On Mar 24, 3:58 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> OK, nice. Many confuse comp (I am a machine) and digital physics
> (reality is a machine), but comp makes reality, whatever it can be,
> being NOT a machine, nor the output of a machine. It is more a
> perspective effect on infinities of computations.

A computer's 1p reality would be digital physics though. If I am Super
Mario, my universe is a digital reality. It seems that you say comp
says that Super Mario will doubt his reality is digital, which I would
agree with if I believed comp. Super Mario's reality could be a
machine or not a machine but his 1p of it is digital because I, as
programmer, have 3p views of its digits.

Of course, I say there is more to it than that: In fact Super Mario
has no 1p at all, and is only a 3p avatar simulating our own 1p world
semiotics. Our own 1p actually permeates 3p because sensemaking is
grounded in the unity of singularity as a natural self dividing into
multiplicity rather than aggregates of data imitating the 3p functions
of a self.

> >>>> UDA explains
> >>>> why the contrary occurs, through the first person indeterminacy
> >>>> bearing on a very huge and complex arithmetical reality.
> >>> Why does hugeness, complexity, first person, or indeterminacy affect
> >>> whether something is digital or not?
> >> Because there is a continuum of computational histories
> >> (computations)
> >> going through your state in arithmetic, or in the UD.
> > There are histories. OK. Why does that make them digital or not?
> I assume "I am a machine". Then the first person notion are NOT
> machine, they are NOT digitalisable for the first person point of view.

Does that mean that the only justification for saying they are not
digital is because our experience is not digital and you assume that
machines are like us?

> >> The rest follows
> >> from the 1-indeterminacy and its invariance for the huge delays in
> >> the
> >> UD virtual reconstitutions. Ask more if this is unclear, but you are
> >> supposed to have study the UDA.
> > Yes, I don't really get where 'delays' come from.
> This is explained already in step 2, and then in the fact that the
> Universal Dovetailer dovetails. It run all computations, but some are
> infinite, so it runs them little pieces by little pieces, and
> introduce vast and many delays in all computations.

I have a similar view but don't limit it to computation. The cosmos is
a process of nesting frames of experience, creating a concrete
interior semiotic medium of nested frequencies ('time') and an
abstract exterior semiotic medium of nested scales ('space'). The
process is computational, but what is being computed is sense and

> > Does the UDA exist
> > in 'time'? Is time an inevitable epi- of +, *, and n?
> I guess you mean the UD. UDA is for the 8 step UD *Argument*.
> Yes, comp makes all notions of time phenomenological, except the UD
> time steps, which are based on the successor relation s(x) = s(x) + 1.
> But physical time and subjective duration needs longer explanations,
> and are mainly indexical first person (plural, singular) notions.

Time then exists as a consequence of UD, not a primitive within which
UD computes and wouldn't have any 'delays'.

> > Still not seeing
> > a connection with whether something is digital or not.
> If we are digital, our experience bears on an infinite set of
> computations, and the result is not digital. I let you study a bit
> more the UDA.

Yeah, I don't understand. Does Super Mario's experience bear on an
infinite set of computations?

> >>>> Second, the first person impression of the machine might be (and is
> >>>> necessarily, once you accept Theaetetus' insight) a non
> >>>> digitalizable
> >>>> truth, from the machine point of view.
> >>> Which of Theaetetus' insight do you mean?
> >> The definition of knowledge by "true belief". Kp = Bp & p.
> > I think I know what that is, but since Google shows nothing at all for
> > it, please spell it out for me one more time.
> Google on "theaetetus".
> Socrates asked to Theaetetus to define "knowledge". Theatetus gives
> many definitions that Socrates critizes/refutes, each of them. One of
> them consists in defining knowledge by belief, in "modern time" the
> mental state, or the computational state of the belief and the
> knowledge is the same, and a belief becomes a knowledge only when it
> is (whatever the reason or absence of reason) true. Another one is the
> justified true belief, which is the one which you can translate in
> arithmetic with Gödel's predicate. You can read "Bp & p" by I can
> justify p from my previous beliefs AND it is the case that p. To give
> you an example, if the snow was blue, a machine asserting "snow is
> blue" can be said to know that snow is blue. Indeed, the machine
> asserts "the snow is blue", and it is the case that snow is blue
> (given the assumption).
> The "problem" (for some) with that theory is that it entails that,
> when awake, we cannot know if we are dreaming or not, although in
> dream we can know that we are dreaming, the same for "being not
> correct". It is not a problem for comp which makes that ignorance
> unavoidable.

