On 04 Apr 2012, at 21:52, meekerdb wrote:

On 4/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 04 Apr 2012, at 18:26, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:


> By comp we can simulate Moscow and Washington precisely enough so that you cannot see the difference for some non null interval. The question is "do you agree that this does not change the evaluation of the indeterminacy?

Yes I agree it does not change, this "1-view indeterminacy" of yours is nonsense if the cities are real

You have not shown that. It is non sense for you because you keep avoiding the difference between the 3-view-on-1-view, and the 1-view themselves (or 1-view on 1-view). You oscillate between trivial, non sense, and 100%. I can't figure out what is your objection.

and its nonsense if the cities are virtual.

The question is asked. If you believe in comp, you know that after the duplication you will not feel to be in two places at once, so it makes sense to evaluate (or to try to evaluate) the chance that you will be in this or that city. If you say 100% for Washington, by definition of the 1-views, the you-in-Moscow will have to admit having been wrong, and vice versa.

Likewise, in the multiplication movie experience, the white-noise movie is far more probable that seeing any particular movie, because the majority of the John K Clark will see such random movie.

Just keep in mind that the question is asked always before the duplication experience and that the answer you give before the experience is verified by interviewing all the resulting person about their personal experiences, not about the experience of their doppelgangers.

So I ask you again what is the probability that you will actually live the experience "seeing the movie flying circus" in the multiplication movie experience. remember that by definition, to verify your answer, I will ask to each John K Clark which movie they have actually seen and ask them if that confirms their prediction. the answer "all movie" is already no more possible, because you already know, by comp, that you, any of your "yous", will feel to see only one movie.

I notice that it seems clear enough if you just duplicate the diary.

Right. It is the point of approximating the first person experience by the memory or the diary. So it reduces the 1/3 distinction into going through the teletransportation or just looking at it from outside. And for the probability, you can replace the human observer by an inference inductive machine. The whole UDA can be done in the third person way.

You write "This diary will be in Washtington." and then when there are two diaries, the one in Washington is right and the one is Moscow in wrong. The diaries don't need to experience anything. As macroscopic objects they have definite spacetime locations and don't exist in a M+W superposition. The use of indicial pronouns only produces a little semantic confusion. I think John's presentation of his thought experiment is wrong - although it's logically possible, it's nomologically impossible and not just technologically. Creating two copies of a person must be two distinguishable copies just by position and "instantaneously swapping their positions" is not nomologically possible. Somewhat the same problem affects the transporter thought experiment. There will necessarily be a discontinuity between the copies and the original - both in body and in consciousness.

But such a discontinuity is relative to the implementation, and accepted as part of accepting that the brain is digital. So it is not clear if consciousness can see that discontinuity, except by the bare fact of being in a place and then in another one. More realistic real duplication would need encoding time, reconstitution time, but those becomes non relevant at the step seven.

I don't think that's fatal to Bruno's argument, but we need to get through the argument to see what aspects of the thought experiment it actually relies on and which are otiose.

Excellent point. A scientist rarely stops when he does not get a point, he always continue, because the next steps can indeed clarify what is or not missing, or important, in previous points. The fact that John talks like he found a fatal flaw let me suspect he want to dismiss the reasoning at the start.
And his tone is ad hominem, which can be a bit boring at time.

I don't want to dream about the number of posts needed to explain the step 8 to him ...

And I am afraid he will not appreciate the abstract theory of intelligence which profiles on the comp horizon, and which almost equates intelligence with modesty ...

Hmm ...

If any one else can help John K Clark to make his point, please help him. If some people believe, like I begin to believe, that John Clark only fake to not understand, and that I should abandon to try, please give your opinion, because I begin to feel like we are going in circle, always coming back with what I see as a confusion between the 3-views on the many 1-views of all doppelgangers, and the 1-views as lived individually by each doppelgangers, and which is on what the probability, asked before the experience begins, is asked. How can John not seen that difference? Is he only joking or what? Any idea?

I once had a friend Jim Johnson, who would say, "Nobody can prove anything to me it I don't want'em to."

Yeah. But then you can use earplugs. What you say is equivalent with the french idiom :"Il n' y a de pire sourd que celui qui ne veut pas entendre". (There is no worst deafness than the one of those who does not want to listen).

It is a bit like the politicians in the cannabis scandal. But in this case we can understand the motivation (the lucrative fear selling business). In the case of John Clark, it is a bit of a mystery.

Thanks for the help,



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