On 4/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Apr 2012, at 18:26, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be
> You confuse "consciousness of being here and now" with "consciousness
here and now".
How in the world could anybody be confused by a idea stated as crystal clearly as you
just did ?
You can be conscious of being here and now. That expression is traditional, and used in
many place, and we have already used it to illustrate the fact that the cnscious feeling
"here and now" is undoubtable, as opposed to the idea that being conscious five minutes
ago and five minutes from now is already doubtable, and you did agree.
I was just saying that consciousness of a localization does not entail the localization
of consciousness. You argument was confusing those two different thing. We agree that
consciousness is not something localisable, but this does not entail that we cannot have
a conscious experience of being localised somewhere, like when we say "I visited Bombay
>> And the only answer you can receive will come from a trivial
the anthropic principle, "I will become the Moscow man if events transpire
I meet the definition of the Moscow man, namely that I see Moscow".
> Which avoids again to answer to the question asked.
The reason I'm not the Moscow man is that I'm the Washington man and the reason I'm the
Washington man is that I saw Washington and the probability the Helsinki man will see
Moscow and Washington is 100%. What more is there to say on this rather dull subject?
That you give the probability that the guy will be in W and M from a third person point
of view, when we ask the probability on his future first person point of view. the
criteria of confirmation is given, by definition, from the result of the
self-localization provided by the persons after their duplication.
In that case, it cannot be 100%, because the guy in M does not feel himself to be in W,
and vice versa.
You still confuse the 3-view on the 1-views (an outsider can ascribe the consciousness
of John K Clark to both persons in each city), with the 1-views on the 1-views ("Ah, I
see I am the one in W" and "Ah, I see I am the one in M"). In Helsinki, he could not
know in advance which one he can happen to be. If you think he could, give me the
>> I repeat yet again, give me a single concrete example of two
identical by the "3-view" but not by "the 1-views themselves" and you
won this argument
> I have been duplicated in W and M and I feel myself in W.
I have been duplicated in W and M and i feel myself in M.
Those are different in the 1-views (as different as seeing M and seeing W),
> But are equal in the 3-view, where I am in both cities.
WRONG! From my 3-view I can clearly see that the brain of Bruno Washington is different
from the brain of Bruno Moscow, one has memories, that is to say physical changes in
the brain, of the sights and sounds of Washington while the other has brain changes
signifying the sights and sounds of Moscow; because of the changes in physical
structure the two brains operate differently, or to say the same thing with different
words, I the third party can see that the mind of Bruno Washington is different from
the mind of Bruno Moscow. Provided that Washington is different from Moscow (I've
never been to Moscow but I imagine that it is) then the brain of Bruno Washington is
physically different from the brain of Bruno Moscow, and I the third party observer can
see those physical differences, and if the construction of those two objects are
different then the way they operate, the mind, is different too.
But this contradict the fact that you agree both person are the Helsinki guy. You are
again transforming "I cannot know for sure I will feel myself in W or M" with I can be
sure that the guy in M will see M and the guy in W will see W, which is does not answer
the question in asked to him in Helsinki.
Try again. Give me a single concrete example of two things being identical by the
"3-view" but not by "the 1-views themselves" and you will have won this argument.
>> Who cares? How is it relevant to the copies if the original is cut
cut as long as he's read?
> If the original is cut, the probability to wake up at Helsinki is 0.
But the Helsinki man is not a copy, it's irrelevant to the copies in Moscow and
Washington what happens to the original.
Of course, but the question is asked before the reading is done. The question is asked
to the guy in Helsinki before the experiment is done. So the probability is 1/3, instead
of 1/2 in the preceding WM duplication with annihilation of the original.
It is equivalent to a multiplication by three, with a null delay of reconstitution on
one branch. Isn't it?
> By comp we can simulate Moscow and Washington precisely enough so that
see the difference for some non null interval. The question is "do you
this does not change the evaluation of the indeterminacy?
Yes I agree it does not change, this "1-view indeterminacy" of yours is nonsense if the
cities are real
You have not shown that. It is non sense for you because you keep avoiding the
difference between the 3-view-on-1-view, and the 1-view themselves (or 1-view on
1-view). You oscillate between trivial, non sense, and 100%. I can't figure out what is
and its nonsense if the cities are virtual.
The question is asked. If you believe in comp, you know that after the duplication you
will not feel to be in two places at once, so it makes sense to evaluate (or to try to
evaluate) the chance that you will be in this or that city. If you say 100% for
Washington, by definition of the 1-views, the you-in-Moscow will have to admit having
been wrong, and vice versa.
Likewise, in the multiplication movie experience, the white-noise movie is far more
probable that seeing any particular movie, because the majority of the John K Clark will
see such random movie.
Just keep in mind that the question is asked always before the duplication experience
and that the answer you give before the experience is verified by interviewing all the
resulting person about their personal experiences, not about the experience of their
So I ask you again what is the probability that you will actually live the experience
"seeing the movie flying circus" in the multiplication movie experience. remember that
by definition, to verify your answer, I will ask to each John K Clark which movie they
have actually seen and ask them if that confirms their prediction. the answer "all
movie" is already no more possible, because you already know, by comp, that you, any of
your "yous", will feel to see only one movie.
I notice that it seems clear enough if you just duplicate the diary. You write "This
diary will be in Washtington." and then when there are two diaries, the one in Washington
is right and the one is Moscow in wrong. The diaries don't need to experience anything.
As macroscopic objects they have definite spacetime locations and don't exist in a M+W
superposition. The use of indicial pronouns only produces a little semantic confusion. I
think John's presentation of his thought experiment is wrong - although it's logically
possible, it's nomologically impossible and not just technologically. Creating two copies
of a person must be two distinguishable copies just by position and "instantaneously
swapping their positions" is not nomologically possible. Somewhat the same problem
affects the transporter thought experiment. There will necessarily be a discontinuity
between the copies and the original - both in body and in consciousness. I don't think
that's fatal to Bruno's argument, but we need to get through the argument to see what
aspects of the thought experiment it actually relies on and which are otiose.
If any one else can help John K Clark to make his point, please help him. If some people
believe, like I begin to believe, that John Clark only fake to not understand, and that
I should abandon to try, please give your opinion, because I begin to feel like we are
going in circle, always coming back with what I see as a confusion between the 3-views
on the many 1-views of all doppelgangers, and the 1-views as lived individually by each
doppelgangers, and which is on what the probability, asked before the experience begins,
is asked. How can John not seen that difference? Is he only joking or what? Any idea?
I once had a friend Jim Johnson, who would say, "Nobody can prove anything to me it I
don't want'em to."
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at