > >> matter, ...) at the start. > > > I don't assume non-comp, I assumed comp for many years until I > > eventually saw reason to stop assuming it. > > All the reason you gave are more related to the reductionist > conception of nulbers and machine, which can no more be sustained > after Gödel's and Turing's discoveries. I don't pretend to understand Gödel's and Turing's discoveries as you do or as even a casual math enthusiast does, but I don't think I misunderstand them. I don't share your interpretation that incompleteness proves the boundless fertility of arithmetic truth, I think it proves the reverse, that all arithmetic logics are limited and incapable of justifying their own axioms, therefore impossible to ground fundamental universal principles. Is there any relevant point of Gödel's and Turing's work that you can tell me about in layman's terms that you think would change my position if I understood it? I think that you think I underestimate the capacity of Universal Machines, but I think that is not the case at all. I am fully prepared to see Turing based logic emulate everything from Jello pudding to sex slaves eventually, but I don't think any of it will be really real, even to us. They will always be CGI churn because they aren't grounded in the overall narrative of the cosmos. They have no unified matter-energy-sense-motive-time-space address, just assemblies of objects that are forever strangers to each other. Craig I like 'nulbers' -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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