To me, the obvious problem is the assumption that mental state and
computation are the same, and that the correspondence between the
assertion and the case (snow is blue) is intentional rather than
mechanical. Once we understand that the mental state is a subjective
sensory event, and the assertion arises organically as a sensible
motive, then the idea of an externally directed or programmed belief
is revealed as empty of sense or motive (belief, intention,

What is not considered under comp is that it automatically privileges
an external index of truth rather than modeling a universe of
intersubjectivlely overlapping sense capacities. Comp doesn't care if
you are scared and say so, it has no way to evaluate that statement as
a 3p true or false fact. It has no way to offer an opinion as to
whether or not it seems true. We do though. We have sense capacities
which allow us to perceive many channels of experience ranging from
the subtle and esoteric to the common and obvious. Comp sees a belief
being true invariably as a validation of a belief, but fails to see
that it goes the other way as well. A truth is only meaningful if we
have some subjective motive for caring about it. Truth is less
important than our ability to say yes or no to the truth...and that
ability is the deeper truth.

> For a machine that "we" know to be arithmetically correct, we know
> that Bp and Bp & p are equivalent. Yet, the machine cannot know that
> about herself, and the logic of Bp and of "Bp & p" are different. They
> obeys to the modal logics G and S4Grz, but I guess you need to read
> some book or some web pages to see what I mean here.


> >>> To me speculating that a machine has a first person impression is
> >>> just
> >>> a way to plug the problem.
> >> With the Theaetetus definition, modeling the first person by the
> >> knower, and modeling belief by provability (as the incompleteness can
> >> justify), the machine has a first person experience.
> > To me all that says is that since knowledge, 'belief', and provability
> > have a relation, then abracadabra: first person experience.
> >> It is a theorem,
> >> not a speculation.
> > If it is impossible to test the theorem, then what is the difference?
> Once proved, you need not to test it. It follows from the assumption
> and definition. But you can test indirect consequences, given that the
> physical reality can and must be extracted from it.

You can test speculation indirectly too.

> >> Non comp makes the machine into a mechanical
> >> variant of a zombie.
> > Non-comp is the atheism of computationalism. it does not make a
> > machine anything, it lets machines be the inanimate puppets that they
> > have always been. It is comp which introduces the expectation of
> > sentience in machines and then balks at the idea of their absence.
> >>> Since subjectivity doesn't make sense
> >>> mechanically or digitally,
> >> This is what we ask an argument for. You beg the question.
> > I understand, I'm just offering insight into the psychology behind the
> > formulation of the idea of first person machine states.
> No problem, except that you seem *sure* that machine cannot bears
> persons, which seems contrary to the evidences, the theories, etc.

The fact that the evidence contradicts the truth is exactly how it has
to appear, since 3p makes 1p look like a machine. It is a black and
white TV that shows us color isn't 'really' real. Evidence is, in 1p
terms, lazy and cowardly. It forces the external world to bear the
full weight of decision making, offers no leap of faith, no
compassion, etc. I understand why machines are incapable of anything
but this bottom level default. They have only passive, reactive
ontology - which, owing to the symmetry of 1p-3p, will take on an
aggregate non-identity: the collective un-person into which our own
fertile imagination will project a fantastic Pinocchio.

> It would be better if you try to explain why you think that mechanism
> is false, without using words like "obvious", "common sense", etc.

Because mechanism pushes a higher level motive on a lower level body
that has no capacity to internalize it. A machine that has not
developed it's own biology can't ground anthropological symbols.

