On Sun, Apr 01, 2012 at 02:33:44PM +0100, David Nyman wrote:
> Bruno, when you talk about the doctor offering one a replacement brain
> you usually describe the substitute as digital, although I think you
> have sometimes just said that it is artificial.  My recent remarks
> about "game physics" got me thinking about this distinction, if indeed
> there is one.


> Since he certainly doesn't want to suffer such an indignity, should he
> say no to the doctor?  The question that troubles Dick is whether,
> assuming comp, he should accept a genuinely
> behaviourally-indistinguishable body, irrespective of its brain being
> organic or clockwork, as an equivalent "avatar" according to the rules
> of the comp game-physics.  If so, Dick should have no reason not to
> accept a behaviourally-indistinguishable, clockwork-equipped body as
> enabling his continued manifestation relative to the familiar
> environments to which he has become so emotionally attached.  Time is
> short, and he must act.  What should he do?
> David

Counter intuitively, he should say no to the doctor, regardless of
whether he believes in COMP or not-COMP. If COMP is true, COMP
immortality is true, and Dick will survive the cancer whether he gets
his brain replaced or not. If COMP is not true, then he is committing



Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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