On May 17, 2:04 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> Sense and matter is what I search an explanation for. You start at the
> finishing line.

That's why you are looking at it upside down. There isn't an
explanation for explanation. It is both the start and finish line.

> >> You could take any universal system, instead of arithmetic. From the
> >> computability perspective, they are equivalent.
> > You can run over anything with a large enough steam roller and it will
> > be flat. If you don't use a computability perspective, they aren't
> > equivalent.
> Which is a defect, imo.

It depends what you are trying to do. Flat hamsters probably make fine

> >>>>> That pattern
> >>>>> recognition is not automatically guaranteed by any arithmetic
> >>>>> logic.
> >>>> In your non-comp theory.
> >>>>> We need a physical machine that remembers that it can remember,
> >>>> That's "Bp -> BBp". Universal machine are like that.
> >>> Those are just letters and symbols. What or who makes them mean
> >>> something and why?
> >> Bp means that some universal machine utters p. Absolutely.
> >> Independently of you and me.
> > But not independently of the universal machine's sense-motive
> > experience. It has to be able to tell the difference between p and
> > something else and characterize the nature of that difference. It has
> > to have the motive power to 'utter', and something has to have the
> > sense receptivity to detect that something might have been uttered.
> > Otherwise there is no uttering.
> That part is let to the observer to judge.

The fact that it is left to the observer to judge supports the
necessity of sense-motive participation.

> >> BBp means that the same universal machine now utters Bp.
> >> For any arithmetic (or equivalent) proposition, Bp > BBp, means that
> >> if that machine utters p, it will soon or later utters Bp.
> > So if I utter 'Toast is square', that means that eventually I will
> > utter 'I utter Toast is square' and then 'I utter I utter I utter I
> > utter Toast is squalre'?
> In principle, except that all universal machine get bored and stop for
> contingent reason. But to do the math, some simplification are in order.

If I'm a UM though, I don't seem to be doing that. I don't seem to be
recapitulating the recapitulation of everything I've ever done

> >> And that is
> >> a theorem of arithmetic, making it true independently of you and me.
> > I never argue that sense is dependent on human consciousness at all.
> > Sense is universal and literally older than time itself.
> I have no clue what is that "sense" and how it related to the use of
> the word "sense".

Sense should be self defining, but to be technical I'll say that it is
detection, participation, and organizing relations between anything
and everything.

> >>>>> and
> >>>>> can experience that memory as an event. It needs to know what
> >>>>> kinds of
> >>>>> strings of remembered digits constitute a meaningful pattern, or
> >>>>> that
> >>>>> there could even be such a thing as a pattern. To say that
> >>>>> patterns
> >>>>> appear and reappear in arithmetic takes the appearance of pattern
> >>>>> itself for granted, then usurps the primacy of the sense
> >>>>> experience
> >>>>> which provides it.
> >>>> Not really, for it appears and reappears only in the mind of
> >>>> universal
> >>>> numbers. It makes sense for them, and indeed they will be
> >>>> astonished
> >>>> that apparent material can lead to that sense. But although locally
> >>>> true, this is globally wrong. Sense is necessarily a first person
> >>>> notion, and relies on the abstract but real configuration involving
> >>>> infinities of arithmetical relations.
> >>> I don't think sense is a first person notion, it is the very
> >>> capacity
> >>> to define first person and third person as separate (opposite) on
> >>> one
> >>> level, and united on another. Sense creates the arithmetical
> >>> relations, but not infinitely. Arithmetical relations are derived a
> >>> posteriori of sense embodiments.
> >> You confuse arithmetic and the human's apprehension of arithmetic.
> > Not at all. You are assuming that arithmetic is conceivable outside of
> > some kind of sense faculty
> That would not make ... sense. You need a conceptor to conceive. But
> you don't need one to make a proposition true or false.

You need a conceptor to even make a proposition in the first place.
True or false is a second order logic on top of that. The idea that
you don't need a subject to make a proposition true or false is no
different to me than the assumption of primitive matter. True to who?
In what context? If you get rid of all of the matter and energy in the
cosmos, what truth there be? Truth about what? Emptiness?