> >>> we'll say it's non digital and hang a
> >>> Mission Accomplished sign. It takes advantage of the privacy and
> >>> ineffability of subjectivity to misrepresent its absence as possible
> >>> presence, even though our experience with machines thus far has not
> >>> supported any presence at all.
> >>>> That is actually the case,
> >>>> because the impression of the machine is a conjunct of both a
> >>>> digitalizable belief and (some) truth, with the greek's suggested
> >>>> notion of knowledge.
> >>> beliefs, truths, knowledge...these are abstractions to me. Tertiary
> >>> level commentaries on experience which barely exist. Important,
> >>> sure,
> >>> but lacking in any power to initiate direct action. Which is maybe
> >>> why
> >>> a machine has no such power.
> >>>>>>>> If you negate this, it means that
> >>>>>>>> you assume the level to be "infinitely low",
> >>>>>>> No, it means I understand that your assumption that description
> >>>>>>> can be
> >>>>>>> quantified is simplistic and inaccurate.
> >>>>>> Description of my (generalized) brain. With your theory we have
> >>>>>> zombie.
> >>>>> Never zombie, only puppet. Zombie is like calling water 'wet
> >>>>> fire'.
> >>>> I don't think so. With the Heisenberg Matrix of the Milky way, no-
> >>>> one
> >>>> would be able to distinguish me or you from the behavior of the
> >>>> entity
> >>>> simulated. If comp is false, those entity who behaves "exactly"
> >>>> like
> >>>> you or me, are not conscious, and so they are by definition p-
> >>>> zombie.
> >>> The word zombie privileges the expectation of consciousness, while
> >>> the
> >>> word puppet does not.
> >> So you beg the question here too. By definiion a zombie has no
> >> consciousness, but behaves like a conscious being.
> > A puppet does the same thing.
> A puppet does not behave like a human being. You said it yourself.

It behaves as much like a human being as possible without actually
being one. The notion of a zombie mistakenly assumes that human
authenticity and human function can be separated.

> > Why not use puppet instead? There must
> > be some reason why you resist this change.
> Because puppet does not match the definition. Zombie or p-zombie
> (philosophical zombie) is the standard term in the literature.

Right, but I'm saying it is an obstacle to understanding. It is rooted
in assumptions which I am saying are factually incorrect and is
therefore obsolete, like aqua vita or humors.

> It is a
> concept. With comp it does not really make sense, although some
> approximation or variants can make sense. With non comp, they make
> sense, and are hard to avoid, as many of us have already try to
> explain to you.

You are all looking at non comp in a 3p mirror, as I have tried to
explain to many of you. When you make the mistake of believing that
awareness is only a function to begin with, then it does not seem
possible to separate awareness from function.

> >>> The fact that the Heisenberg Matrix of the Milky
> >>> way fails completely in detecting consciousness
> >> I said that we fail to do that. Not the (virtual) Milky Way.
> > It's our virtual Milky Way, so that's the same thing.
> >>> does not mean that the
> >>> simulations it takes for genuine are missing something that they
> >>> should have.
> >>> That they are simulations in the first place means that we intend
> >>> them
> >>> to resemble something that they are not.
> >> We don't know that.
> > Why not? I make a simulation of the Milky Way but don't know that I
> > intend the resemblance to it?
> You don't know that it resembles to something that they are not.


If I make a picture of a flower I know it resembles what a flower is
to me.

> The
> "don't know" bears on "... that they are not".


> >>> I make a witch's head out of
> >>> a shrunken apple - that is a simulation of a witch; a puppet of a
> >>> witch. It isn't an actual witch that has been rendered a zombie. It
> >>> freaks me out that I keep having to explain this, it seems
> >>> stunningly
> >>> obvious to me. I draw a dog on a paper bag, is it now a dog zombie?
> >>> The deeper insight here of course is that simulation relates only to
> >>> the intended audience.
> >> Nobody has been supposed to look at the simulation.
> > Then why create it?
> For the sake of the reasoning. To show that non-comp entails the
> existence of zombie.

Non-comp has no zombies, only puppets. The idea of a zombie is what
you get when you project comp assumptions on non-comp. It's wrong and
it's wrong about being right (it has no choice but to be wrong about
1p, it's a black and white machine looking at color).

>The virtual Milky Way emulates Craig and Bruno
> discussing on this list. That very conversation appears there, if you
> agree that QM is correct, notably.

QM observations are correct but I suspect the interpretations are
exactly incorrect.

> >>> It looks like a witch or a dog only to us. It's
> >>> a text.
> >> Not at all. It is a computation. It concerns true relations which
> >> cannot be considered in a text.
> > What true relations are you talking about? That it truly looks like a
> > witch to us means that it truly looks like a witch to a house fly?
> >http://deuxfilleslemercredisoir.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/ceci-nest...
> The text "1+1=2" is something different from the truth of the fact
> that when you add one to one you get two.

