On 3/22/2012 1:31 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Mar 21, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be 
<mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:

        >> This illustrates the problem I have with your ideas, it's not your
        mathematics it's the assumption you make right at the start which is the
        foundation for everything else.


    > Which assumption?


Your assumption that if a identical copy of you is made everything may seen identical to a third party but to itself, to the copy and the original, they would somehow have different viewpoints even if everything they saw was the same and they remained identical. I think that is just plain wrong. Lately you seem to be equivocating somewhat on this point and everybody has a right to change their mind, but if you do then you'll have to rewrite your proof from page 1 because that assumption was important.

    > Those admit precise and simple definition, related to the duplication and
    multiplication thought experience.
    First person = content of a diary bring in the duplication devices.


OK, but the original and the copy will both write in their diaries "I walked into the duplicating chamber, the machine was turned on and a copy of me appeared right in front of me face to face", the copy and the original agree on what occurred, so according to you the first person perspective, the one that both you and I believe is most important, is identical; so there is only one perspective, one consciousness.

I don't think Bruno disagreed with this. I know I didn't. The one consciousness only becomes two when there is something different - in the perception of the outside (Washington vs Moscow) or some random internal change. Your thought experiment shows that comp implies that persons bodies can be duplicated without duplicating their consciousness (at least for a moment or two). But as I said I don't see that this invalidates Bruno's argument which I take to be that quantum uncertainty can be modeled by uncertainty in personal identity.


    > Third person = content of a diary of an external observers.


OK, but the third person observer will write in his diary "the original walked into the duplicating chamber, the machine was turned on and a copy of him appeared right in front of him face to face", the third person agrees on what happened with the first person, he agrees with both the copy and the original.

    > First person plural = content of the diaries of a collection of person 
duplicated
    together.


I don't see the point of this one because according to you (and me too) if the viewpoint is identical then the consciousness of all of them is identical, so the word "plural" serves no purpose and just creates confusion.

        >>but you can't give a scrap of evidence that such differences actually 
exist,


    >Just look at the content of the diaries.


I did, if they say the same thing then their consciousness is identical from their viewpoint and my viewpoint and your viewpoint and the Easter Bunny's viewpoint and ANY viewpoint; and if the diaries are different then they are different people from ANY viewpoint.

But they are not different people from Everett's relative state viewpoint. In that view they are the same person who has just made different observations. I agree that is just a semantic difference about what it means to 'be the same person'. But so far as modeling quantum uncertainty one could as well say observing a quantum event produces a different person and the John C. Clark who's reading this is just one of many different John C. Clarks who happens to share my macroscopic world for the time being.


    > It contains statements like "I predict that I will feel to be in W or in 
M, I am
    in M, so I win", pr "I predict that I will see Flying circus, but I see 
nothing
    recognizable, so I fail", etc.


If the purpose of all this "predict" stuff is to find a clear continuous path that establishes what is meant by "I" then it's like pushing on a string, you're doing it backwards, you've got to do it from the present to the past not from the present to the future. Looking back the Washington man remembers being the Helsinki man so they both are part of the same I, and the Moscow man remembers being the Helsinki man so they both are part of the same I, but the Moscow man does not remember being the Washington man so they are not part of the same I.

    > I have no real clue what you are talking about.


I could be wrong but I have a hunch you do have a clue what I'm talking about but you're trying to convince yourself that you do not.

    > If the guy annihilated die, then he would say that P(M) = P(W) = 1/2, and 
there
    would be no 1-indeterminacy.


First of all you seem to make a distinction between dying and being annihilated that I do not understand, and second, if either of those things had happened to you you wouldn't be making any predictions, you wouldn't be saying anything at all.

Not between dying and being annihilated, between dying and being encoded+annihilated+reconstituted.

Brent


  John K Clark



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