> > and I don't see any reason to agree with
> > that. It doesn't have to be human apprehension at all, it could be
> > anything from a single atom to the totality of all mass-energy of the
> > cosmos as a single unit...or even some other sensible-but-real entity
> > beyond our ability to conceive through human sense. All of it has to
> > make sense in some way to some thing. Something has to detect
> > something.
> This explain what you start from an observer perspective. I don't buy
> this if the price is that machine can't think.

Why do you want machines to think?

> >>> Sense generates the capacities,
> >>> intentions, symmetries, and rhythms that underlie recursive
> >>> enumeration, as well as frames the context of all sequence and
> >>> consequence. It all has to make sense.
> >> We need only the idea that a reality can exists beyond human sensing.
> > I'm fine with that, but no reality can exist beyond sense. Realism is
> > nothing but a category of sense.
> >> This is what I assume by making explicit the arithmetical realism,
> >> and
> >> that can be shown enough when we assume that we work locally as
> >> machine, at some description level.
> > Its circular reasoning though. If I assume I'm a machine, then I
> > define everything I do as being mechanical. So what? If I define
> > myself as a spirit, then I define the universe as a spiritual journey.
> > What's the difference? They are both equally tautological.
> Not really. If I am a machine, then "physics is in my head". I can
> take a look, and compare with facts, so I can test mechanism. I don't
> see how your theory (assuming there is one) is testable. It just look
> as an negative assertion on a class of possible individuals.

But the facts are in your head too, as are the results of any test you
could perform. You can see that this is the case from our dreams. One
minute we can be sitting on the couch reading the tax code and the
next we can be floating down a stream of carrots. There's no test I
can perform on the carrots that will wake me up.

> >> As I already told you, to make this false, you need to build an
> >> explicit non computable and non Turing recoverable function having a
> >> genuine role for the mind.
> > I don't need to build it, I am living in it already,
> How do you know that?
> How do you justify that?

In all kinds of ways. If I weren't, I could look at a graphic display
of the contents of an mp3 file and experience it the same way as
listening to the song. Nobody would have ever felt that machines were
inherently different from living organisms - that they were in any way
cold or unfeeling. CGI would look warm, real and tangible rather than
ephemeral and simulated. Higher math would be easier to learn than
emotions for infants. I don't think the burden of proof lies on my
end. What is one example of a Turing machine's behavior that suggests

> > you just aren't
> > admitting that it is the case.
> I am neutral. I just try to make sense of your prejudice against
> machine, a priori.

It's not pre-judice, it's post-judice. I have seen machines and I see
no reason to assume that they feel anything. They don't deserve the
benefit of the doubt because I know their history originates
inorganically. There is no more reason to think a computer can feel
than I would think a cartoon can feel.

> >> This unfortunately only makes more complex
> >> both mind and matter, making your non-comp hypothesis looking like a
> >> construct for making impossible to reason in that field.
> > I would not even say I have a non-comp hypothesis, I have a meta-comp
> > conjecture :)
> > I don't disagree that it might make it impossible to reason in that
> > field, and because of that, we need other inside-out and upside-down
> > models (anthropomorphic, mechanemorphic, logomorphic, technemorphic)
> > to get to our blind spot, but that doesn't change the absolute truth
> > value of the sense model that encompasses them all, as well as the
> > relations among them.
> >>> Not everything has to make
> >>> numbers. Dizzy doesn't make numbers, but it makes sense.
> >> But numbers does not make only numbers. They make and develop sense
> >> for many things far more complex than numbers, that is the point.
> > How does it follow from numbers though that they necessarily develop
> > anything at all?
> That is a good question. It is not obvious at all. But Gödel and
> others found this.

Can you explain it in English?

> > You are suggesting that bytes are alive and do things
> > on their own, yet we have never seen that to be the case nor does it
> > make intuitive sense.
> It certainly does, once you assume comp.

Comp is not intuitive though.

> And it certainly does from a
> third person perspective when you look at the arithmetical relations.
> Some emulate the galaxy, with all its inhabitants, and in principle,
> you can look at them, even talk with them.

Why should they emulate anything?

> > If that were true, we should see that Bugs Bunny
> > is having new adventures behind our back on 60 year old celluloid
> > reels by now. The internet would be haunted by autonomous entities
> > that we should be looking for like SETI.
> You drive conclusion too much quickly. I use math to have very high
> level perspective on arithmetic, something infinite, you seems to look
> just under a tree, and then conclude that there is no mushroom in the
> whole forest.

