On 5/15/2012 5:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Stephen,

On 14 May 2012, at 19:16, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 5/14/2012 4:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Do you mean that when all chemists accept the multiverse interpretation, they will start working more productively?

They accept it. I have a book, by Baggot, who explains that he taught chemistry for 17 years, absolutely convinced that QM was true only on little distance, so he predicts that nature did not violate Bell's inequality, but when the experience of Aspect was done, he revised his opinion, and accept the idea that QM might be true macroscopically, and that it makes the weirdness a real fact of life. De Broglie behaves like ghat too. This illustrates that people can use a theory, without taking it seriously, because they follow their wishful conviction. It is typical for humans to do that.

If you decide the destination of your holiday with a quantum choice, QM predicts that all the term of the wave makes sense, and that "you" will differentiate into going to all the chosen Holiday places. If you believe that only one term "really results", it is up to you to say what is wrong in QM.

Hi Bruno,

Could we agree that this concept of "really results" is merely the folk language way of talking about what we can communicate unambiguously about?

It is the content intended in that folk language, but it is also the literal reading of the wave.

Hi Bruno,

But you must understand that the "wave" does not encode position information thus you cannot speak of it as if it does; doing so is mathematically inconsistent. You must understand that the "wave" picture assumes a particular basis, the momentum basis via the phase and the amplitude quantities of the wave, and it does consider position questions only to the degree that they can be specified by the Fourier transform. In the wave picture there is not such thing as "you are in Moscow" or "you are in Helsinki" or "you are in Washington". That information is simply not considered by the representations and so questions regarding places are unanswerable. One thing that is the hardest part of QM for people to understand - at least it was for me - is the implications of the freedom and need to choose a basis. Without specifying the basis, it is not possible to define the inner product or orthogonality relation for the state vectors. It is impossible to have a predictive theory at all!

I mention all of this because it is what is informing my question. I am asking about how it is that we continue to assume things about our shared reality that we know are false? We have to start off with a set of assumptions as to what is required for us to have a shared Reality in the first place, not just assume that the Reality is "out there" and we somehow can talk coherently about it.

I see this as the same kind of idea as what you describe with Diary entries in your UDA. In that sense it seems to me that this is something that could use more closer exploration.

Sure. Everything I say deserves more closer exploration. That's the goal. Now, I present a reasoning, and its validity is independent of further exploration.

That is a nice attitude, Bruno Marchal is the "designator of what is interesting" (/sarcasm). What is true, my dear friend, but only for you. Your identity is tied up in what is interesting to you, but you are not the only mind that exist and your interests and Identity is not the only one that must be accounted for.

I have a conjecture that our "shared reality" is restricted to being representable by a Boolean algebra (not a Heyting algebra!), have you any comment on this?

Why not. As long as we try to explain how such classicality emerge from the quantum, itself emerging from the classical relations of numbers.

You share that particular belief with many people, even - to my surprise - David Deutsch. I have come to the conclusion that that belief may be false; numbers in general are not necessarily "classical objects" with classical relations. Only the Integers come close to being "classical" but that is only because they are specified in advance to have a particular set of properties. Numbers in general cannot be said to have some particular set of properties in an a priori fashion unless one has specified the Arithmetic (algebra of relations between the numbers) structure that defines the basis within which the numbers can be known.

This is a symptom of a problem in the Bp&p formulation of truth, it assumes an accidental <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accidentalism> notion of how it is that a particular string has some particular set of properties. I might agree with you that this is a good place to start in one's theology/cosmogony ideas motivating toward an ontological theory, as you discuss in your explanations of the hypostases, but it is not without its own problems. One of my favorite philosophers used a similar idea, Tychism <http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-tychism.htm>, and involved a notion of chance and I see it also explicitly in the <> and [] of model logic, but we have to be careful that it not be interpreted to imply more that what it can. We have to also account for intentionality. Intentionality and chance seem to be duals in the same way as possibility and necessity are...

