On 3/23/2012 6:47 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: *Joseph Knight* <joseph.9...@gmail.com
Date: Fri, Mar 23, 2012 at 5:45 PM
Subject: Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
To: Joseph Knight <joseph.9...@gmail.com <mailto:joseph.9...@gmail.com>>
Sorry Stephen, I had not finished my reply to your message when I
accidently hit "Send" (and then got swept away to do other things).
Here's the rest of my response.
On Mar 23, 2012, at 2:44 PM, Joseph Knight <joseph.9...@gmail.com
A pre-ordained harmony is, by definition, a global regime. I
am quite happy with the fact that you point out here, that
"arithmetical truth is independent of a particular
instantiation". I am arguing against independence _of all
I know. But I think that the fact that arithmetical truth is
independent of _particular instantiations_ already implies that
the truth "1+1=2", say, exists independently of _all
instantiations_ (here "instantiation" means "physical
instantiation", as I'm sure you mean as well.) In other words,
it exists "Platonically".
OK, but it seems to me that making this jump from
"independent of any particular" to "independent of all
particulars" is a leap too far as it is, as the religious would
say, an act of blind faith.
I think the opposite is true: it's a bizarre and unjustified belief to
think that there is nothing more than particulars.
Let us reason a bit about this belief. I think that it is very much
justified simply because if one cannot name an object then statements
about its truth or existence cannot be communicated. If a true statement
about something cannot be communicated, is it really a truth? I assume,
perhaps wrongly, that if an object can be named than it is, by
definition, a "particular". Therefore, by Bp&p -> p, believing in a
statement and that statement is true obliges me to only believe in
particulars. Now your comment might be restated as "it is bizarre and
unjustified to think that existence (or there is nothing more) is
nothing more than that which can be named". Would you still believe the
statement? I am merely trying to be consistent with Bruno's thesis.
You refer to Pratt's work. It seems like an interesting
metaphor, but I don't see how it solves the problem. Could
you be more explicit? The "rational mechanics" paper takes,
IMO, some odd and unjustified leaps when it comes to his
definitions. (An example: he says that the categories SET
and SET^OP "represent respectively the physical and the
Did you read the entire paper? He does explain this on
page 4 for example using functions and antifunctions... The
key is to not think of bodies and minds as "things" but as
processes. Pratt is considering a "process dualism", not a
"substance dualism" as he points out that the notion of
substance is the fatal flaw of Descartes' program. I was
originally looking at Leibniz' Monadology in my study of the
mind body problem and found a similar solution, but such
required a rehabilitation of Leibniz' "pre-established
harmony" concept. (Basically, we would replace his idea of a
global fiat regime of synchronizations between the monads
with a "ongoing process" idea using concepts from quantum
game theory. I have found similar ideas in the work of Lee
Smolin, Stuart Kaufmann
and David Deutsch. But that is not sufficient to make it
"true". It is just a "crazy idea" at this point.)
Yes, I understand what the constructs are, and I see how Pratt
is making an interesting analogy, but I don't see the
justification for his conclusions about the mind-body problem.
But I haven't finished grokking the article.
It took me close to 6 years of autodidactic study to make
sense of Pratt's work and I must say that reading the other
papers on theChu Guide <http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html>
helped a lot. I know that it is too much to ask for you to invest
this much effort into an idea that is by my admission "crazy" but
I invite you to anyway.
Thanks for the link; I'll continue looking into it.
Awesome! I hope that it is at least mildly entertaining.
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