On 28 Apr 2012, at 16:06, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Apr 28, 3:10 am, Evgenii Rudnyi <use...@rudnyi.ru> wrote:
If we say that everything based on models, the question is then what
physical laws are.

'Models' are nothing whatsoever except strategies we employ to make
sense of something we are unfamiliar with by tying them metaphorically
to a sense experience that is more familiar to us.

I agree, except that logician use preferably "theory" with this. The "theory" can even be seen as a machine, which can evolve and play a role of dynamical mirror of some possibilities. A brain, or a universal machine is close to a theory of everything, but eventually clouded by many particular theories.

Physicists use the term "model", like the little boy when talking of "toy model". The model is basically a simplifying map of what is supposed to be real. It is the representation of the thing which we want to represent.

Logicians use the term model like the painters, where the model is the "reality" of the naked person posing in front of the painter, which will then make the theory (the map, the painting, the representation). The models, for a logician are usually the mathematical structures, or the object therein, they want to talk about, through "theories", which are finite piece of things, with dynamical rules (inference rules, differential equations).

Such an opposite use of the term "model" is already responsible for many deaf's dialog between physicists and logicians.




For example, if quantum mechanics is just a model,
then its interpretation, for example MWI, in my view, does not make too
much sense.

The MWI is like Dark matter and Dark energy, plugs to preserve the
theory rather than confront the challenge that reality (or realism)
presents.

MWI is just QM, without collapse, taken literally.
By QM, superposition of states are lifted to superposition of environments and worlds.

Everett never decided to interpret QM in term of many-worlds, he suggests only that QM applies to the physicists and their measuring instruments. Basically he suggests just to drop the wave collapse phenomenon, which is an ad hoc way to prevent the contagion of the particles superposition to the physicist observing, or, not the particle.

The copenhagen theory can be described by the principle "the wave equation does not apply to the body of the observer". With comp, we can understand that the wave can be applied to both the particles and the body of the observers, but not the soul (the first person), which can be divided from her first person pov.

And comp predicts easily, without any complex formalism, that the many- things cannot be avoided, and should be palpable when looking around beyond the substitution level, where the "physical events" can differentiate without changing the computation above the level.

Bruno






Evgenii

On 28.04.2012 03:00 meekerdb said the following:

...

> Something like the latter. When you ask for an explanation of something, > you need to have in mind some terms that would satisfy that request. > They need to be something you understand better than the thing to be
 > explained. They need to provide you with manipulative or at least
> predictive power. Otherwise they are just inventing names for things
 > (like Craig's 'senses').

Sense is a very common term which I am using in exactly the same
'sense' that everyone else uses. How can anyone say that I invented
the term 'sense'? I chose it deliberately to make sure that everyone
knows that I am not inventing anything, only interpreting what is
already here.


Once you have that, you feel you have an
> explanation. What you refer to as an 'intractable distinction' is no > more intractable than the question asked of Newton as to how gravity > pushed on the planets. When you study physics and engineering you learn > pretty quickly that questions about 'How does it do that' bottom out. At > some level, now QFT or GR, it just does. Everybody who isn't a physicist > or engineer, thinks, "Oh those physicists and engineers have got it > figured out." No, they don't. They've got good working models. So what I > mean is that in the end that's the best you can do - have a good working
 > model.

Speak for yourself. I have done better than a model, I have an
understanding. With that, I can churn out many models.

And when we have a good working model of consciousness, we'll
 > have bypassed the 'hard problem'.

Not if matter-space and mind-time have a form/content relation rather
than a cause-effect relation. There can never be a solution to the
hard problem any more than there can be a way of making a heads side
of a coin out of it's own tails side.



> The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to interpret,

Which is why science will have to expand if it is to address
interpretation and explanation (consciousness) itself.

Craig

> they mainly make models. By a model is meant a mathematical construct > which, with the addition of certain verbal interpretations, describes > observed phenomena. The justification of such a mathematical construct
 > is solely and precisely that it is expected to work.
 > --—John von Neumann
 >

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to