I don't need to look under even one tree to know that there is no
talking mushroom in the whole forest.

> >> Arithmetical truth itself is far beyond of numbers,
> > Why should that be and how could that be the case? At what point can
> > numbers no longer tolerate being numbers and suddenly become...what?
> > From where?
> This is again not easy to explain in few line. It is related to
> Tarski, and other, who prove this. After Gödel discover than we can
> define arithmetical provability *in* arithmetic, it was soon (if not
> earlier) discovered that truth and knowledge by numbers and about
> numbers, cannot be defined by numbers.
> That is why arithmetic is a good ontology, because it is naturally
> creative from inside.

To me " truth and knowledge by numbers and about  numbers, cannot be
defined by numbers." should suggest that arithmetic truth fails to
define the whole of the cosmos in the same way that numbers fail to
define arithmetic truth.

> >> yet numbers can
> >> relatively develop some intuition about those kind of things.
> >> You just seems stuck in a reductionist conception of numbers and
> >> machines. We know such conception are wrong.
> > You confuse your conception of numbers with the reality of (non-human)
> > sense in general.
> Oh? Why not? Why adding something which seems more complex that what
> we try to understand. it looks like the God of the gap.

I'm not adding sense, you are. I claim sense from the start. You
smuggle it in as an unexplained addition on to arithmetic.

> >>> It is a
> >>> sensation that makes sense to an embodied animal, but not to a
> >>> computer.
> >> How could we know that? Why should we believe that?
> > Because we know that we have different channels of sense and we know
> > that it is not necessary for a computer to have multiple sense
> > channels, and that in fact, all data must be compiled into a one
> > dimensional binary stream.
> The cerebral stems also simplifies a lot. But adding complexity does
> not solve the problem, per se. In the worst case, it dilutes it.

Which problem?

> > Our senses multiply the richness of our
> > experience, and even simple sensations like a circle quickly invite
> > imaginative elaboration. If a person is dizzy, they will complain. A
> > computer will never complain even if it is inside of a washing machine
> > that never turns off.
> It depend which one.

None of them will complain unless someone programs it to do so.

> >>>>>>> To say they are creatures implies a creation.
> >>>>>> Why not. You could say that they are created by the addition and
> >>>>>> multiplication laws. You need only to bet that 1+1=2 and alike
> >>>>>> does
> >>>>>> not depend on us.
> >>>>> Because there's no mathematical logic to how or why that creation
> >>>>> could occur.
> >>>> But there is.
> >>> What is it?
> >> That the existence of universal numbers, and their many dreams, is a
> >> consequence of logic and arithmetic.
> > Which is a consequence of sense and motive.
> Arithmetic cannot be a consequence of anything, except if it assumed
> it (or equivalent) already.

What makes you think that? Some people can do arithmetic better than
others, the ability to understand arithmetic develops at certain ages
and not others. In people we see clearly that arithmetic understanding
is a consequence of physiological development.

> >>>>> If we posit a universe of arithmetic realism, how can we
> >>>>> accept that it falls off a cliff when it comes to the arithmetic
> >>>>> of
> >>>>> it's own origins? What makes 1+1=2? Sense.
> >>>> Truth.
> >>> Truth requires sense.
> >> Why?
> > How can something be determined to be true without something else
> > making sense of it as being true?
> It can be true without anybody capable of determine if it is true or
> not. That's the point of being realist.

I would say that the capacity to determine truth or not (sense) is the
only independently valid condition. Truth is a second order logic of

> > It's like asking why water can't be
> > completely dehydrated and still feel wet.
> >>> Not everything that makes sense is true (fiction
> >>> for example), but everything that is true makes sense.
> >> For who?
> > For anyone or anything that can in some way experience it as true.
> Can the the birth of the universe be experienced? Again, you would
> need an observer, before.

The birth of the universe is continuously happening, it never
happened, it's going to happen, and it will never happen. Wherever the
universe is, there is observation, or more precisely, participation.

> >>>> Why do you want someone to assess the truth for something being
> >>>> true. That is anthropomorphic.
> >>> It's ontologically necessary. What is a truth without it being
> >>> detectable in some way to something?
> >> It is an unknown truth.
> > Unknown to us, but not unknown to its own context.
> ?

