On Sun, Apr 1, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> >> you've added tons of bells and whistles but for all the complex
>> convolutions you have not added one single bit of additional information
>> about what is likely to happen.
> > On the contrary, comp entails that you should expect white noice for the
> multiplication movie experience

But non-comp predicts exactly the same thing simply because the number of
states the screen can be in that we would put in the category "white noise"
is far greater than the number of states we would put in the "Monty Python
movie" category; and this would be true even if the Bible thumpers were
right about the soul and consciousness, which means your thought experiment
and all the numerous copies of you are a useless complication in
investigating these questions.

> that you should expect the WM duplication as equivalent with the throw of
> a random coin, etc. But you don't need to agree with that analysis. You
> need only to agree that there is an indeterminacy

Of course there is a indeterminacy! A key part of your thought experiment
is that a million pixels on a screen change at RANDOM 60 times a second
from black to white for 2 hours, being RANDOM you can't (or at least should
not) be certain what you'll see on the screen. If Everett is right the
indeterminacy is purely a measure of lack of information on your part and
that information exists you just don't have it. If you knew what branch of
the multiverse you were in, what particular universe you were in, you'd
know for certain what you were going to see on that screen; if you are in a
Monty Python branch you will see a Monty Python movie and if you're in a
white noise branch you'll see white noise. Once again your "1-view
indeterminacy" brings nothing new to the mix.

I can hear you say, but that's the point, you don't know what branch you
are in until you see white noise or Monty Python on that screen. But
according to Everett until you see something unique on that screen that
nobody else in any universe sees you are not in that branch because that
branch does not exist, seeing Monty Python is exactly what makes it the
Monty Python branch.

> So I think we could move on step 4. You cannot stop in a middle on a
> proof on the pretext that you have learn nothing.

I can understand your desire to gloss over this major difficulty and move
on, but I feel that if a proof has made a blunder it's pointless to read

 > There is a difference between anything can happen in the "reality", and
> anything can happen in the next moment.

And what difference is that?

> If Everett is right the probability must be derived from the statistics
> of measurements *as described by the wave evolution*.

If Everett is right then you can use the square of the absolute value of
the Schrodinger Wave Equation to help you guess which branch you are in, he
says it's the best guess you can make with the limited information you have
at your disposal, it's not perfect but it's the best we can do. However if
Everett is right everything that can happen to you will happen to you
somewhere in some branch of the multiverse.

> The distinction you are introducing concerns what the outsider can write
> in his diary (the 3-view), it does not bear on the individual diary
> contents (the 1-views).

I see, the contents of the diary are 3-view but the diary contents are
1-view. No I take that back, I don't see.

> After the experience, both "concedes" that they feel in one city, as they
> describe in their respective diary, and both recognize that they don't feel
> to be in both city, and that they don't feel any possible sensation of
> their respective doppelganger.

And both will record in their diary that they are Bruno Marchal, in fact
they both insist on this point very very strongly, and I the outside
observer can find absolutely no reason to say that one is more Bruno
Marchal-like than the other, so if I told you before the duplication that
you would see Washington AND Moscow I would be correct, Bruno Marchal will
indeed see both cities.

> But n Helsinki you cannot know for sure in which city you will wake up.

Asking why you are the Moscow man not the Washington man is exactly like
asking why you are Bruno Marchal and not John K Clark.

>>  But exactly what does your 50% really mean? You're treating it not as a
>> measure of ignorance
> > Well, you can treat it as a measure on ignorance, by using the PUP
> principle.

 I wish you'd stop expecting people to remember what all your homemade
acronyms mean.

> > Basically the 1-view is the subjective(*) experience, and the 3-view is
> what an outsider can "objectively" described.

Then you can give no examples where according to the 3-view things are
identical but according to the 1-view they are not, although it's easy to
find examples where according to the 1-view things are identical but by the
3-view they are not. So when you complain that I'm just looking at things
from the 3-view and from only that view are things identical your complaint
is ridiculous. There are almost certainly lots of cases where two minds are
identical from the 1-view but different from the 3-view, but at the very
least I know for certain if they are identical from the 3-view they are
identical from the 1-view, and it's the 1-view that I'm really interested
in. If things are identical objectively then they are identical
subjectively, the reverse is not necessarily true but it can be.

> You have to consider two classical teleportation experiences, from Earth
> to Mars. So you are read on Earth, annihilated on Earth and reconstituted
> on Mars from the info sent by some laser beam.

I'm not clear on what was annihilated on Earth, it wasn't matter and it
wasn't information and I don't believe in the soul.

> In the first experience there are no special delays of reconstitution, in
> the second experience a delay of one year is introduced, and you are
> reconstituted one year later.

That delay is significant objectively but subjectively its not important, I
know this because subjectively it's not even detectable so it can't effect
your consciousness, and subjectivity is what interests me.

> I use mars, to ensure that you have no environmental clue of the time
> passed in your neighborhood.

So in this case the subjective experience would be the same even though
objectively it is different.

> the 1-view remains completely identical "I was on earth and now I am on
> Mars".

And information can be duplicated so it could simultaneously be "I was on
earth and now I am on Venus".

> you look around you, may be you ask some people on the street in which
> city you are

Different city or different planet, subjectively its just a question on
what information you receive.

  John K Clark

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