On 4 April 2012 18:55, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> If any one else can help John K Clark to make his point, please help him. If
> some people believe, like I begin to believe, that John Clark only fake to
> not understand, and that I should abandon to try, please give your opinion,
> because I begin to feel like we are going in circle, always coming back with
> what I see as a confusion between the 3-views on the many 1-views of all
> doppelgangers, and the 1-views as lived individually by each doppelgangers,
> and which is on what the probability, asked before the experience begins, is
> asked. How can John not seen that difference? Is he only joking or what? Any
> idea?

It's not entirely clear to me that John is more committed to
clarifying the issues than to trying to make a fool of you.  I'm
beginning to suspect the latter might be the case, though I would
prefer to be charitable in my assessment of the motives of anyone who
commits so much time to posting on this list.  As for "helping", I
notice that he hasn't commented on any of the points I raised in my
recent post in this regard, though others have done so.  As someone
once remarked, the obvious can be elusive, so disagreement is no
problem, but there must be an underlying commitment to seriousness and
respect for the dialogue to be fruitful.

David

>
> On 04 Apr 2012, at 18:26, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>> > You confuse "consciousness of being here and now" with "consciousness
>> > would be here and now".
>
>
> How in the world could anybody be confused by a idea stated as crystal
> clearly as you just did ?
>
>
> You can be conscious of being here and now. That expression is traditional,
> and used in many place, and we have already used it to illustrate the fact
> that the cnscious feeling "here and now" is undoubtable, as opposed to the
> idea that being conscious five minutes ago and five minutes from now is
> already doubtable, and you did agree.
>
> I was just saying that consciousness of a localization does not entail the
> localization of consciousness. You argument was confusing those two
> different thing. We agree that consciousness is not something localisable,
> but this does not entail that we cannot have a conscious experience of being
> localised somewhere, like when we say "I visited Bombay last week-end".
>
>
>
>
>>>
>>> >>  And the only answer you can receive will come from a trivial
>>> >> application of the anthropic principle, "I will become the Moscow man if
>>> >> events transpire so that I meet the definition of the Moscow man, namely
>>> >> that I see Moscow".
>>
>>
>> > Which avoids again to answer to the question asked.
>
>
> The reason I'm not the Moscow man is that I'm the Washington man and the
> reason I'm the Washington man is that I saw Washington and the probability
> the Helsinki man will see Moscow and Washington is 100%. What more is there
> to say on this rather dull subject?
>
>
> That you give the probability that the guy will be in W and M from a third
> person point of view, when we ask the probability on his future first person
> point of view. the criteria of confirmation is given, by definition, from
> the result of the self-localization provided by the persons after their
> duplication.
> In that case, it cannot be 100%, because the guy in M does not feel himself
> to be in W, and vice versa.
> You still confuse the 3-view on the 1-views (an outsider can ascribe the
> consciousness of John K Clark to both persons in each city), with the
> 1-views on the 1-views ("Ah, I see I am the one in W" and "Ah, I see I am
> the one in M"). In Helsinki, he could not know in advance which one he can
> happen to be. If you think he could, give me the algorithm.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>>
>>> >>   I repeat yet again, give me a single concrete example of two things
>>> >> being identical by the "3-view" but not by "the 1-views themselves" and 
>>> >> you
>>> >> will have won this argument
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > I have been duplicated in W and M and I feel myself in W.
>> or
>> I have been duplicated in W and M and i feel myself in M.
>> Those are different in the 1-views (as different as seeing M and seeing
>> W),
>
>
> Right.
>
>> > But are equal in the 3-view, where I am in both cities.
>
>
> WRONG! From my 3-view I can clearly see that the brain of Bruno Washington
> is different from the brain of Bruno Moscow, one has memories, that is to
> say physical changes in the brain, of the sights and sounds of Washington
> while the other has brain changes signifying the sights and sounds of
> Moscow; because of the changes in physical structure the two brains operate
> differently, or to say the same thing with different words, I the third
> party can see that the mind of Bruno Washington is different from the mind
> of Bruno Moscow.  Provided that Washington is different from Moscow (I've
> never been to Moscow but I imagine that it is) then the brain of Bruno
> Washington is physically different from the brain of Bruno Moscow, and I the
> third party observer can see those physical differences, and if the
> construction of those two objects are different then the way they operate,
> the mind, is different too.
>
>
> But this contradict the fact that you agree both person are the Helsinki
> guy. You are again transforming "I cannot know for sure I will feel myself
> in W or M" with I can be sure that the guy in M will see M and the guy in W
> will see W, which is does not answer the question in asked to him in
> Helsinki.
>
>
>
>
> Try again. Give me a single concrete example of two things being identical
> by the "3-view" but not by "the 1-views themselves" and you will have won
> this argument.
>
>>> >>  Who cares? How is it relevant to the copies if the original is cut or
>>> >> not cut as long as he's read?
>>
>>
>>
>> > If the original is cut, the probability to wake up at Helsinki is 0.
>
>
> But the Helsinki man is not a copy, it's irrelevant to the copies in Moscow
> and Washington what happens to the original.
>
>
> Of course, but the question is asked before the reading is done. The
> question is asked to the guy in Helsinki before the experiment is done. So
> the probability is 1/3, instead of 1/2 in the preceding WM duplication with
> annihilation of the original.
>
> It is equivalent to a multiplication by three, with a null delay of
> reconstitution on one branch. Isn't it?
>
>
>
>> > By comp we can simulate Moscow and Washington precisely enough so that
>> > you cannot see the difference for some non null interval. The question is
>> > "do you agree that this does not change the evaluation of the 
>> > indeterminacy?
>
>
> Yes I agree it does not change, this "1-view indeterminacy" of yours is
> nonsense if the cities are real
>
>
> You have not shown that. It is non sense for you because you keep avoiding
> the difference between the 3-view-on-1-view, and the 1-view themselves (or
> 1-view on 1-view). You oscillate between trivial, non sense, and 100%. I
> can't figure out what is your objection.
>
>
> and its nonsense if the cities are virtual.
>
>
> The question is asked. If you believe in comp, you know that after the
> duplication you will not feel to be in two places at once, so it makes sense
> to evaluate (or to try to evaluate) the chance that you will be in this or
> that city. If you say 100% for Washington, by definition of the 1-views, the
> you-in-Moscow will have to admit having been wrong, and vice versa.
>
> Likewise, in the multiplication movie experience, the white-noise movie is
> far more probable that seeing any particular movie, because the majority of
> the John K Clark will see such random movie.
>
> Just keep in mind that the question is asked always before the duplication
> experience and that the answer you give before the experience is verified by
> interviewing all the resulting person about their personal experiences, not
> about the experience of their doppelgangers.
>
> So I ask you again what is the probability that you will actually live the
> experience "seeing the movie flying circus" in the multiplication movie
> experience. remember that by definition, to verify your answer, I will ask
> to each John K Clark which movie they have actually seen and ask them if
> that confirms their prediction. the answer "all movie" is already no more
> possible, because you already know, by comp, that you, any of your "yous",
> will feel to see only one movie.
>
> If any one else can help John K Clark to make his point, please help him. If
> some people believe, like I begin to believe, that John Clark only fake to
> not understand, and that I should abandon to try, please give your opinion,
> because I begin to feel like we are going in circle, always coming back with
> what I see as a confusion between the 3-views on the many 1-views of all
> doppelgangers, and the 1-views as lived individually by each doppelgangers,
> and which is on what the probability, asked before the experience begins, is
> asked. How can John not seen that difference? Is he only joking or what? Any
> idea?
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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