An ant may do things that are unknown to humans, but not unknown to
ants. Ants may do things that are unknown even to them, but not
unknown to the cells that make up their bodies, etc.

> >> A billion digit numbers can be prime without
> >> us being able to know it.
> > Sure, but if nothing is ever able to know it, then it isn't something
> > real, it's only an idea of what could be real.
> ?

There is no factory making numbers in reality. Numbers are
hypothetical. Like Zeno's paradox - the idea that something would be
impeded from moving because it would first have to move halfway is a
fallacy because 'halfway' is an intellectual interpretation with
intellectual consequences. It has no causally efficacious consequence
on its own.

> >> Some universal machine does not stop on some
> >> argument without anyone being able to prove or know it. Some pebble
> >> on
> >> some far away planet can be eroded without anyone knowing it.
> > Yes, I'm not talking about human knowledge. My hypothesis is
> > panexperiential. We see a pebble but what it is without us is a group
> > of atoms holding onto each other. It could be a purely tactile-
> > kinetic-
> > acoustic awareness, or it could be an omniscient state of zen
> > paralysis. Maybe they experience something only when the status of
> > that holding changes, so a billion years goes by in ten seconds to
> > them, who knows. Maybe the pebble is only a fragment of star and the
> > whole solar system is the entity that lives a billion years in each
> > second. Lots of possibilities we can't even imagine...
> That seems to be an acceptance that truth and possibilities can be
> independent of sense and observation.

Independent of human sense and observation, but not independent of all
sense and observation. As long as the atoms feel like atoms, there is
atomic truth. When you add organic molecules, then there is a mineral
truth. Add biology, zoology, and anthropology, then you get a pebble

> >>>> Th greek get well that point, and
> >>>> originate the whole scientific enterprise from there, as in the
> >>>> conclusion of this video:
> >>>>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=69F7GhASOdM
> >>> Great video, but now you are the one anthropomorphizing. Just
> >>> because
> >>> the released man doesn't create the outside world by seeing it
> >>> doesn't
> >>> mean that the outside world can exist without being held together by
> >>> experienced sense relations on every level. My computer doesn't
> >>> create
> >>> the internet, but that doesn't mean that the internet isn't
> >>> created on
> >>> computers.
> >> But where the first observer come from?
> > "First" and "come from" are aspects of observerness. Observer is
> > primordial and absolute (totality/singularity).
> That's what I thought, but it looks like a reductio of absurdum of non-
> comp. That's OK, you are coherent.
> >>>> If not, it is the whole idea of a reality which makes no more
> >>>> sense,
> >>>> and we get solipsist or anthropomorphic.
> >>> That's where sense comes in. Sense divides the totality into
> >>> solipsistic/anthropomorphic and objective/mechanemorphic on one
> >>> level,
> >>> but bleeds through that division on another level, thus creating a
> >>> diffracted continuum that oscillates through time but remains
> >>> continuous across space (and vice versa).
> >> Time and space, looks concrete, thanks to millions years of
> >> evolution,
> >> but are much more sophisticated notion than elementary addition and
> >> multiplication to me.
> > I use time and space to keep it simple. It is really the sense of
> > continuity and oscillating discontinuity itself which, when multiplied
> > by many subjects experiencing themselves objectively, gives rise to
> > the abstractions of space and time.
> >>> Numbers are a synthetic
> >>> analysis of that process, distilled to a nearly meaningless but
> >>> nearly
> >>> omnipotent extreme of universality (qualitative flatness). Numbers
> >>> are
> >>> the opposite of the solipsistic personal experience (qualitative
> >>> depth
> >>> asymptotic to 'Selfness' itself). They are the least appropriate
> >>> tools
> >>> to describe feeling.
> >> Atoms, fields, space, time seems as much.
> > I agree, but the ability to experience any of them, including numbers,
> > is more primitive.
> Well, it certainly is, with comp, for it relies in the additive and
> multiplicative of numbers. But you want them to be primary, and thus
> unexplainable. This makes your approach a bit too much like "don't
> ask". But even machine will ask, so I search for more understandable
> theories.

It's only unexplainable because it is explanation itself. Why would
you need further explanation?

