On 4/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 04 Apr 2012, at 18:26, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:

    > You confuse "consciousness of being here and now" with "consciousness 
would be
    here and now".

How in the world could anybody be confused by a idea stated as crystal clearly as you just did ?

You can be conscious of being here and now. That expression is traditional, and used in many place, and we have already used it to illustrate the fact that the cnscious feeling "here and now" is undoubtable, as opposed to the idea that being conscious five minutes ago and five minutes from now is already doubtable, and you did agree.

I was just saying that consciousness of a localization does not entail the localization of consciousness. You argument was confusing those two different thing. We agree that consciousness is not something localisable, but this does not entail that we cannot have a conscious experience of being localised somewhere, like when we say "I visited Bombay last week-end".

    >>  And the only answer you can receive will come from a trivial 
application of
    the anthropic principle, "I will become the Moscow man if events transpire 
so that
    I meet the definition of the Moscow man, namely that I see Moscow".

    > Which avoids again to answer to the question asked.

The reason I'm not the Moscow man is that I'm the Washington man and the reason I'm the Washington man is that I saw Washington and the probability the Helsinki man will see Moscow and Washington is 100%. What more is there to say on this rather dull subject?

That you give the probability that the guy will be in W and M from a third person point of view, when we ask the probability on his future first person point of view. the criteria of confirmation is given, by definition, from the result of the self-localization provided by the persons after their duplication. In that case, it cannot be 100%, because the guy in M does not feel himself to be in W, and vice versa. You still confuse the 3-view on the 1-views (an outsider can ascribe the consciousness of John K Clark to both persons in each city), with the 1-views on the 1-views ("Ah, I see I am the one in W" and "Ah, I see I am the one in M"). In Helsinki, he could not know in advance which one he can happen to be. If you think he could, give me the algorithm.

        >>   I repeat yet again, give me a single concrete example of two 
things being
        identical by the "3-view" but not by "the 1-views themselves" and you 
will have
        won this argument

    > I have been duplicated in W and M and I feel myself in W.
    I have been duplicated in W and M and i feel myself in M.
    Those are different in the 1-views (as different as seeing M and seeing W),


    > But are equal in the 3-view, where I am in both cities.

WRONG! From my 3-view I can clearly see that the brain of Bruno Washington is different from the brain of Bruno Moscow, one has memories, that is to say physical changes in the brain, of the sights and sounds of Washington while the other has brain changes signifying the sights and sounds of Moscow; because of the changes in physical structure the two brains operate differently, or to say the same thing with different words, I the third party can see that the mind of Bruno Washington is different from the mind of Bruno Moscow. Provided that Washington is different from Moscow (I've never been to Moscow but I imagine that it is) then the brain of Bruno Washington is physically different from the brain of Bruno Moscow, and I the third party observer can see those physical differences, and if the construction of those two objects are different then the way they operate, the mind, is different too.

But this contradict the fact that you agree both person are the Helsinki guy. You are again transforming "I cannot know for sure I will feel myself in W or M" with I can be sure that the guy in M will see M and the guy in W will see W, which is does not answer the question in asked to him in Helsinki.

Try again. Give me a single concrete example of two things being identical by the "3-view" but not by "the 1-views themselves" and you will have won this argument.

        >>  Who cares? How is it relevant to the copies if the original is cut 
or not
        cut as long as he's read?

    > If the original is cut, the probability to wake up at Helsinki is 0.

But the Helsinki man is not a copy, it's irrelevant to the copies in Moscow and Washington what happens to the original.

Of course, but the question is asked before the reading is done. The question is asked to the guy in Helsinki before the experiment is done. So the probability is 1/3, instead of 1/2 in the preceding WM duplication with annihilation of the original.

It is equivalent to a multiplication by three, with a null delay of reconstitution on one branch. Isn't it?

    > By comp we can simulate Moscow and Washington precisely enough so that 
you cannot
    see the difference for some non null interval. The question is "do you 
agree that
    this does not change the evaluation of the indeterminacy?

Yes I agree it does not change, this "1-view indeterminacy" of yours is nonsense if the cities are real

You have not shown that. It is non sense for you because you keep avoiding the difference between the 3-view-on-1-view, and the 1-view themselves (or 1-view on 1-view). You oscillate between trivial, non sense, and 100%. I can't figure out what is your objection.

and its nonsense if the cities are virtual.

The question is asked. If you believe in comp, you know that after the duplication you will not feel to be in two places at once, so it makes sense to evaluate (or to try to evaluate) the chance that you will be in this or that city. If you say 100% for Washington, by definition of the 1-views, the you-in-Moscow will have to admit having been wrong, and vice versa.

Likewise, in the multiplication movie experience, the white-noise movie is far more probable that seeing any particular movie, because the majority of the John K Clark will see such random movie.

Just keep in mind that the question is asked always before the duplication experience and that the answer you give before the experience is verified by interviewing all the resulting person about their personal experiences, not about the experience of their doppelgangers.

So I ask you again what is the probability that you will actually live the experience "seeing the movie flying circus" in the multiplication movie experience. remember that by definition, to verify your answer, I will ask to each John K Clark which movie they have actually seen and ask them if that confirms their prediction. the answer "all movie" is already no more possible, because you already know, by comp, that you, any of your "yous", will feel to see only one movie.

I notice that it seems clear enough if you just duplicate the diary. You write "This diary will be in Washtington." and then when there are two diaries, the one in Washington is right and the one is Moscow in wrong. The diaries don't need to experience anything. As macroscopic objects they have definite spacetime locations and don't exist in a M+W superposition. The use of indicial pronouns only produces a little semantic confusion. I think John's presentation of his thought experiment is wrong - although it's logically possible, it's nomologically impossible and not just technologically. Creating two copies of a person must be two distinguishable copies just by position and "instantaneously swapping their positions" is not nomologically possible. Somewhat the same problem affects the transporter thought experiment. There will necessarily be a discontinuity between the copies and the original - both in body and in consciousness. I don't think that's fatal to Bruno's argument, but we need to get through the argument to see what aspects of the thought experiment it actually relies on and which are otiose.

If any one else can help John K Clark to make his point, please help him. If some people believe, like I begin to believe, that John Clark only fake to not understand, and that I should abandon to try, please give your opinion, because I begin to feel like we are going in circle, always coming back with what I see as a confusion between the 3-views on the many 1-views of all doppelgangers, and the 1-views as lived individually by each doppelgangers, and which is on what the probability, asked before the experience begins, is asked. How can John not seen that difference? Is he only joking or what? Any idea?

I once had a friend Jim Johnson, who would say, "Nobody can prove anything to me it I don't want'em to."


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