On May 18, 10:44 am, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Wed, May 16, 2012 at 10:34 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > I don't think you understand what I understand. Of course the > > limitation of the 1p view excludes information relative to a 3p view, > > but the reverse is true as well. Indeterminism emerges as a third > > person phenomenon in that subjective privacy cannot be experienced > > through it. Determinism emerges as both a first and third person > > phenomenon in the form of sense. Motive or will (or 'energy' in third > > person') emerges as an orthogonal category relative to determinism; > > self-determination, which is the impulse and capacity to make the > > indetermined determined. 'I am become will, the collapser of wave > > functions.' > > You haven't understood a basic point, which is important independently > of the current discussion. This point is that if we live in a > perfectly deterministic multiverse, our subjective experience will be > probabilistic. This is because it is impossible for a being embedded > in the multiverse to know in which branch he will end up. The > impossibility is logical, not merely empirical.
If I decide to type this sentence, the probability of both of us ending up in a branch of the multiverse in which this sentence appears before you on your screen is close to 100%. How does that work exactly? Since I know that it will appear in both of our universes, not merely logically or empirically but intuitively and unquestionably, does that mean that MWI is cannot be viable? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.