(I suspect that I am missing something in this conjecture but am not sure what it is.)

Now, physicists never define what they mean by universe, with comp, we could say that there is zero universes, indeed, zero physical objects, we are dreaming those things, the universes are first person plural construct.

This concept of "first person plural" is something that I have never understood. Could you elaborate on it please?

It is the same as the first person, except that instead of having one individual going into a teleportation or duplication device, we teleport or duplicate population of individuals. In that case frequency statistics match "Deutsch book"-like betting probabilities. We share computations, because the most numerous going through our states duplicate our conjoint states. Exactly like in Everett QM.

I have a problem with this. You are assuming the result of physical actions (that may or may not actually be possible!) and then defining a set of relations and properties on the resulting population and then using Occam to eliminate the physicality that generated the population in the first place. This is like holding me personally responsible for the shape of my ears and ignoring the long chain of events that came to bear on the DNA of my body. We have a notion of computation because there is a behavior that we can perform physically that generates a pattern. Absent the ability to invoke some class of physical process that in turn generates the functional equivalence class of behaviors, there is no such thing as computation. This is what upsets me so much about your interpretation; you do not seem to understand that independence of any particular member of a class is not independence from the class.

If we are going to consider notions of "shared states" then there has to be something that is "shared" and there has to be a plurality that is sharing. To take the universality of computations out of the functional equivalence of physical processes is to also leave behind the very definiteness that the physicality induces. Physical states are definite and "classical" because we share them, it is not the case that we share them because they are definite. This is what I have been trying to get you to see about the idea that numbers are "classical". It is a mistake to postulate such without explicitly admitting that to so such is an "act of faith" and not one that is based on actual facts. You are in fact using Bp&p reasoning about the truth of the Bp&p reasoning, how nicely vicious! ;-) I like this idea, but could you be honest about what you are doing?

The "matrix" image is more close to reality than a substantial reality, and this, by comp, explains where the physical reality comes from. To have a unique real universe, you need a non computationalist theory of mind, and nobody even try to present one.

I agree with you here, but my reasoning is different. A non-computationalist theory of mind does not have to be one that denies that the specific content of _any singl_e experience (1-p) is Turing emulable, it could be a theory that shows how a _sequence_ of 1-p content is not Turing computable without accounting for the specific means that the resources for the computation became available.

But this is like adding non necessary difficulties, because comp makes already sequences of 1_p non computable a priori, but defined statistically on infinities of computations.

No no no no no! It is necessary, because we would just be assuming something is true without proof otherwise.

The weakening of the comp hypothesis does not suppress any "universes/dreams", on the contrary.

I agree, but it does severely undermine the idea that the mere existence and a priori truth of formal sentences uniquely determines the content of those sentences.

What would mean "true", if it was not referring to some content of the proposition.

And that, my dear friend, is the problem. You are assuming that truth is a distributive property. You are assuming that because the set of formal sentences that you can actually think of as true (because of some proofs) must be true, that the set of all formal sentences must have a definite truth value as well. This is the problem of induction hat David Deutsch rails against. Unless you have a means to specify what the content is, then you cannot assume that the content has a definite truth value. The mere possibility of being a number has such and such a value is not a "true statement" in the same sense as "1+1=2" is a true statement. Ambiguous definitions imply only ambiguous truth values.

A good analogy to this is seen in Shannon's theory of information <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_theory>; there is nothing that quantifies the particular meaningfulness of a message in the theory. It is only about the ability to recognize a signal as distinct from noise. This is the difference between a statistical notion and a non-statistical notion.

I am not sure that analogy could work. Private content is not in a sentences, or strings. It is in the working mind of a universal machine, relative to its more probable universal neighborhood. The universal beings are the creator and co-creator of sense.

I agree with what you wrote here, but I was unclear in my sentence above. A nice illustration of the general idea that I am trying to discuss here with you. I will keep trying, I just wish that you could switch basis in your thinking a bit more. ;-)



"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon

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