On May 18, 10:44 am, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, May 16, 2012 at 10:34 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> 
> wrote:
> > I don't think you understand what I understand. Of course the
> > limitation of the 1p view excludes information relative to a 3p view,
> > but the reverse is true as well. Indeterminism emerges as a third
> > person phenomenon in that subjective privacy cannot be experienced
> > through it. Determinism emerges as both a first and third person
> > phenomenon in the form of sense. Motive or will (or 'energy' in third
> > person') emerges as an orthogonal category relative to determinism;
> > self-determination, which is the impulse and capacity to make the
> > indetermined determined. 'I am become will, the collapser of wave
> > functions.'
> You haven't understood a basic point, which is important independently
> of the current discussion. This point is that if we live in a
> perfectly deterministic multiverse, our subjective experience will be
> probabilistic. This is because it is impossible for a being embedded
> in the multiverse to know in which branch he will end up. The
> impossibility is logical, not merely empirical.

If I decide to type this sentence, the probability of both of us
ending up in a branch of the multiverse in which this sentence appears
before you on your screen is close to 100%. How does that work

Since I know that it will appear in both of our universes, not merely
logically or empirically but intuitively and unquestionably, does that
mean that MWI is cannot be viable?


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