On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> You confuse "consciousness of being here and now" with "consciousness
> would be here and now".
>

How in the world could anybody be confused by a idea stated as crystal
clearly as you just did ?

>
> >>  And the only answer you can receive will come from a trivial
>> application of the anthropic principle, "I will become the Moscow man if
>> events transpire so that I meet the definition of the Moscow man, namely
>> that I see Moscow".
>>
>
> > Which avoids again to answer to the question asked.
>

The reason I'm not the Moscow man is that I'm the Washington man and the
reason I'm the Washington man is that I saw Washington and the probability
the Helsinki man will see Moscow and Washington is 100%. What more is there
to say on this rather dull subject?


> >>   I repeat yet again, give me a single concrete example of two things
>> being identical by the "3-view" but not by "the 1-views themselves" and you
>> will have won this argument
>>
>
>
>
> I have been duplicated in W and M and I feel myself in W.
> or
> I have been duplicated in W and M and i feel myself in M.
> Those are different in the 1-views (as different as seeing M and seeing W),
>

Right.

> But are equal in the 3-view, where I am in both cities.


WRONG! From my 3-view I can clearly see that the brain of Bruno Washington
is different from the brain of Bruno Moscow, one has memories, that is to
say physical changes in the brain, of the sights and sounds of Washington
while the other has brain changes signifying the sights and sounds of
Moscow; because of the changes in physical structure the two brains operate
differently, or to say the same thing with different words, I the third
party can see that the mind of Bruno Washington is different from the mind
of Bruno Moscow.  Provided that Washington is different from Moscow (I've
never been to Moscow but I imagine that it is) then the brain of Bruno
Washington is physically different from the brain of Bruno Moscow, and I
the third party observer can see those physical differences, and if the
construction of those two objects are different then the way they operate,
the mind, is different too.

Try again. Give me a single concrete example of two things being identical
by the "3-view" but not by "the 1-views themselves" and you will have won
this argument.

>>  Who cares? How is it relevant to the copies if the original is cut or
>> not cut as long as he's read?
>>
>
>
> If the original is cut, the probability to wake up at Helsinki is 0.
>

But the Helsinki man is not a copy, it's irrelevant to the copies in Moscow
and Washington what happens to the original.

> By comp we can simulate Moscow and Washington precisely enough so that
> you cannot see the difference for some non null interval. The question is
> "do you agree that this does not change the evaluation of the
> indeterminacy?
>

Yes I agree it does not change, this "1-view indeterminacy" of yours is
nonsense if the cities are real and its nonsense if the cities are
virtual.

 John K Clark

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