On May 4, 8:00 pm, Pierz <pier...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Bertrand Russell pointed out long ago that the properties of the
> members of a set need not be properties of the set itself. I.e.,
> everything in the universe may have a cause but the universe - the set
> of all things - need not. We can argue about whether the ontological
> nature of the "set of everything" is physical, mathematical,
> spiritual, sensical (Weinbergism) or some other -al, but the question
> why any such set exists (its cause) has no answer.
> The best response is Sidney Morgenbesser's ( sure you all know it):
> "If there were nothing you'd still be complaining!"
Haha, yes, it may be the case that the universe began as the
simultaneous complaint of everythingness and nothingness...the grass
is always greener.
It's true though, it's not a new idea. To me, what makes it bold right
now is to take this cosmology out of the realm of philosophy and into
the realm of scientific reason. If we interpret sense as primary, I
think it becomes easy to see how time, then matter, computation, space
and causality might arise as secondary consequences. To have a set of
anything, we need the possibility of a set, which can only be a form
of pattern recognition. Pattern recognition doesn't arise from data
alone. Something has to experience something directly - I think that
the accounting of that experience as 'data' has to be an afterthought.
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