On 04 Apr 2012, at 18:26, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
You confuse "consciousness of being here and now" with
would be here and now".
How in the world could anybody be confused by a idea stated as
clearly as you just did ?
You can be conscious of being here and now. That expression is
and used in many place, and we have already used it to illustrate
that the cnscious feeling "here and now" is undoubtable, as opposed
idea that being conscious five minutes ago and five minutes from
already doubtable, and you did agree.
I was just saying that consciousness of a localization does not
localization of consciousness. You argument was confusing those two
different thing. We agree that consciousness is not something
but this does not entail that we cannot have a conscious experience
localised somewhere, like when we say "I visited Bombay last week-
And the only answer you can receive will come from a trivial
application of the anthropic principle, "I will become the
Moscow man if
events transpire so that I meet the definition of the Moscow
that I see Moscow".
Which avoids again to answer to the question asked.
The reason I'm not the Moscow man is that I'm the Washington man
reason I'm the Washington man is that I saw Washington and the
the Helsinki man will see Moscow and Washington is 100%. What more
to say on this rather dull subject?
That you give the probability that the guy will be in W and M from
person point of view, when we ask the probability on his future
point of view. the criteria of confirmation is given, by
the result of the self-localization provided by the persons after
In that case, it cannot be 100%, because the guy in M does not feel
to be in W, and vice versa.
You still confuse the 3-view on the 1-views (an outsider can
consciousness of John K Clark to both persons in each city), with the
1-views on the 1-views ("Ah, I see I am the one in W" and "Ah, I
see I am
the one in M"). In Helsinki, he could not know in advance which one
happen to be. If you think he could, give me the algorithm.
I repeat yet again, give me a single concrete example of two
being identical by the "3-view" but not by "the 1-views
themselves" and you
will have won this argument
I have been duplicated in W and M and I feel myself in W.
I have been duplicated in W and M and i feel myself in M.
Those are different in the 1-views (as different as seeing M and
But are equal in the 3-view, where I am in both cities.
WRONG! From my 3-view I can clearly see that the brain of Bruno
is different from the brain of Bruno Moscow, one has memories, that
say physical changes in the brain, of the sights and sounds of
while the other has brain changes signifying the sights and sounds of
Moscow; because of the changes in physical structure the two brains
differently, or to say the same thing with different words, I the
party can see that the mind of Bruno Washington is different from
of Bruno Moscow. Provided that Washington is different from Moscow
never been to Moscow but I imagine that it is) then the brain of
Washington is physically different from the brain of Bruno Moscow,
and I the
third party observer can see those physical differences, and if the
construction of those two objects are different then the way they
the mind, is different too.
But this contradict the fact that you agree both person are the
guy. You are again transforming "I cannot know for sure I will feel
in W or M" with I can be sure that the guy in M will see M and the
guy in W
will see W, which is does not answer the question in asked to him in
Try again. Give me a single concrete example of two things being
by the "3-view" but not by "the 1-views themselves" and you will
Who cares? How is it relevant to the copies if the original
is cut or
not cut as long as he's read?
If the original is cut, the probability to wake up at Helsinki is
But the Helsinki man is not a copy, it's irrelevant to the copies
and Washington what happens to the original.
Of course, but the question is asked before the reading is done. The
question is asked to the guy in Helsinki before the experiment is
the probability is 1/3, instead of 1/2 in the preceding WM
annihilation of the original.
It is equivalent to a multiplication by three, with a null delay of
reconstitution on one branch. Isn't it?
By comp we can simulate Moscow and Washington precisely enough so
you cannot see the difference for some non null interval. The
"do you agree that this does not change the evaluation of the
Yes I agree it does not change, this "1-view indeterminacy" of
nonsense if the cities are real
You have not shown that. It is non sense for you because you keep
the difference between the 3-view-on-1-view, and the 1-view
1-view on 1-view). You oscillate between trivial, non sense, and
can't figure out what is your objection.
and its nonsense if the cities are virtual.
The question is asked. If you believe in comp, you know that after
duplication you will not feel to be in two places at once, so it
to evaluate (or to try to evaluate) the chance that you will be in
that city. If you say 100% for Washington, by definition of the 1-
you-in-Moscow will have to admit having been wrong, and vice versa.
Likewise, in the multiplication movie experience, the white-noise
far more probable that seeing any particular movie, because the
the John K Clark will see such random movie.
Just keep in mind that the question is asked always before the
experience and that the answer you give before the experience is
interviewing all the resulting person about their personal
about the experience of their doppelgangers.
So I ask you again what is the probability that you will actually
experience "seeing the movie flying circus" in the multiplication
experience. remember that by definition, to verify your answer, I
to each John K Clark which movie they have actually seen and ask
that confirms their prediction. the answer "all movie" is already
possible, because you already know, by comp, that you, any of your
will feel to see only one movie.
If any one else can help John K Clark to make his point, please
help him. If
some people believe, like I begin to believe, that John Clark only
not understand, and that I should abandon to try, please give your
because I begin to feel like we are going in circle, always coming
what I see as a confusion between the 3-views on the many 1-views
doppelgangers, and the 1-views as lived individually by each
and which is on what the probability, asked before the experience
asked. How can John not seen that difference? Is he only joking or
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