> >>>>> Not primitive sense either,
> >>>>> but high order cognitive abstraction. There is no '1' or '2'
> >>>>> literally, they are ideas about our common sense - what we have in
> >>>>> common with everything. Numbers are literally 'figures', symbols
> >>>>> which
> >>>>> can be applied mentally to represent many things,
> >>>> No. That's number description. Not numbers.
> >>> I'm not talking about the characters "1" or "2", I'm talking about
> >>> what they represent. The concept of numbers defines them as
> >>> figurative
> >>> entities, but you make them literal. That's ok with me if you are
> >>> doing that for mathematical purposes since it is a powerful way to
> >>> approach it, through the negative symmetry, but just as you might
> >>> trace a picture better if it's upside down, eventually you should
> >>> turn
> >>> it right side up when you finish. To say that numbers literally
> >>> exist
> >>> but matter does not is the logo-morphic position, orthogonal to both
> >>> anthropomorphic and mechanemorphic, but it is still as
> >>> pathologically
> >>> unreal if taken literally. Again, thats ok with me, we need
> >>> surrealists too, I'm just saying, when the rubber hits the road,
> >>> it's
> >>> not sanity.
> >> Hmm...
> >>>>> and to deploy
> >>>>> orderly control of some physical systems - but not everything
> >>>>> can be
> >>>>> reduced to or controlled by numbers.
> >>>> But that's what number can discover by themselves.
> >>> In your logopomorphic theory of comp.
> >> Be polite!
> >> :)
> > Hah. I wasn't trying to be pejorative, just saying that your view
> > makes sense in my view but my view doesn't make sense in yours.
> On the contrary. As I told you, you just reify the first person point
> of view. I already know why machine want to do that. The illusion is
> true and genuinely felt by them, yet illusory. (in the comp theory).

And as I have told you, you just reify the logomorphic point of view.
I too know why mathematicians and logicians want to to that. The
illusion is true and logically proved by them, yet (relatively)

> >>>> Once you are at the
> >>>> treshold of numbers, the complexity of the relations (even just
> >>>> between numbers) get higher than what you can describe with
> >>>> numbers.
> >>>> the numbers already know that, with reasonable account of what is
> >>>> knowledge.
> >>> If the complexity exceeds the capacity of numbers, then you need to
> >>> invoke even more complexity in the form of additional forms of
> >>> expression of that complexity...out of thin air?
> >> It develops from intuition.
> > That's sense!
> OK. For machine, it is what depend on both the machine beliefs, and
> (arithmetical) truth.

AKA, what (hypothetically) makes sense to a machine.

> >> Numbers, relatively to universal numbers,
> >> can develop intuition, due to the true relation existing between
> >> numbers, including the truth that they cannot rationally justified.
> >> So
> >> it comes from truth.
> > Truth goes along with what I'm trying to say about quanta being the
> > flattest and most universal qualia. Absolute truth means true for all
> > entities on all sense channels, so that necessarily requires that it
> > be absolutely flat qualitatively (otherwise you are dependent upon
> > some particular category of conditions, making it a relative truth
> > rather than absolute).
> > Under this criteria, numbers are an excellent candidate for universal
> > truth - almost. Numbers are so qualitatively flat that they act like a
> > skeleton key, sliding into every form and structure, but it also makes
> > it too easy to mistake the user of the key for the key itself since
> > the flattening dis-qualifies non-arithmetic realities.
> At the ontological level only. Not for the epistemology, which is on
> the contrary vaccinated against reductionism.

The ontological level is all that I care about. I am trying to
describe the universe, not engineer within it.

> > This is what
> > counting is; an abstraction layer which we use to identify or mention
> > *that* things are, but it doesn't address the actual experience of
> > what it is to be presented with those things. We count five apples but
> > the number five tells us nothing about apples.
> > What the logomorphic perspective does is invite an elevation of truth
> > values and universality at the direct expense of qualitatively rich
> > experience and specificity. It amputates the protocol stack of humans,
> > animals, organisms, chemicals, even physics and leaves only a
> > mathematical stump.
> Not at all. comp explains entirely whay arithmetic, seen from inside,
> look even beyond the mathematical (and why machine naturally develop
> theologies, which goes beyond what they can rationally justified).
> What you accuse comp of doing, is what you do on machines. you
> amputate their qualitatively super rich epistemological realities by
> looking only to the third description of the computations or
> arithmetical relations.

