On 04 Apr 2012, at 18:26, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> You confuse "consciousness of being here and now" with
"consciousness would be here and now".
How in the world could anybody be confused by a idea stated as
crystal clearly as you just did ?
You can be conscious of being here and now. That expression is
traditional, and used in many place, and we have already used it to
illustrate the fact that the cnscious feeling "here and now" is
undoubtable, as opposed to the idea that being conscious five minutes
ago and five minutes from now is already doubtable, and you did agree.
I was just saying that consciousness of a localization does not entail
the localization of consciousness. You argument was confusing those
two different thing. We agree that consciousness is not something
localisable, but this does not entail that we cannot have a conscious
experience of being localised somewhere, like when we say "I visited
Bombay last week-end".
>> And the only answer you can receive will come from a trivial
application of the anthropic principle, "I will become the Moscow
man if events transpire so that I meet the definition of the Moscow
man, namely that I see Moscow".
> Which avoids again to answer to the question asked.
The reason I'm not the Moscow man is that I'm the Washington man and
the reason I'm the Washington man is that I saw Washington and the
probability the Helsinki man will see Moscow and Washington is 100%.
What more is there to say on this rather dull subject?
That you give the probability that the guy will be in W and M from a
third person point of view, when we ask the probability on his future
first person point of view. the criteria of confirmation is given, by
definition, from the result of the self-localization provided by the
persons after their duplication.
In that case, it cannot be 100%, because the guy in M does not feel
himself to be in W, and vice versa.
You still confuse the 3-view on the 1-views (an outsider can ascribe
the consciousness of John K Clark to both persons in each city), with
the 1-views on the 1-views ("Ah, I see I am the one in W" and "Ah, I
see I am the one in M"). In Helsinki, he could not know in advance
which one he can happen to be. If you think he could, give me the
>> I repeat yet again, give me a single concrete example of two
things being identical by the "3-view" but not by "the 1-views
themselves" and you will have won this argument
> I have been duplicated in W and M and I feel myself in W.
I have been duplicated in W and M and i feel myself in M.
Those are different in the 1-views (as different as seeing M and
> But are equal in the 3-view, where I am in both cities.
WRONG! From my 3-view I can clearly see that the brain of Bruno
Washington is different from the brain of Bruno Moscow, one has
memories, that is to say physical changes in the brain, of the
sights and sounds of Washington while the other has brain changes
signifying the sights and sounds of Moscow; because of the changes
in physical structure the two brains operate differently, or to say
the same thing with different words, I the third party can see that
the mind of Bruno Washington is different from the mind of Bruno
Moscow. Provided that Washington is different from Moscow (I've
never been to Moscow but I imagine that it is) then the brain of
Bruno Washington is physically different from the brain of Bruno
Moscow, and I the third party observer can see those physical
differences, and if the construction of those two objects are
different then the way they operate, the mind, is different too.
But this contradict the fact that you agree both person are the
Helsinki guy. You are again transforming "I cannot know for sure I
will feel myself in W or M" with I can be sure that the guy in M will
see M and the guy in W will see W, which is does not answer the
question in asked to him in Helsinki.
Try again. Give me a single concrete example of two things being
identical by the "3-view" but not by "the 1-views themselves" and
you will have won this argument.
>> Who cares? How is it relevant to the copies if the original is
cut or not cut as long as he's read?
> If the original is cut, the probability to wake up at Helsinki is 0.
But the Helsinki man is not a copy, it's irrelevant to the copies in
Moscow and Washington what happens to the original.
Of course, but the question is asked before the reading is done. The
question is asked to the guy in Helsinki before the experiment is
done. So the probability is 1/3, instead of 1/2 in the preceding WM
duplication with annihilation of the original.
It is equivalent to a multiplication by three, with a null delay of
reconstitution on one branch. Isn't it?
> By comp we can simulate Moscow and Washington precisely enough so
that you cannot see the difference for some non null interval. The
question is "do you agree that this does not change the evaluation
of the indeterminacy?
Yes I agree it does not change, this "1-view indeterminacy" of yours
is nonsense if the cities are real
You have not shown that. It is non sense for you because you keep
avoiding the difference between the 3-view-on-1-view, and the 1-view
themselves (or 1-view on 1-view). You oscillate between trivial, non
sense, and 100%. I can't figure out what is your objection.
and its nonsense if the cities are virtual.
The question is asked. If you believe in comp, you know that after the
duplication you will not feel to be in two places at once, so it makes
sense to evaluate (or to try to evaluate) the chance that you will be
in this or that city. If you say 100% for Washington, by definition of
the 1-views, the you-in-Moscow will have to admit having been wrong,
and vice versa.
Likewise, in the multiplication movie experience, the white-noise
movie is far more probable that seeing any particular movie, because
the majority of the John K Clark will see such random movie.
Just keep in mind that the question is asked always before the
duplication experience and that the answer you give before the
experience is verified by interviewing all the resulting person about
their personal experiences, not about the experience of their
So I ask you again what is the probability that you will actually live
the experience "seeing the movie flying circus" in the multiplication
movie experience. remember that by definition, to verify your answer,
I will ask to each John K Clark which movie they have actually seen
and ask them if that confirms their prediction. the answer "all movie"
is already no more possible, because you already know, by comp, that
you, any of your "yous", will feel to see only one movie.
If any one else can help John K Clark to make his point, please help
him. If some people believe, like I begin to believe, that John Clark
only fake to not understand, and that I should abandon to try, please
give your opinion, because I begin to feel like we are going in
circle, always coming back with what I see as a confusion between the
3-views on the many 1-views of all doppelgangers, and the 1-views as
lived individually by each doppelgangers, and which is on what the
probability, asked before the experience begins, is asked. How can
John not seen that difference? Is he only joking or what? Any idea?
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