On 02 Apr 2012, at 18:14, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Apr 1, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>> you've added tons of bells and whistles but for all the complex convolutions you have not added one single bit of additional information about what is likely to happen.

> On the contrary, comp entails that you should expect white noice for the multiplication movie experience

But non-comp predicts exactly the same thing simply because the number of states the screen can be in that we would put in the category "white noise" is far greater than the number of states we would put in the "Monty Python movie" category; and this would be true even if the Bible thumpers were right about the soul and consciousness, which means your thought experiment and all the numerous copies of you are a useless complication in investigating these questions.

The point is that comp predicts white noise.
That something else predicts white noise too is not relevant in the proof.

> that you should expect the WM duplication as equivalent with the throw of a random coin, etc. But you don't need to agree with that analysis. You need only to agree that there is an indeterminacy

Of course there is a indeterminacy!

Don't say of course. That is not so obvious as your posts illustrates. After all, "officially" the thesis has been rejected (in Brussels, before it being accepted in Lille) at step 3. This might be enough to say that it is new, and not understood so quickly by many.

A key part of your thought experiment is that a million pixels on a screen change at RANDOM 60 times a second from black to white for 2 hours,

In the 3-view there is no randomness at all. In the protocol, we don't change the pixels randomly, neither in the comp multiplication-movie experience, nor in the quantum wave which evolves deterministically. The point is that the randomness bears on the first person experiences. We get this directly with comp, without assuming QM.

being RANDOM you can't (or at least should not) be certain what you'll see on the screen. If Everett is right the indeterminacy is purely a measure of lack of information on your part and that information exists you just don't have it. If you knew what branch of the multiverse you were in, what particular universe you were in, you'd know for certain what you were going to see on that screen; if you are in a Monty Python branch you will see a Monty Python movie and if you're in a white noise branch you'll see white noise. Once again your "1-view indeterminacy" brings nothing new to the mix.

What is new is that we get it without postulating quantum physics. It is not so new, I publish it in the 80 (and make it public before in many conferences).

But the question is not if it is new or not. The question is do you get the point of step 3, which shows that comp entails that objective indeterminacy on the subjective experiences.

(Note also that "objective" is used temporarily. later we will see that "physically objective" is not a 1-view, but a 1-plural view. yet, at this stage, we can use "objective", because it refers only to the content of a diary of an outsider looking at the experience without doing it himself).

I can hear you say, but that's the point, you don't know what branch you are in until you see white noise or Monty Python on that screen. But according to Everett until you see something unique on that screen that nobody else in any universe sees you are not in that branch because that branch does not exist, seeing Monty Python is exactly what makes it the Monty Python branch.

There is a little nuance, the one between duplication of worlds or differentiation of worlds. But it is not really relevant at this stage. So indeed, that's the point. But note that comp does not assume QM, yet explains the existence of a phenomenologically similar indeterminacy.

> So I think we could move on step 4. You cannot stop in a middle on a proof on the pretext that you have learn nothing.

I can understand your desire to gloss over this major difficulty

I thought you just grasped it. What major difficulty? The only one you have ever mentionned as been shown to be a confusion of 1-view and 3- view (or on the 3-view on the 1-views, and the 1-views themselves. Reread perhaps the preceding posts).

and move on, but I feel that if a proof has made a blunder it's pointless to read more.

Which blunder?

> There is a difference between anything can happen in the "reality", and anything can happen in the next moment.

And what difference is that?

The conditional probabilities. Everett, and also comp (as you will see later) predict that everything (consistent) happens, but with different relative probability. If I put water on the gas, there are worlds where it freeze, and there are worlds where it boils hot. To take a decision I need to have trust that I can influence the worlds, so I need laws, and laws explains why some happening are more probable, relatively to my current sate, than others.

> If Everett is right the probability must be derived from the statistics of measurements *as described by the wave evolution*.

If Everett is right then you can use the square of the absolute value of the Schrodinger Wave Equation to help you guess which branch you are in, he says it's the best guess you can make with the limited information you have at your disposal, it's not perfect but it's the best we can do. However if Everett is right everything that can happen to you will happen to you somewhere in some branch of the multiverse.

But we are interested in evaluating the relative probabilities. Everett can use the P = A^2, and the point of UDA will be that with comp we have to justify both the A and the P=A^2 from arithmetic. But let us not anticipate.

> The distinction you are introducing concerns what the outsider can write in his diary (the 3-view), it does not bear on the individual diary contents (the 1-views).

I see, the contents of the diary are 3-view but the diary contents are 1-view. No I take that back, I don't see.

Please read what I say. This is also explained in my other posts and in sane04. You confuse the diary of the outsider, which does not enter the transporter/duplicator boxes and the diaries of the transported people. OK, I could have been more precise here, but I was short just because I have already explained this more than one time, and it is well defined in the paper, which I guess you are reading.

> After the experience, both "concedes" that they feel in one city, as they describe in their respective diary, and both recognize that they don't feel to be in both city, and that they don't feel any possible sensation of their respective doppelganger.

