On Mar 22, 11:47 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 22 Mar 2012, at 03:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > On Mar 21, 3:23 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 21 Mar 2012, at 17:40, Craig Weinberg wrote (partially).
> >>>>> It's not just 'we' but our entire participation in the world
> >>>>> that is
> >>>>> assumed to be digitally interchangeable. A digitizable body can
> >>>>> only
> >>>>> exist within a digitizable universe.
> >>>> False. The exact contrary has been proved.
> >>> How has it been proved? How can we be ourselves without a world to
> >>> exist in?
> >> Sure. What has been proved is that if comp is true we can only be
> >> in a
> >> non digitizable world.
> >> Digital physics is non sense, except as tool for building approximate
> >> theory.
> >> Comp is not digital physics.
> > How does a digital artificial intelligence make sense of it's world
> > without converting or sampling every truth about that world available
> > to it into digital?
> First, the fact that the digital machine converts "truth about the
> world" into digital, does not make that world digital.

Which world, the one being converted or the one that has been

> UDA explains
> why the contrary occurs, through the first person indeterminacy
> bearing on a very huge and complex arithmetical reality.

Why does hugeness, complexity, first person, or indeterminacy affect
whether something is digital or not?

> Second, the first person impression of the machine might be (and is
> necessarily, once you accept Theaetetus' insight) a non digitalizable
> truth, from the machine point of view.

Which of Theaetetus' insight do you mean?

To me speculating that a machine has a first person impression is just
a way to plug the problem. Since subjectivity doesn't make sense
mechanically or digitally, we'll say it's non digital and hang a
Mission Accomplished sign. It takes advantage of the privacy and
ineffability of subjectivity to misrepresent its absence as possible
presence, even though our experience with machines thus far has not
supported any presence at all.

> That is actually the case,
> because the impression of the machine is a conjunct of both a
> digitalizable belief and (some) truth, with the greek's suggested
> notion of knowledge.

beliefs, truths, knowledge...these are abstractions to me. Tertiary
level commentaries on experience which barely exist. Important, sure,
but lacking in any power to initiate direct action. Which is maybe why
a machine has no such power.

> >>>> If you negate this, it means that
> >>>> you assume the level to be "infinitely low",
> >>> No, it means I understand that your assumption that description
> >>> can be
> >>> quantified is simplistic and inaccurate.
> >> Description of my (generalized) brain. With your theory we have
> >> zombie.
> > Never zombie, only puppet. Zombie is like calling water 'wet fire'.
> I don't think so. With the Heisenberg Matrix of the Milky way, no-one
> would be able to distinguish me or you from the behavior of the entity
> simulated. If comp is false, those entity who behaves "exactly" like
> you or me, are not conscious, and so they are by definition p-zombie.

The word zombie privileges the expectation of consciousness, while the
word puppet does not. The fact that the Heisenberg Matrix of the Milky
way fails completely in detecting consciousness does not mean that the
simulations it takes for genuine are missing something that they
should have.

That they are simulations in the first place means that we intend them
to resemble something that they are not. I make a witch's head out of
a shrunken apple - that is a simulation of a witch; a puppet of a
witch. It isn't an actual witch that has been rendered a zombie. It
freaks me out that I keep having to explain this, it seems stunningly
obvious to me. I draw a dog on a paper bag, is it now a dog zombie?

The deeper insight here of course is that simulation relates only to
the intended audience. It looks like a witch or a dog only to us. It's
a text. It's symbols are not grounded in the firmament of the cosmos
like matter or biology, they are only suggestions that help 'us'
fabricate a fictional association for ourselves.

> >> Study the sane04 paper.  Or search in the archive. It is a
> >> consequence
> >> of comp that physics emerge from the way numbers can bet on
> >> arithmetical relations. It is not entirely obvious.
> > I don't have a problem with physics emerging from comp, I have a
> > problem with consciousness emerging from either one.
> I understand.
> This is related with the fact that we can explain why consciousness is
> not entirely explainable by the machine.
> The machine also find hard to believe that consciousness "emerge" from
> arithmetical truth. But she cannot accept this because she can
> understand the necessary transcendent aspect of any notion of truth
> encompassing the truth about herself.

It sounds like you mean that machines can tell what is true about
themselves so they can't accept that there is an external source of
all truth. That makes a little sense, but I have no problem accepting
that there could or could not be an external source of all truth, I
just don't see why it would be arithmetic in either case.

> What might help you is the idea that with comp, contrary to the
> (contradictory) belief that consciousness is a natural product of some
> physical activity, consciousness is an atemporal global feature of the
> arithmetical truth. Machine does not produce consciousness, they
> borrow it to the truth. With comp, there is a sense to say that only
> God is conscious, but to manifest itself relatively to machines, he
> has to be amnesic to who he is. Nature invented the brain, not to make
> machines conscious, but to make them amnesic to their true identity.
> If not, the prey would not mind escaping the predator, and life could
> not evolve.

I don't have a problem with any of that, but why would it be only
arithmetic and not multisensory?

