On 28 Mar 2012, at 06:07, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Mar 27, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> so you do get the point of the difference of the 3-view and the 1- view,


Truer words were never spoken. If 2 different consciousnesses can not be distinguished in my symmetrical room from the first person point of view or from the third person point of view then it seems pointless to insist that there are really 2 and not just one mind involved.

We agree on this since the beginning. You are unclear if this means or not if you get the difference between the 1-view and the 3-view, given that I was commenting a paragraph were you were disagreeing with that difference.



>> If this thing you call "1-comp indeterminacy" were untrue then we would always know what the environment was going to throw at us next and we could always predict our actions,
> This does not follow logically.
Of course it follows logically! All "1-comp indeterminacy" means is you never know what's coming next, a fact that is as true as it is trivial.

?



>> very obviously this is untrue so of course "1-comp indeterminacy" is not controversial. It's not new or deep either.

> You fail to give me the reference,

Reference? How can I give a reference when the term "1-comp indeterminacy" is your own invention? The only reference I can give you is Forest Gump, "life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what you're going to get".

?

It seems to me that you are playing with words.



> he usual coin is indeterminate by classical ignorance, but not for the Laplacean God.

It's irrelevant if the coin is deterministic or not because either way I don't know what the coin is going to do so the best I can do is use probabilities.

Different theories explains probabilities differently.





>> but so does the copy (or maybe he really is the original and you are the copy), you raise your right hand and you see on the video monitor the both images do too, you jump up and down but you see both images jump up and down. Not only can't you tell if you are the copy or the original you can't even tell which image on that video screen is you and which is the other fellow. If subjectively there is no difference and objectively there is no difference then there is no difference between "3-you" and "1-you".

> OK. Here you are clearly wrong, and this by your own argument. An outside observer can see that there are two bodies

Yes two bodies, but we're not talking about bodies, we were talking about points of view and consciousness.

On the contrary, we are talking on both. Indeed we are interested in the relation between the two.




> where the 1-view is unique, as you insist (and are right). So, there are two "3-you", and only one "1-you", and this makes them obviously different notion.

But you can see there are 2 bodies of Bruno Marchal just as well as the outside observer, and you can not tell which one is you any better than the outside observer can!

No. The outsider can see both necks for example. The insider cannot be sure that he is not in front of some mirror, according to your own analysis.



The third party sees the 2 bodies behave and answer questions in exactly the same way, the third party can not distinguish between the 2 consciousness, so it would make it meaningless to say there are two; the observer sees 2 chunks of matter but they are both behaving in a Brunomarchalian way. And you Bruno Marchal can not determine which of the 2 bodies is you either, if I instantly exchanged the position of the 2 bodies you would not notice the slightest change, nor could the very universe itself. None of this should be surprising if we understand that Bruno Marchal is not a noun but a adjective.

Words play. Have you read step 2? It is the step which explains more easily the difference between the 1-view and the 3-view, already without duplication.




> The difference between the 1-view and the 3-view is the difference between a body and the private experience of the owner of that body, or bodies in case of identical bodies.

The outside observer can not distinguish 2 conscious beings inside that cylindrical symmetrical room but only one, and the exact same thing is true of you Bruno Marchal, looking at the live video from the camera in the center of the ceiling of that room you can not distinguish which body is you nor could you be expected to as both chunks of matter are behaving in a Brunomarchalian way.

So you fail to distinguish the 1-view and the 3-view. (Re)read step 2, and tell me if you agree or not.



>> This thing you call "first person indeterminacy" just means a person doesn’t always know what they will see or what they will do next, that's it; and people had discovered this fact of life many thousands of years before Heisenberg or Godel or Turing or you were born.

> You betray yourself here. You are telling me that you would have rejected the work of Gödel and Turing by telling them that we know indeterminacy before so that they have discovered nothing.

The fact that human beings don't know everything and cannot infallibly predict the future is simply not a new discovery, even ignoring Quantum Mechanics they generally don't know the initial conditions of things well enough and even if they did humans don't have access to enough computational resources to make good predictions about what will happen next. What was discovered in the 20'th century was that we can't even in theory know the position and momentum or the energy and time of something to arbitrary precision.

OK. So what is new with comp is a form of indeterminacy which even in theory we cannot predict, and which does not rely on physical experimentation and extrapolation, nor on the same anti- diagonalization used by Gödel or Turing. Then it has different consequences as the rest of the reasoning explores. Just proceed in the reasoning. You will see by yourself that your argument is not relevant.


The discovery that there are things that are true but can not be proven is also new.

Never say "cannot be proven" without adding "by a specific machine M" or "in a specific theory". If not it is simply false. For any statement you can find a theory proving it.


This thing you call "first person indeterminacy" tells us nothing new.

Even if you did grasp it, you cannot say this without studying the rest of the reasoning. It remains unclear for me if you did or not grasp this.




> You forget that you said yes to the digitalist surgeon.

I guess I did because I even forgot what the hell a "digitalist surgeon" is so I don't know what you're talking about.

It is the doctor to who you say yes for the digital brain transplant.




> In the simple teleportation without duplication, the probability is one (assuming comp and the default hypotheses 'course). So the probability is 1/2,

Huh? Probability of what?

The answer is "probability that I will feel myself to live in W (resp. M). (In the unique thought step 3 thought experiment we are talking since the beginning).






>> I don't understand what you want me to predict. I can predict with 100% certainty that IF I see images of Moscow

> But this is not the question. I have emphasized the "IF" in the quote above. There is no such "IF" in the question I asked.

You want to know what is the probability you will become the Moscow man, but the only way that can happen is if you see images of Moscow, that's what being the Moscow man means.

You can apply that argument to the throwing of a coin. That contradicts the statement above that you can use probability for the coin, so why can't you use it for the probability of feeling to be the Moscow man?




If this answer is unsatisfactory I'm sorry but all I can do is repeat I don't understand what you want me to predict.

The experience/feeling/1-view that you will have after the duplication.




> The question was about how to evaluate in Helsinki the possibility/ probability that you will see W.

Exactly the same as the probability you will see Moscow, 100%.

Given that the probability concerns the 1-views (that is the 1-view from the 1-person Pov), saying 100% for Moscow and 100% for Washington entails that you predict that you will *feel* to be in the two places at once. But comp explains why the M and W man will both disagree with you, so your statement contradicts comp. Here you confuse again the 1-view you can intellectually attribute, and the 1-view that you can personally live. Reread the explanations that many of us have already try to give to you on this.

I suspect that you are stuck in a denying mindset. As a math teacher I know that can happen, and I suggest you to take some holiday or take some rest, and then proceed on the reasoning to see the point and the non relevance of your remark.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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