1+1=2 is only a fact if you are talking about factual solid objects
under observable conditions. 1 cloud + 1 cloud is any number of
clouds. These are abstract conceptual tools, not concrete forces or

> >>> It's symbols are not grounded in the firmament of the cosmos
> >>> like matter or biology, they are only suggestions that help 'us'
> >>> fabricate a fictional association for ourselves.
> >> Not at all.
> > Why not?
> Because of a difference between a text and its meaning, or between a
> machine and its thought/behavior. In both case you need a universal
> number to put the fire on the text---so to speak.

What makes you think that a universal number has any fire,
metaphorical or otherwise?

> >>>>>> Study the sane04 paper.  Or search in the archive. It is a
> >>>>>> consequence
> >>>>>> of comp that physics emerge from the way numbers can bet on
> >>>>>> arithmetical relations. It is not entirely obvious.
> >>>>> I don't have a problem with physics emerging from comp, I have a
> >>>>> problem with consciousness emerging from either one.
> >>>> I understand.
> >>>> This is related with the fact that we can explain why consciousness
> >>>> is
> >>>> not entirely explainable by the machine.
> >>>> The machine also find hard to believe that consciousness "emerge"
> >>>> from
> >>>> arithmetical truth. But she cannot accept this because she can
> >>>> understand the necessary transcendent aspect of any notion of truth
> >>>> encompassing the truth about herself.
> >>> It sounds like you mean that machines can tell what is true about
> >>> themselves so they can't accept that there is an external source of
> >>> all truth. That makes a little sense, but I have no problem
> >>> accepting
> >>> that there could or could not be an external source of all truth, I
> >>> just don't see why it would be arithmetic in either case.
> >> This mean you have not study the UDA.
> > I would if I could, but it really doesn't work for me when I try to do
> > that. My understanding of UDA goes something like this: Instead of the
> > big bang, the universe may be a single program running each and every
> > possible program (which means making each possible program within each
> > program) such that we are a function of the particular sheath of
> > nested programs which have given rise to a machine capable of
> > sustaining machines like us. Is that not more or less the case?
> Not really, because you must proceed step by step and be sure to get
> all the points. Of course need the ability to conceive that you might
> survive with an artificial digital brain. The rest is shown to be a
> consequence of that.

If we were machines, it would make sense that we might survive with an
artificial digital brain. It would also make sense that we I could cut
and paste the flame from an actual candle into a computer. We aren't
only machines though, and it doesn't make sense to turn the meal into
a menu and back. You can copy a digital music recording that way, but
you can't record or play it without physical microphones and speakers.
A person is like a microphone/speaker. It cannot be substituted. No
amount of graphics software can make up for the lack of a video
display screen.

> >>>> What might help you is the idea that with comp, contrary to the
> >>>> (contradictory) belief that consciousness is a natural product of
> >>>> some
> >>>> physical activity, consciousness is an atemporal global feature of
> >>>> the
> >>>> arithmetical truth. Machine does not produce consciousness, they
> >>>> borrow it to the truth. With comp, there is a sense to say that
> >>>> only
> >>>> God is conscious, but to manifest itself relatively to machines, he
> >>>> has to be amnesic to who he is. Nature invented the brain, not to
> >>>> make
> >>>> machines conscious, but to make them amnesic to their true
> >>>> identity.
> >>>> If not, the prey would not mind escaping the predator, and life
> >>>> could
> >>>> not evolve.
> >>> I don't have a problem with any of that, but why would it be only
> >>> arithmetic and not multisensory?
> >> Because we assume comp. The rest is logic.
> > Ok, so you admit it is purely arbitrary from the beginning.
> It might be. That is not relevant.

It is to me. My whole point is that what is wrong with comp is that it
puts the cart before the horse. Numbers are a way of making sense, but
sense isn't always a way of making numbers.

> It is not, given the evidences, but I am not so inclined to argue for
> the truth or falsity of any statement. It is not my job.

If it turned out that I was right, and sense is actually primitive, if
it could be proved to you somehow, would you care?

