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On Apr 4, 2012, at 1:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:

> 
> 
> 2012/4/4 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> 
> On 04 Apr 2012, at 18:26, John Clark wrote:
> 
>> On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> 
>> > You confuse "consciousness of being here and now" with "consciousness 
>> > would be here and now".
>> 
>> How in the world could anybody be confused by a idea stated as crystal 
>> clearly as you just did ? 
> 
> You can be conscious of being here and now. That expression is traditional, 
> and used in many place, and we have already used it to illustrate the fact 
> that the cnscious feeling "here and now" is undoubtable, as opposed to the 
> idea that being conscious five minutes ago and five minutes from now is 
> already doubtable, and you did agree.
> 
> I was just saying that consciousness of a localization does not entail the 
> localization of consciousness. You argument was confusing those two different 
> thing. We agree that consciousness is not something localisable, but this 
> does not entail that we cannot have a conscious experience of being localised 
> somewhere, like when we say "I visited Bombay last week-end".
> 
> 
> 
>>  
>>> >>  And the only answer you can receive will come from a trivial 
>>> >> application of the anthropic principle, "I will become the Moscow man if 
>>> >> events transpire so that I meet the definition of the Moscow man, namely 
>>> >> that I see Moscow".
>> 
>> 
>> > Which avoids again to answer to the question asked.
>> 
>> The reason I'm not the Moscow man is that I'm the Washington man and the 
>> reason I'm the Washington man is that I saw Washington and the probability 
>> the Helsinki man will see Moscow and Washington is 100%. What more is there 
>> to say on this rather dull subject?
> 
> That you give the probability that the guy will be in W and M from a third 
> person point of view, when we ask the probability on his future first person 
> point of view. the criteria of confirmation is given, by definition, from the 
> result of the self-localization provided by the persons after their 
> duplication. 
> In that case, it cannot be 100%, because the guy in M does not feel himself 
> to be in W, and vice versa.
> You still confuse the 3-view on the 1-views (an outsider can ascribe the 
> consciousness of John K Clark to both persons in each city), with the 1-views 
> on the 1-views ("Ah, I see I am the one in W" and "Ah, I see I am the one in 
> M"). In Helsinki, he could not know in advance which one he can happen to be. 
> If you think he could, give me the algorithm. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>>  
>> >>   I repeat yet again, give me a single concrete example of two things 
>> >> being identical by the "3-view" but not by "the 1-views themselves" and 
>> >> you will have won this argument
>> 
>>  
>> > I have been duplicated in W and M and I feel myself in W.
>> or
>> I have been duplicated in W and M and i feel myself in M.
>> Those are different in the 1-views (as different as seeing M and seeing W),
>> 
>> Right.
>> 
>> > But are equal in the 3-view, where I am in both cities.
>> 
>> WRONG! From my 3-view I can clearly see that the brain of Bruno Washington 
>> is different from the brain of Bruno Moscow, one has memories, that is to 
>> say physical changes in the brain, of the sights and sounds of Washington 
>> while the other has brain changes signifying the sights and sounds of 
>> Moscow; because of the changes in physical structure the two brains operate 
>> differently, or to say the same thing with different words, I the third 
>> party can see that the mind of Bruno Washington is different from the mind 
>> of Bruno Moscow.  Provided that Washington is different from Moscow (I've 
>> never been to Moscow but I imagine that it is) then the brain of Bruno 
>> Washington is physically different from the brain of Bruno Moscow, and I the 
>> third party observer can see those physical differences, and if the 
>> construction of those two objects are different then the way they operate, 
>> the mind, is different too.
> 
> But this contradict the fact that you agree both person are the Helsinki guy. 
> You are again transforming "I cannot know for sure I will feel myself in W or 
> M" with I can be sure that the guy in M will see M and the guy in W will see 
> W, which is does not answer the question in asked to him in Helsinki.
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> Try again. Give me a single concrete example of two things being identical 
>> by the "3-view" but not by "the 1-views themselves" and you will have won 
>> this argument.
>> 
>> >>  Who cares? How is it relevant to the copies if the original is cut or 
>> >> not cut as long as he's read?
>>  
>> > If the original is cut, the probability to wake up at Helsinki is 0. 
>> 
>> But the Helsinki man is not a copy, it's irrelevant to the copies in Moscow 
>> and Washington what happens to the original.  
> 
> Of course, but the question is asked before the reading is done. The question 
> is asked to the guy in Helsinki before the experiment is done. So the 
> probability is 1/3, instead of 1/2 in the preceding WM duplication with 
> annihilation of the original.
> 
> It is equivalent to a multiplication by three, with a null delay of 
> reconstitution on one branch. Isn't it?
> 
> 
>> 
>> > By comp we can simulate Moscow and Washington precisely enough so that you 
>> > cannot see the difference for some non null interval. The question is "do 
>> > you agree that this does not change the evaluation of the indeterminacy? 
>> 
>> Yes I agree it does not change, this "1-view indeterminacy" of yours is 
>> nonsense if the cities are real
> 
> You have not shown that. It is non sense for you because you keep avoiding 
> the difference between the 3-view-on-1-view, and the 1-view themselves (or 
> 1-view on 1-view). You oscillate between trivial, non sense, and 100%. I 
> can't figure out what is your objection.
> 
> 
>> and its nonsense if the cities are virtual.  
> 
> The question is asked. If you believe in comp, you know that after the 
> duplication you will not feel to be in two places at once, so it makes sense 
> to evaluate (or to try to evaluate) the chance that you will be in this or 
> that city. If you say 100% for Washington, by definition of the 1-views, the 
> you-in-Moscow will have to admit having been wrong, and vice versa.
> 
> Likewise, in the multiplication movie experience, the white-noise movie is 
> far more probable that seeing any particular movie, because the majority of 
> the John K Clark will see such random movie.
> 
> Just keep in mind that the question is asked always before the duplication 
> experience and that the answer you give before the experience is verified by 
> interviewing all the resulting person about their personal experiences, not 
> about the experience of their doppelgangers. 
> 
> So I ask you again what is the probability that you will actually live the 
> experience "seeing the movie flying circus" in the multiplication movie 
> experience. remember that by definition, to verify your answer, I will ask to 
> each John K Clark which movie they have actually seen and ask them if that 
> confirms their prediction. the answer "all movie" is already no more 
> possible, because you already know, by comp, that you, any of your "yous", 
> will feel to see only one movie.
> 
> If any one else can help John K Clark to make his point, please help him. If 
> some people believe, like I begin to believe, that John Clark only fake to 
> not understand, and that I should abandon to try, please give your opinion, 
> because I begin to feel like we are going in circle,
> 
> I think you should abandon. John Clark does not want to discuss, he suffers 
> the "I am the best mind in the world, you moron" when in fact he has just 
> shut down his own brain, it's pathetic.

I have not been actively participating in this discussion, but I have been 
reading, and I have to agree here.

>  
> always coming back with what I see as a confusion between the 3-views on the 
> many 1-views of all doppelgangers, and the 1-views as lived individually by 
> each doppelgangers, and which is on what the probability, asked before the 
> experience begins, is asked. How can John not seen that difference? Is he 
> only joking or what? Any idea?
> 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> 
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