> >> They don't need to dream. But they can (trivially with comp that I
> >> assume all the time). Physics appears because deep linear dreams are
> >> shared by relatively persistent universal numbers.
> > Couldn't physics still theoretically appear without anything dreaming
> > anything? Isn't that the point of physics, to explain the world as a
> > structured relation which makes sense entirely in physical terms?
> That's is very natural to believe. Somehow we are programmed to
> believe this.

My view explains the 'Somehow'. Symmetry makes us see the universe on
one level as that which we are not.

> But it is false in the comp theory, as the UDA
> explains, and as most mystics seems to grasp from introspection.

Yes, it is false in one sense, but it is also true in another - hence
the 'Somehow'.

> Note that this makes also possible to explain the physical in a non
> circular way, that is without assuming the physical.

Yes, but  it only explains it in a deeper but still just as circular

> This is counter-intuitive, and has to be counter-intuitive. We are not
> programmed to believe this, quite the contrary, as suggested by the
> above remark.
> >>>>> and if we have dreams we don't need numbers.
> >>>> ?
> >>> If our lives are being dreamed by Platonic universal principles, why
> >>> do we want to turn them into dust by seeking out the dreamers?
> >> Because we are curious.
> > In Comp that can make sense that we would be curious about what can
> > only reveal our own lives meaningless data. In a sense realism, we are
> > only likely to be curious because on some level we already know that
> > comp is just another new dimension of meaning to explore and create
> > in. We know, on some level, that we don't really have to worry about
> > computers coming to life or developing feelings.
> There is nothing to worry indeed. About machines coming to life. They
> will treat us as we treat them.

Not worry about them being hostile, I mean worry about it ever coming
to pass that any machine ever comes to life at all - ie develops
intention and self interest. I'm saying that deep inside, we know that
is not possible in reality.

> We can worry only about ourselves.
> Brains and universal numbers are relative dynamical mirror. If we fear
> them, they will fear us, and that can lead to a diabolical vicious
> circle. This is true also in between humans.

Is there a mathematical proof that addresses fear of universal

> >>>>> To me they have to be two
> >>>>> poles of a single continuum, neither of which can be explained in
> >>>>> terms of the other or expressed in terms other than their own.
> >>>>>>> Somewhere between the complete failure to answer universal
> >>>>>>> questions
> >>>>>>> and the certainty of arithmetic lies the really important
> >>>>>>> questions.
> >>>>>> I have no certainty. You are introducing it.
> >>>>> Isn't certainty what addition and multiplication are all about?
> >>>> No, it is just a logical consequence.
> >>> Logic is also about certainty.
> >> It is about relations between beliefs. The "certainty" is in the
> >> sharable deduction, not in the content of the statements.
> > Isn't all certainty in the sharable deduction?
> Not really, because the "real feeling of certainty" comes from the
> first person experience.

But isn't the content of that feeling all about transcending or
sharing beyond first person experience?

> But the publicly communicable certainty is
> only in the sharable deduction, because the first person experience is
> just not publicly sharable.
> To communicate the 1-truth would be like trying to communicate that
> "in reality you are the one having been reconstituted in Washington,
> which is either a trivial 3p statement for your interlocutor, or a
> sort of delusion as the doppelganger in Moscow can understand (because
> *he* lives the delusion of being "in reality" the guy in Moscow). This
> can explain the frustration we can have about communicating that we
> are what we are. That's a 3-tautology, lived as an incredible non
> tautological 1-experience. But then this can give rise to deep poem
> and music.

You don't have to communicate the 1-truth, you communicate a 3-symbol
and the audience shares your reflected 1-truth as their own locally
isomorphic 1-truth.

> >>> I'm assuming them though. As you assume addition and
> >>> multiplication, I
> >>> could assume odor and color and go from there.
> >> Except that addition is far simpler than a notion of odor and color.
> > Tell that to a two year old.
> It is 3-simpler. A simple abacus can illustrate the point. The odor is
> only 1-simpler, for the owner of a sophisticate universal machine-
> brain. Here I was using "simple" in the usual 3p sense. "1+5 = 6" is
> simpler than the universal machinery to get the smell of something.

That's not comparing apples to apples though. The universal machinery
to get the smell may be incredibly primitive, while for something to
actually understand that 1+5 = 6 (rather than to simply be embody it)
may require some kind of a brain. The abacus doesn't know that 1+5 =
6. It doesn't even know + or =. It only knows xxoooxxxx. Same as a
computer. Odor could go all the way down to quarks for all we know.

> >> We need a big human brain to get easily the human color.
> > How do you know that the color we see isn't what the molecules in a
> > cone cell see?
> I think this is not plausible from what we can believe about brain.
> But even if true, a molecule is by itself a very complex object/
> notion, far more complex than natural numbers.