> > You don't
> > need to consider assuming comp instead because you choose to comp and
> > that's that. Doesn't matter what the universe actually is, only what
> > theory you are invested in. That's ok, but I'm only interested in the
> > theory that explains why multisense can or can't be true.
> You have not say enough to conclude that multisense is incompatible
> with comp.
> As I told you already many times, it seems to me, as far I can make
> sense of what you say, to be more a consequence of comp than a
> refutation of comp.

It's a refutation of comp because sense isn't a logical part of comp
but comp is a sensible part of logic.

> Incompleteness-like phenomena explains why a machine does not feel
> like if it was a machine. The machine can only bet on this, and on his
> substitution level.

It doesn't explain feeling in any way. It conveniently steals feeling
from non-comp and plugs it in while nobody is looking. Once you take
feeling for granted, sure all that great G-T stuff explains why a
hypothetical feeling agent might experience this or that perspective.
I'm looking though. I see the card sticking out of its sleeve.

> >>>>>> They don't need to dream. But they can (trivially with comp
> >>>>>> that I
> >>>>>> assume all the time). Physics appears because deep linear dreams
> >>>>>> are
> >>>>>> shared by relatively persistent universal numbers.
> >>>>> Couldn't physics still theoretically appear without anything
> >>>>> dreaming
> >>>>> anything? Isn't that the point of physics, to explain the world
> >>>>> as a
> >>>>> structured relation which makes sense entirely in physical terms?
> >>>> That's is very natural to believe. Somehow we are programmed to
> >>>> believe this.
> >>> My view explains the 'Somehow'. Symmetry makes us see the universe
> >>> on
> >>> one level as that which we are not.
> >>>> But it is false in the comp theory, as the UDA
> >>>> explains, and as most mystics seems to grasp from introspection.
> >>> Yes, it is false in one sense, but it is also true in another -
> >>> hence
> >>> the 'Somehow'.
> >>>> Note that this makes also possible to explain the physical in a non
> >>>> circular way, that is without assuming the physical.
> >>> Yes, but  it only explains it in a deeper but still just as circular
> >>> way.
> >> Why. If physics is explain from numbers, the explanation is not
> >> circular.
> > Because it then fails to explain numbers.
> We know today that numbers cannot be explained in any theory which
> does not assume them, or equivalent.

Which is why it's circular. God can't be explained by any theory which
does not assume God either. No first cause can be anything other than
circular except sense. Sense is our own first cause as well as the
cause of the contents of our experience, so there is no way to
possibly deny it. Existence of any kind without sense is
inconceivable, but I can dream up universes that have no universal
numbers (odor universe, morality universe, emotion universe, pain

> > What's the difference
> > whether you explain numbers as physics or physics as numbers?
> Number are 3-simple. You can explain them to young children. Physics
> is complex, and the physical reality is controversial.

Then that would make physics the more counter-intuitive truth. Numbers
are just another veil of the universal physical-sensual dream.

> > Neither
> > of them need to feel like anything, and that is the only thing that
> > would make the universe matter. What makes numbers matter?
> What makes numbers matter? Their sharable dreams. (Read UDA to see why).

What makes the dreams or sharing them matter?

> I am not saying that this is true, only that it follows from comp.


> >>>> This is counter-intuitive, and has to be counter-intuitive. We are
> >>>> not
> >>>> programmed to believe this, quite the contrary, as suggested by the
> >>>> above remark.
> >>>>>>>>> and if we have dreams we don't need numbers.
> >>>>>>>> ?
> >>>>>>> If our lives are being dreamed by Platonic universal principles,
> >>>>>>> why
> >>>>>>> do we want to turn them into dust by seeking out the dreamers?
> >>>>>> Because we are curious.
> >>>>> In Comp that can make sense that we would be curious about what
> >>>>> can
> >>>>> only reveal our own lives meaningless data. In a sense realism, we
> >>>>> are
> >>>>> only likely to be curious because on some level we already know
> >>>>> that
> >>>>> comp is just another new dimension of meaning to explore and
> >>>>> create
> >>>>> in. We know, on some level, that we don't really have to worry
> >>>>> about
> >>>>> computers coming to life or developing feelings.
> >>>> There is nothing to worry indeed. About machines coming to life.
> >>>> They
> >>>> will treat us as we treat them.
> >>> Not worry about them being hostile, I mean worry about it ever
> >>> coming
> >>> to pass that any machine ever comes to life at all - ie develops
> >>> intention and self interest. I'm saying that deep inside, we know
> >>> that
> >>> is not possible in reality.
> >> We know nothing of that sort. In science, we never know. We believe
> >> temporarily.
> > I'm not talking about what we think we know, I'm talking about out
> > deep intuitive connections that are true.
> How can we know that a deep intuitive connection is true?