We don't have direct access to any super rich qualities of comp, they
all are inferred through our natively super rich qualities of

> The whole complete theology of any universal machine is beyond any
> human conceivable domain.

The sense of the totality-singularity is beyond any conceivable

> But we can get nice big picture of it, in
> the study of fixed little a priori correct machine; it is already
> quite a mess full of things that *we* can name, in more powerful
> theories than arithmetic, and we can see why the machine cannot get
> those names, and the catastrophes which can occur if they
> inadvertantly give a name to those things. Then we can lift such
> theologies for us, with the proviso that we can only bet on our
> correctness, and that eventually, we need to refer to truly unameable
> things to ensure such theologies makes sense.
> You are the reductionist, and this to claim that we (who exactly?)
> have something that a vast class of creature cannot have according to
> your feeling.

They aren't creatures though, they are ideas of creatures. Ideas don't
create things, creators create using ideas.

> I can understand that before Gödel, we might have tought mechanism is
> a reductionism, but after Gödel, mechanism appears to be a vaccine
> against reductionism. The self-referentially correct machine is bound
> up to be a universal dissident.
> If she succeed in never exchanging an atom of security for an atom of
> liberty, she can go to heaven (Dt and Co.), if not she can go to hell
> (Bf and Co.). Despite it is hard to imagine something less
> deterministic than arithmetic, from inside, it is looks like we surf
> on a frontier between security (below universality, or sigma_1
> completeness, we can control our submachines), and liberty (you can be
> become whichever machine you want, you are (at different levels)
> Turing universal, or sigma_1 complete. Universal machines, in a sense,
> have already a sort of free will possibility, because they are initial
> segment of the all histories, or subjective experience, dreams, or the
> comp first person experiences.

The desire to go to heaven and avoid hell is sense. It doesn't emerge
logically from arithmetic. What do numbers care about heaven and hell?

> > The assumption is that using the splinters of the
> > stump, we must be able to build the entire tree, but what keeps
> > happening is that we get only a Turing Frankentree and splinters in
> > our hands.
> Possible. But I bet on the contrary. I don't feel superior, and it is
> also a hope, and a fear. Typically I dunno. But it is a simple and
> elegant hypothesis, with an "effective everything" (the UD, made solid
> by Church thesis), and which leads to a physics that we can tested.

That's ok but it doesn't lead to the untestable first hand experience
of reality.

> > The danger is that rather than seeing this a sign to
> > understand the tree as a unique top-down event in the cosmos as well
> > as a bottom up assembled machine, we become even more fascinated by
> > the challenge of transmuting AI gold from leaden code and pursue it
> > even more avidly and obsessively.
> It is not without danger. The only danger, both for comp and non-comp,
> would be in pretending to know the truth about that. Comp is a type of
> technological religion, and the question is really "can your daughter
> marry a guy who bet on comp?".

Betting on comp is ok, I just think that betting on sense makes more

> Just make clearer all your terms, learn a bit of logic, and build a
> "real" non-comp theory of reality. But the math needed to handle non
> comp entities is basically the same than the math for comp, and you
> have to conceive quite complex (but existing) entities to escape the
> mathematical theologies of the self-referentially correct entity.
> Another solution, is that you stop pretending that your theory of
> reality decides between comp and non-comp, for you do have some
> intuition comparable ... to the machine's intuition. The first person
> of the machine already don't believe she is a machine.

Does the first person machine also believe that her world is a

> > This is what is going on in Big
> > Physics (mechanemorphism) now as well, and in fundamentalist revivals
> > (Big Religion, anthropomorphism) around the world and Big Business
> > (technemorphism).
> Business and religion are wonderful things, like money, which is the
> blood of economy, unless it is captured by special interest and will
> in control. So the state has to be independent of them, or it leads to
> Big Gangsterism (current situation, btw).
> > All four points on the compass are hyperextended
> > into pathology until unity can be reconciled.
> That happens all the time with the liars.
> The role of the lies in life and in matter is still unclear for me.

