On 04 Apr 2012, at 21:52, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Apr 2012, at 18:26, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> By comp we can simulate Moscow and Washington precisely enough
so that you cannot see the difference for some non null interval.
The question is "do you agree that this does not change the
evaluation of the indeterminacy?
Yes I agree it does not change, this "1-view indeterminacy" of
yours is nonsense if the cities are real
You have not shown that. It is non sense for you because you keep
avoiding the difference between the 3-view-on-1-view, and
the 1-view themselves (or 1-view on 1-view). You oscillate between
trivial, non sense, and 100%. I can't figure out what is your
and its nonsense if the cities are virtual.
The question is asked. If you believe in comp, you know that after
the duplication you will not feel to be in two places at once, so
it makes sense to evaluate (or to try to evaluate) the chance that
you will be in this or that city. If you say 100% for Washington,
by definition of the 1-views, the you-in-Moscow will have to admit
having been wrong, and vice versa.
Likewise, in the multiplication movie experience, the white-noise
movie is far more probable that seeing any particular movie,
because the majority of the John K Clark will see such random movie.
Just keep in mind that the question is asked always before the
duplication experience and that the answer you give before
the experience is verified by interviewing all the resulting person
about their personal experiences, not about the experience of their
So I ask you again what is the probability that you will actually
live the experience "seeing the movie flying circus" in the
multiplication movie experience. remember that by definition, to
verify your answer, I will ask to each John K Clark which movie
they have actually seen and ask them if that confirms their
prediction. the answer "all movie" is already no more possible,
because you already know, by comp, that you, any of your "yous",
will feel to see only one movie.
I notice that it seems clear enough if you just duplicate the diary.
Right. It is the point of approximating the first person experience by
the memory or the diary. So it reduces the 1/3 distinction into going
through the teletransportation or just looking at it from outside.
And for the probability, you can replace the human observer by an
inference inductive machine. The whole UDA can be done in the third
You write "This diary will be in Washtington." and then when there
are two diaries, the one in Washington is right and the one is
Moscow in wrong. The diaries don't need to experience anything. As
macroscopic objects they have definite spacetime locations and don't
exist in a M+W superposition. The use of indicial pronouns only
produces a little semantic confusion. I think John's presentation
of his thought experiment is wrong - although it's logically
possible, it's nomologically impossible and not just
technologically. Creating two copies of a person must be two
distinguishable copies just by position and "instantaneously
swapping their positions" is not nomologically possible. Somewhat
the same problem affects the transporter thought experiment. There
will necessarily be a discontinuity between the copies and the
original - both in body and in consciousness.
But such a discontinuity is relative to the implementation, and
accepted as part of accepting that the brain is digital. So it is not
clear if consciousness can see that discontinuity, except by the bare
fact of being in a place and then in another one. More realistic real
duplication would need encoding time, reconstitution time, but those
becomes non relevant at the step seven.
I don't think that's fatal to Bruno's argument, but we need to get
through the argument to see what aspects of the thought experiment
it actually relies on and which are otiose.
Excellent point. A scientist rarely stops when he does not get a
point, he always continue, because the next steps can indeed clarify
what is or not missing, or important, in previous points. The fact
that John talks like he found a fatal flaw let me suspect he want to
dismiss the reasoning at the start.
And his tone is ad hominem, which can be a bit boring at time.
I don't want to dream about the number of posts needed to explain the
step 8 to him ...
And I am afraid he will not appreciate the abstract theory of
intelligence which profiles on the comp horizon, and which almost
equates intelligence with modesty ...
If any one else can help John K Clark to make his point, please
help him. If some people believe, like I begin to believe, that
John Clark only fake to not understand, and that I should abandon
to try, please give your opinion, because I begin to feel like we
are going in circle, always coming back with what I see as a
confusion between the 3-views on the many 1-views of all
doppelgangers, and the 1-views as lived individually by each
doppelgangers, and which is on what the probability, asked before
the experience begins, is asked. How can John not seen that
difference? Is he only joking or what? Any idea?
I once had a friend Jim Johnson, who would say, "Nobody can prove
anything to me it I don't want'em to."
Yeah. But then you can use earplugs. What you say is equivalent with
the french idiom :"Il n' y a de pire sourd que celui qui ne veut pas
entendre". (There is no worst deafness than the one of those who does
not want to listen).
It is a bit like the politicians in the cannabis scandal. But in this
case we can understand the motivation (the lucrative fear selling
business). In the case of John Clark, it is a bit of a mystery.
Thanks for the help,
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