We don't know that natural numbers exist independently of the totality
of arithmetic or consciousness. That is far more complex than a

> >> It is simpler
> >> to agree on the simple laws that I show in my post to Stephen. You
> >> assume what I want to explain. You could say as well that the reason
> >> why there is a moon, is that when we look at it we see it.
> > I would never say that the moon is there for us to see, only that the
> > 'thereness' of the moon only exists as a function of things being
> > similar enough to the moon to detect it but dissimilar enough not to
> > be it.
> > In the words of Ernst Mach (http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1259/1/
> > MachContributionToInertia.pdf):
> >    “the sensations are not representations of things, but on the
> > contrary
> >    a thing is a mental representation of a set of relatively stable
> > sensations”
> >    Mach E., Die Prinzipien der W¨armelehre historisch-kritisch
> > dargestellt (Lipsia) 1896
> > I would make a couple of small but important changes:
> > “a thing is THE mental PRESENTATION of a set of relatively stable
> > sensations.”
> I am OK, up to the vagueness present.
> Comp leads in that direction too.

It shouldn't be vague. I think any vagueness comes from comp being
insensitive to the universally obvious.

> >>> I could say arithmetic
> >>> is part of the dream of universal qualia.
> >> Everybody agree and grasp arithmetic. for "qualia" I regularly met
> >> people who don't grasp the notion.
> > That's what makes qualia the counter-intuitive universal truth.
> This contradicts the intuitive nature of qualia, that both you and I
> agree already on.

The referent of qualia is intuitive, but the notion of it is, as you
agreed, not grasped by most (counter-intuitive).

> We just interpret it differently, which is normal given that we work
> in different theories.
> > Of
> > course we don't readily grasp ourselves in the world since the world
> > is the reflection of exactly what we are not, not what we are.
> >>> All digital patterns could
> >>> be reduced to stereo distinctions of simpler whole qualia into which
> >>> complexity is injected as an afterthought.
> >> Please do it.
> > 1 = feeling of flow
> > 0 = feeling of holding back
> > done
> Hmm...

1 = actively assert
0 = passively allow

> >>> I don't assume non-comp, I assumed comp for many years until I
> >>> eventually saw reason to stop assuming it.
> >> All the reason you gave are more related to the reductionist
> >> conception of nulbers and machine, which can no more be sustained
> >> after Gödel's and Turing's discoveries.
> > I don't pretend to understand Gödel's and Turing's discoveries as you
> > do or as even a casual math enthusiast does, but I don't think I
> > misunderstand them. I don't share your interpretation that
> > incompleteness proves the boundless fertility of arithmetic truth, I
> > think it proves the reverse, that all arithmetic logics are limited
> > and incapable of justifying their own axioms, therefore impossible to
> > ground fundamental universal principles.
> > Is there any relevant point of Gödel's and Turing's work that you can
> > tell me about in layman's terms that you think would change my
> > position if I understood it? I think that you think I underestimate
> > the capacity of Universal Machines, but I think that is not the case
> > at all. I am fully prepared to see Turing based logic emulate
> > everything from Jello pudding to sex slaves eventually, but I don't
> > think any of it will be really real, even to us. They will always be
> > CGI churn because they aren't grounded in the overall narrative of the
> > cosmos. They have no unified matter-energy-sense-motive-time-space
> > address, just assemblies of objects that are forever strangers to each
> > other.
> You are right that Gödel's incompleteness shows the limitations of the
> finite entities (logic, machine) with respect to truth. But machines
> can prove their own incompleteness theorem and learn to overcome their
> limitations, and accept the price of it, giving them the possibility
> for some courage and grandeur.

Are you saying that a particular enactment of a machine can be more
courageous than another identical machine? Can a program running on my
computer do something that the same program running on a different but
identical computer lacks the courage to do?

> You don't convince me that unified matter-energy-sense-motive-time-
> space even exists, nor even that it makes sense, and still less that
> something like that would be necessary for consciousness.

See if this new metaphor I posted today helps:

Lights - Camera - Action!

Corresponding to the Who and Why, "Lights" direct attention as they
enable access to the content of attention. Light is sense and motive.

"Camera" is the What and How of motion picture production. It is the
objective vehicle or body with an entirely non-directorial
cinematographic mechanism. The camera doesn’t care what the film looks
like. Camera is matter and energy; sense and motive seen from the
outside looking back in.

"Action!" is the When and Where. It is the coming together of
cinematic subjects and objects in a syncretic tableau that is unique
and unrepeatable. It is the LIVE ACTION Mise-en-scène which is
recorded for later use as a vicarious sense experience to the camera’s

> It looks to much like a prejudice against them, or a feeling of
> superiority from your part.

Not at all. That's the funny part. I'm much more a fan of computers
than human beings. I have no emotional attachment one way or the other
to comp, but I do have an emotional attachment to my understanding of
why comp cannot be true.

> I don't think either that we can ground any fundamental universal
> principle in a manner such that we feel them as truth. They can only
> be a sort of hope or bet, and we might find better one by listening to
> others and looking into the unknown. The rest seems to me like wishful
> thinking or pseudo-religion. It is marmalade to hide the pill. It
> seems to me.

That's exactly the way it has to look from the comp-favoring (or
"Camera"-favoring, if you prefer) perspective. Comp seems like a
wishful thinking or pseudo-religion to me too. How could it not?


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