We can't always. That's what makes them intuitive. We have to have
genuine faith in them to find out. Sometimes we are disappointed. That
is, quite literally, life.

> >>>> We can worry only about ourselves.
> >>>> Brains and universal numbers are relative dynamical mirror. If we
> >>>> fear
> >>>> them, they will fear us, and that can lead to a diabolical vicious
> >>>> circle. This is true also in between humans.
> >>> Is there a mathematical proof that addresses fear of universal
> >>> numbers?
> >> Many. Google on emotion, machine, AI. One of my student has make a
> >> thesis on machine emotion (Giovona Colombetti), a long time ago.
> > I'll take your word for it, since I wouldn't be able to understand
> > what it said anyhow.
> It looks like you have not just prejudices on machines, but also on
> yourself.

It's not prejudice, it's experience. Postjudice.

> >>>> Not really, because the "real feeling of certainty" comes from the
> >>>> first person experience.
> >>> But isn't the content of that feeling all about transcending or
> >>> sharing beyond first person experience?
> >> No. First person singular feeling are not sharable.
> > How do you know? Love? Hate? These things are isolated parameters in
> > the dark?
> No, they are supposedly true personal impression. Only poet can
> revived them in us, but that's not the rational communication I was
> alluding to.

Rational communication floats on an accumulation of worldly sense
experience and human interaction. It is that understanding, the bottom
of the iceberg, that is shared. It's not an object so it insists
subtractively rather than exists additively. We use words to play our
minds together like a band plays a song together. The song doesn't
exist, it insists through the shared interiority of the musicians and
audience through the exteriority (body) of their instruments.

> >>>> But the publicly communicable certainty is
> >>>> only in the sharable deduction, because the first person experience
> >>>> is
> >>>> just not publicly sharable.
> >>>> To communicate the 1-truth would be like trying to communicate that
> >>>> "in reality you are the one having been reconstituted in
> >>>> Washington,
> >>>> which is either a trivial 3p statement for your interlocutor, or a
> >>>> sort of delusion as the doppelganger in Moscow can understand
> >>>> (because
> >>>> *he* lives the delusion of being "in reality" the guy in Moscow).
> >>>> This
> >>>> can explain the frustration we can have about communicating that we
> >>>> are what we are. That's a 3-tautology, lived as an incredible non
> >>>> tautological 1-experience. But then this can give rise to deep poem
> >>>> and music.
> >>> You don't have to communicate the 1-truth, you communicate a 3-
> >>> symbol
> >>> and the audience shares your reflected 1-truth as their own locally
> >>> isomorphic 1-truth.
> >> ?
> > You don't have to transplant your feelings into another person, you
> > give them a signal with a shared association and they experience their
> > version of your feeling (or their reaction to your feeling, or some
> > combination thereof).
> OK, but this presupposed that they have already similar impressions.
> We bet on that, we don't prove that, and we don't know that.

Right, but that's the good part. We have to take a leap of faith. We
don't know it, but we aren't completely in the dark like a machine
would be. We have a sense of whether our signal might be sharable to a
particular audience. Sometimes the dog knows us more than we think.
Sometimes best we don't know best friends as well as we thought.

> >>>>>>> I'm assuming them though. As you assume addition and
> >>>>>>> multiplication, I
> >>>>>>> could assume odor and color and go from there.
> >>>>>> Except that addition is far simpler than a notion of odor and
> >>>>>> color.
> >>>>> Tell that to a two year old.
> >>>> It is 3-simpler. A simple abacus can illustrate the point. The odor
> >>>> is
> >>>> only 1-simpler, for the owner of a sophisticate universal machine-
> >>>> brain. Here I was using "simple" in the usual 3p sense. "1+5 = 6"
> >>>> is
> >>>> simpler than the universal machinery to get the smell of something.
> >>> That's not comparing apples to apples though. The universal
> >>> machinery
> >>> to get the smell may be incredibly primitive, while for something to
> >>> actually understand that 1+5 = 6 (rather than to simply be embody
> >>> it)
> >>> may require some kind of a brain. The abacus doesn't know that 1+5 =
> >>> 6. It doesn't even know + or =. It only knows xxoooxxxx. Same as a
> >>> computer. Odor could go all the way down to quarks for all we know.
> >> You confuse "1+5=6" with "I understand 1+5=6".
> > You confuse "bacon smells good" with "I smell bacon".
> Hmm... It is more ""I smell bacon"" with "I smell bacon". Or "I smell
> bacon" with the fact that right now I am smelling bacon.