And both will record in their diary that they are Bruno Marchal, in fact they both insist on this point very very strongly, and I the outside observer can find absolutely no reason to say that one is more Bruno Marchal-like than the other,


so if I told you before the duplication that you would see Washington AND Moscow I would be correct, Bruno Marchal will indeed see both cities.

That the 3-view on the 1-view. But the probabilities bears on the 1- views themselves. You can ascribe the consciousness of Bruno Marchal to both, but each one will ascribe their present "here and now" type of consciousness only to themselves subjectively. They will ascribe as you do consciousness to the other only intellectually (as you do). And, as I have repeated many times, the probability we try to evaluate bears on the future 1-views, not on the 3-views we can have on those 1- views.

> But n Helsinki you cannot know for sure in which city you will wake up.

Asking why you are the Moscow man not the Washington man is exactly like asking why you are Bruno Marchal and not John K Clark.

Possible. I do agree with this. But there is a difference. John and Bruno have already differentiated. But in the WM duplication experience, we duplicate instantaneous computational state by a special duplicator machine, so that we can ask the question to the guy before the duplication. Such a clear protocol is lacking for the question of being me or you. Should we ask a common ancestor, the first amoeba, the first primate? In the duplication, we ask the question precisely to the guy in Helsinki, before the duplication is proceeded.

> Basically the 1-view is the subjective(*) experience, and the 3- view is what an outsider can "objectively" described.

Then you can give no examples where according to the 3-view things are identical but according to the 1-view they are not, although it's easy to find examples where according to the 1-view things are identical but by the 3-view they are not.

That's my point. So you grasp very well the difference between 1-view and 3-view. So I have no clue what difficulties you seem to have but never succeed to convey.

So when you complain that I'm just looking at things from the 3-view and from only that view are things identical your complaint is ridiculous.

I complain only when you say that there is no indeterminacy at step 3.
But you seem to oscillate. For you accept the comp 1-indeterminacy, and then you reject it, and so one.

There are almost certainly lots of cases where two minds are identical from the 1-view but different from the 3-view, but at the very least I know for certain if they are identical from the 3-view they are identical from the 1-view, and it's the 1-view that I'm really interested in. If things are identical objectively then they are identical subjectively, the reverse is not necessarily true but it can be.

We agree on this since the start.

> You have to consider two classical teleportation experiences, from Earth to Mars. So you are read on Earth, annihilated on Earth and reconstituted on Mars from the info sent by some laser beam.

I'm not clear on what was annihilated on Earth, it wasn't matter and it wasn't information and I don't believe in the soul.

It is your body, which is annihilated on earth. You are "read" and "cut".

> In the first experience there are no special delays of reconstitution, in the second experience a delay of one year is introduced, and you are reconstituted one year later.

That delay is significant objectively but subjectively its not important, I know this because subjectively it's not even detectable so it can't effect your consciousness, and subjectivity is what interests me.

OK. Good. We can go to step 5. See below.

Of, course we are or should be interested in the relation between the objective and the subjective, and the light or difficulties that comp put on all this.

> I use mars, to ensure that you have no environmental clue of the time passed in your neighborhood.

So in this case the subjective experience would be the same even though objectively it is different.

Which shows that you grasp well the 1-view and the 3-view.
So it is weird that you still see a problem somewhere, which is just a confusion between the intellectual 3-view on 1-views that we can ascribe to other people and their own "directly knowable by each of them" 1-views.

> the 1-view remains completely identical "I was on earth and now I am on Mars".

And information can be duplicated so it could simultaneously be "I was on earth and now I am on Venus".

And so whatever means you are using to evaluate the probabilities of your next 1-view, it will not change if a delay is introduced asymmetrically.

If you are read and cut in Helsinki, and pasted two days after on Mars, and three years after on Venus, and nowhere else, your probability, evaluated in Helsinki to find yourself on Mars or on Venus is the same as the probability evaluated if you are pasted at the same time on Venus and Mars. OK?

This is a point where a known theory of identity gives a different result. Indeed Robert Nozick argues that in this case the probability is one to be on Mars (where you are pasted well before being pasted on Venus). This is his "closer continuer assumption", and I see that you agree with me that it violates the comp theory.

> you look around you, may be you ask some people on the street in which city you are

Different city or different planet, subjectively its just a question on what information you receive.


Step 5.

The protocol is the same as in step 1, except that the "original" (= the body in Helsinki) is no more annihilated.

So you are read and NOT cut in Helsinki, and you are reconstituted in Sidney.

Do you agree that if the comp-1-indeterminacy is given by P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 in the WM-duplication experiment, and thus with annihilation of the "original" (the body of the guy in Helsinki), then the probability is 1/2 to find oneself in Sidney, or in Washington, in this teleportation experiment, where, I repeat, the original is only read and non cut? Do you agree that this is just a duplication?

In case you object to the specific P = 1/2 in the WM-duplication, you can use any other probability or uncertainty evaluation. The point is not on the specific way we evaluate the indeterminacy, only on the existence on a indeterminacy bearing on the reconstitutions done in those experiment, and on the invariance of the probabilities for the introduction of delays.

For the step 5, to see the point, you can consider that "NOT being annihilated" is equivalent, subjectively, to an annihilation followed by a reconstitution with a delay which is null.



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