That's what I was trying to get at with numbers being constrained by
truth. A sense based model means that fiction is primary, fiction is
the whole or ultimate truth, while fact is a quality of fiction
reliably presented as non-fiction.

> >>> With sense,
> >>> complexity is generated recursively from bottom up entropy, while
> >>> simplicity pulls from the top down toward unity as significance.
> >>> Evolution is the interference pattern between them.
> >>>>>>> What
> >>>>>>> necessary logic turns a nuclear chain reaction (addition and
> >>>>>>> multiplication) into a nursery for problem solving sentience?
> >>>>>> The same logic making tiny system Turing universal. Usually some
> >>>>>> small
> >>>>>> part of classical logic is enough.
> >>>>> Why would any kind of universality or logic entail the automatic
> >>>>> development of sentience? What is logical about sentience?
> >>>> The illogicality of sentience. From the point of view of numbers,
> >>>> when
> >>>> they look at themselves, they discover, for logical reason, that
> >>>> there
> >>>> is something non logical about them.
> >>> If there is something non logical about numbers (which are really
> >>> the
> >>> embodiment of pure logic), why does that truth have to be
> >>> 'discovered'
> >>> by them?
> >> Because truth extend logics, and number are constrained by truth,
> >> before what they can believe.
> > I get that truth extends logic, and that numbers are constrained by
> > truth (which I say is lowest common denominator sense) but I don't get
> > the last part. Why does truth have to discover itself?
> I am not sure truth can discover itself. Truth from inside divides
> into different perspectives, like the provable, the knowable, the
> observable, the sensible. Necessarily when in the case of the "eyes of
> a universal machine", with the classical definition. Truth itself,
> from inside is not nameable.

It's not nameable but it is experienced through sense.

> >>> In our development as children, do we not discover logic out
> >>> of the chaos of infancy rather than the other way around? Do we not
> >>> learn numbers rather than learn feelings?
> >> Because we have brains which sum up millions years of teaching in
> >> nine
> >> month, making us believe that walking and seeing is simpler than
> >> trigonometry. Later we can understand that is the contrary.
> > You are right in one sense, but that sense doesn't exist until
> > 'later'. Trigonometry is indeed simpler mathematics than the
> > mathematics underlying human walking and seeing, but the sense
> > underlying trigonometry is even simpler. That sense is the same common
> > denominator that makes us a single walking seeing person - it's the
> > absolute common denominator, simplicity itself - unity, totality,
> > wholeness, being. It makes no distinction between now and forever,
> > between everything and nothing. It is the greatest and least inertial
> > frame possible. For this not to be the case, there would have to be
> > something preventing it. Some limitation inherent that does not allow
> > everything to be one thing on some level. Sense does this temporarily,
> > I think literally, it does it through time.
> Ok, but then you reduce the ontology to the arithmetical sense. That
> makes sense, even with comp.

It reduces to sense but why say that it's arithmetic sense?

> >>>> Then the comp act of faith
> >>>> appears to be the simplest way to restore logic, except for that
> >>>> act
> >>>> of faith and the belief in addition and multiplication.
> >>> What kind of faith does a Turing machine have?
> >> If she is correct, it looks like it is plotinian sort of faith. But a
> >> machine can also develop a faith in mechanism, by surviving back-up,
> >> and be led, with occam, to a more pythagorean sort of faith.
> > Sounds like a very Greco-Anglican faith. Where are the Vedic machines?
> Very close. I have a craving for the study of the relation between
> Greeks theologies and Eastern "theologies", it is a rich subject. My
> favorite text is the question of king Milinda. The arithmetical
> interpretation of Plotinus comes from an earlier arithmetical
> interpretation of Lao-Tseu.
> I mean all correct machines seems quite Vedic to me.
> With comp, the outer-god, the One, cannot recognize itself, but the
> inner-god, the soul, the first person, can.

That makes sense in my terms too. That necessity to project an
interior that projects an exterior is the same thing as metaphor. I
think it's fundamental architecture of sense. The Big Diffraction
means that this can only be accomplished by masking the self into
partitions, so it's not really a projection as a gated filter on a
sense of everything which in turn filters itself into a sense of self
and other things. Metaphor is how awareness bleeds through the
partitions, across levels vertically, ie in defiance of strict logic
(horizontal sense within one channel of sense).


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