On 02 Apr 2012, at 18:14, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Apr 1, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> you've added tons of bells and whistles but for all the complex
convolutions you have not added one single bit of additional
information about what is likely to happen.
> On the contrary, comp entails that you should expect white noice
for the multiplication movie experience
But non-comp predicts exactly the same thing simply because the
number of states the screen can be in that we would put in the
category "white noise" is far greater than the number of states we
would put in the "Monty Python movie" category; and this would be
true even if the Bible thumpers were right about the soul and
consciousness, which means your thought experiment and all the
numerous copies of you are a useless complication in investigating
The point is that comp predicts white noise.
That something else predicts white noise too is not relevant in the
> that you should expect the WM duplication as equivalent with the
throw of a random coin, etc. But you don't need to agree with that
analysis. You need only to agree that there is an indeterminacy
Of course there is a indeterminacy!
Don't say of course. That is not so obvious as your posts illustrates.
After all, "officially" the thesis has been rejected (in Brussels,
before it being accepted in Lille) at step 3. This might be enough to
say that it is new, and not understood so quickly by many.
A key part of your thought experiment is that a million pixels on a
screen change at RANDOM 60 times a second from black to white for 2
In the 3-view there is no randomness at all. In the protocol, we don't
change the pixels randomly, neither in the comp multiplication-movie
experience, nor in the quantum wave which evolves deterministically.
The point is that the randomness bears on the first person
experiences. We get this directly with comp, without assuming QM.
being RANDOM you can't (or at least should not) be certain what
you'll see on the screen. If Everett is right the indeterminacy is
purely a measure of lack of information on your part and that
information exists you just don't have it. If you knew what branch
of the multiverse you were in, what particular universe you were in,
you'd know for certain what you were going to see on that screen; if
you are in a Monty Python branch you will see a Monty Python movie
and if you're in a white noise branch you'll see white noise. Once
again your "1-view indeterminacy" brings nothing new to the mix.
What is new is that we get it without postulating quantum physics. It
is not so new, I publish it in the 80 (and make it public before in
But the question is not if it is new or not. The question is do you
get the point of step 3, which shows that comp entails that objective
indeterminacy on the subjective experiences.
(Note also that "objective" is used temporarily. later we will see
that "physically objective" is not a 1-view, but a 1-plural view. yet,
at this stage, we can use "objective", because it refers only to the
content of a diary of an outsider looking at the experience without
doing it himself).
I can hear you say, but that's the point, you don't know what branch
you are in until you see white noise or Monty Python on that screen.
But according to Everett until you see something unique on that
screen that nobody else in any universe sees you are not in that
branch because that branch does not exist, seeing Monty Python is
exactly what makes it the Monty Python branch.
There is a little nuance, the one between duplication of worlds or
differentiation of worlds. But it is not really relevant at this
stage. So indeed, that's the point. But note that comp does not assume
QM, yet explains the existence of a phenomenologically similar
> So I think we could move on step 4. You cannot stop in a middle on
a proof on the pretext that you have learn nothing.
I can understand your desire to gloss over this major difficulty
I thought you just grasped it. What major difficulty? The only one you
have ever mentionned as been shown to be a confusion of 1-view and 3-
view (or on the 3-view on the 1-views, and the 1-views themselves.
Reread perhaps the preceding posts).
and move on, but I feel that if a proof has made a blunder it's
pointless to read more.
> There is a difference between anything can happen in the
"reality", and anything can happen in the next moment.
And what difference is that?
The conditional probabilities. Everett, and also comp (as you will see
later) predict that everything (consistent) happens, but with
different relative probability. If I put water on the gas, there are
worlds where it freeze, and there are worlds where it boils hot. To
take a decision I need to have trust that I can influence the worlds,
so I need laws, and laws explains why some happening are more
probable, relatively to my current sate, than others.
> If Everett is right the probability must be derived from the
statistics of measurements *as described by the wave evolution*.
If Everett is right then you can use the square of the absolute
value of the Schrodinger Wave Equation to help you guess which
branch you are in, he says it's the best guess you can make with the
limited information you have at your disposal, it's not perfect but
it's the best we can do. However if Everett is right everything that
can happen to you will happen to you somewhere in some branch of the
But we are interested in evaluating the relative probabilities.
Everett can use the P = A^2, and the point of UDA will be that with
comp we have to justify both the A and the P=A^2 from arithmetic. But
let us not anticipate.
> The distinction you are introducing concerns what the outsider can
write in his diary (the 3-view), it does not bear on the individual
diary contents (the 1-views).
I see, the contents of the diary are 3-view but the diary contents
are 1-view. No I take that back, I don't see.
Please read what I say. This is also explained in my other posts and
in sane04. You confuse the diary of the outsider, which does not enter
the transporter/duplicator boxes and the diaries of the transported
people. OK, I could have been more precise here, but I was short just
because I have already explained this more than one time, and it is
well defined in the paper, which I guess you are reading.
> After the experience, both "concedes" that they feel in one city,
as they describe in their respective diary, and both recognize that
they don't feel to be in both city, and that they don't feel any
possible sensation of their respective doppelganger.