In order for you to smell bacon, there must first be a such thing as a
bacon smell, which could be no less primitive than arithmetic truths
like 1+5=6. Think of it Bruno, a whole olfactory Platonia of
eigenstinks and aromatic set theory ;)

> >>>>>> We need a big human brain to get easily the human color.
> >>>>> How do you know that the color we see isn't what the molecules
> >>>>> in a
> >>>>> cone cell see?
> >>>> I think this is not plausible from what we can believe about brain.
> >>>> But even if true, a molecule is by itself a very complex object/
> >>>> notion, far more complex than natural numbers.
> >>> We don't know that natural numbers exist independently of the
> >>> totality
> >>> of arithmetic or consciousness. That is far more complex than a
> >>> molecule.
> >> You confuse "1+5=6" with the whole of arithmetic. No need for that in
> >> my argument above.
> > How does 1+5=6 without 6-5=1, 1+2+3=5+1, etc?
> They are indeed true and connected, but all  the true connections are
> not needed for 1+5 = 6 to be understood as true by you.

We're not talking about my understanding at all though, because then
we are talking monkey neurology and all of that. We are talking
universal primitives only.

> >>>> I am OK, up to the vagueness present.
> >>>> Comp leads in that direction too.
> >>> It shouldn't be vague. I think any vagueness comes from comp being
> >>> insensitive to the universally obvious.
> >> Only for you, apparently.
> > I think presentation is a fairly clear and universal term.
> ?

To be made present or local. Directly and concurrently available.

> >>> Are you saying that a particular enactment of a machine can be more
> >>> courageous than another identical machine? Can a program running
> >>> on my
> >>> computer do something that the same program running on a different
> >>> but
> >>> identical computer lacks the courage to do?
> >> Yes. Comp is compatibilist.
> > In theory.
> Of course. Comp is a theory.
> > Have we seen chronically timid iterations of identical
> > machines?
> ?

We see it in identical twins all the time. One more dominant and one
more submissive. Where in machines though?

> >>>> It looks to much like a prejudice against them, or a feeling of
> >>>> superiority from your part.
> >>> Not at all. That's the funny part. I'm much more a fan of computers
> >>> than human beings. I have no emotional attachment one way or the
> >>> other
> >>> to comp, but I do have an emotional attachment to my understanding
> >>> of
> >>> why comp cannot be true.
> >> But you fail to convey that understanding.
> > Because it isn't important.
> Why do you try so much then?

I'm trying to convey my enthusiasm for computers, I'm trying to share
an understanding of consciousness.

> >>>> I don't think either that we can ground any fundamental universal
> >>>> principle in a manner such that we feel them as truth. They can
> >>>> only
> >>>> be a sort of hope or bet, and we might find better one by listening
> >>>> to
> >>>> others and looking into the unknown. The rest seems to me like
> >>>> wishful
> >>>> thinking or pseudo-religion. It is marmalade to hide the pill. It
> >>>> seems to me.
> >>> That's exactly the way it has to look from the comp-favoring (or
> >>> "Camera"-favoring, if you prefer) perspective. Comp seems like a
> >>> wishful thinking or pseudo-religion to me too. How could it not?
> >> Because we don't pretend it is true. We reason from it.
> > I don't pretend multisense is true, I understand from it.
> I doubt this. It might be true in your "theory", but again, you cannot
> talk like if God told you something. Personal convictions are not
> arguments.

Arguments are nothing but means to influence personal convictions.

> But you have the right to postulate non-comp, but that already needs a
> good comprehension of comp, to make something genuinely non
> computationalist, given that comp already gives a key role to many non
> computational notions. It seems to me you add only more mystery on
> real questions, or you trivialize them by making the mystery directly
> your theory. It really looks like the "don't ask" theory to me.

What is it you think my theory wants you not to ask?


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