And both will record in their diary that they are Bruno Marchal, in
fact they both insist on this point very very strongly, and I the
outside observer can find absolutely no reason to say that one is
more Bruno Marchal-like than the other,
so if I told you before the duplication that you would see
Washington AND Moscow I would be correct, Bruno Marchal will indeed
see both cities.
That the 3-view on the 1-view. But the probabilities bears on the 1-
views themselves. You can ascribe the consciousness of Bruno Marchal
to both, but each one will ascribe their present "here and now" type
of consciousness only to themselves subjectively. They will ascribe as
you do consciousness to the other only intellectually (as you do).
And, as I have repeated many times, the probability we try to evaluate
bears on the future 1-views, not on the 3-views we can have on those 1-
> But n Helsinki you cannot know for sure in which city you will
Asking why you are the Moscow man not the Washington man is exactly
like asking why you are Bruno Marchal and not John K Clark.
Possible. I do agree with this. But there is a difference. John and
Bruno have already differentiated. But in the WM duplication
experience, we duplicate instantaneous computational state by a
special duplicator machine, so that we can ask the question to the guy
before the duplication. Such a clear protocol is lacking for the
question of being me or you. Should we ask a common ancestor, the
first amoeba, the first primate? In the duplication, we ask the
question precisely to the guy in Helsinki, before the duplication is
> Basically the 1-view is the subjective(*) experience, and the 3-
view is what an outsider can "objectively" described.
Then you can give no examples where according to the 3-view things
are identical but according to the 1-view they are not, although
it's easy to find examples where according to the 1-view things are
identical but by the 3-view they are not.
That's my point. So you grasp very well the difference between 1-view
and 3-view. So I have no clue what difficulties you seem to have but
never succeed to convey.
So when you complain that I'm just looking at things from the 3-view
and from only that view are things identical your complaint is
I complain only when you say that there is no indeterminacy at step 3.
But you seem to oscillate. For you accept the comp 1-indeterminacy,
and then you reject it, and so one.
There are almost certainly lots of cases where two minds are
identical from the 1-view but different from the 3-view, but at the
very least I know for certain if they are identical from the 3-view
they are identical from the 1-view, and it's the 1-view that I'm
really interested in. If things are identical objectively then they
are identical subjectively, the reverse is not necessarily true but
it can be.
We agree on this since the start.
> You have to consider two classical teleportation experiences, from
Earth to Mars. So you are read on Earth, annihilated on Earth and
reconstituted on Mars from the info sent by some laser beam.
I'm not clear on what was annihilated on Earth, it wasn't matter and
it wasn't information and I don't believe in the soul.
It is your body, which is annihilated on earth. You are "read" and
> In the first experience there are no special delays of
reconstitution, in the second experience a delay of one year is
introduced, and you are reconstituted one year later.
That delay is significant objectively but subjectively its not
important, I know this because subjectively it's not even detectable
so it can't effect your consciousness, and subjectivity is what
OK. Good. We can go to step 5. See below.
Of, course we are or should be interested in the relation between the
objective and the subjective, and the light or difficulties that comp
put on all this.
> I use mars, to ensure that you have no environmental clue of the
time passed in your neighborhood.
So in this case the subjective experience would be the same even
though objectively it is different.
Which shows that you grasp well the 1-view and the 3-view.
So it is weird that you still see a problem somewhere, which is just a
confusion between the intellectual 3-view on 1-views that we can
ascribe to other people and their own "directly knowable by each of
> the 1-view remains completely identical "I was on earth and now I
am on Mars".
And information can be duplicated so it could simultaneously be "I
was on earth and now I am on Venus".
And so whatever means you are using to evaluate the probabilities of
your next 1-view, it will not change if a delay is introduced
If you are read and cut in Helsinki, and pasted two days after on
Mars, and three years after on Venus, and nowhere else, your
probability, evaluated in Helsinki to find yourself on Mars or on
Venus is the same as the probability evaluated if you are pasted at
the same time on Venus and Mars. OK?
This is a point where a known theory of identity gives a different
result. Indeed Robert Nozick argues that in this case the probability
is one to be on Mars (where you are pasted well before being pasted on
Venus). This is his "closer continuer assumption", and I see that you
agree with me that it violates the comp theory.
> you look around you, may be you ask some people on the street in
which city you are
Different city or different planet, subjectively its just a question
on what information you receive.
The protocol is the same as in step 1, except that the "original" (=
the body in Helsinki) is no more annihilated.
So you are read and NOT cut in Helsinki, and you are reconstituted in
Do you agree that if the comp-1-indeterminacy is given by P(W) = P(M)
= 1/2 in the WM-duplication experiment, and thus with annihilation of
the "original" (the body of the guy in Helsinki), then the probability
is 1/2 to find oneself in Sidney, or in Washington, in this
teleportation experiment, where, I repeat, the original is only read
and non cut? Do you agree that this is just a duplication?
In case you object to the specific P = 1/2 in the WM-duplication, you
can use any other probability or uncertainty evaluation.
The point is not on the specific way we evaluate the indeterminacy,
only on the existence on a indeterminacy bearing on the
reconstitutions done in those experiment, and on the invariance of the
probabilities for the introduction of delays.
For the step 5, to see the point, you can consider that "NOT being
annihilated" is equivalent, subjectively, to an annihilation followed
by a reconstitution with a delay which is null.
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