On May 18, 2:56 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 17 May 2012, at 23:02, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > On May 17, 2:04 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> Sense and matter is what I search an explanation for. You start at
> >> the
> >> finishing line.
> > That's why you are looking at it upside down. There isn't an
> > explanation for explanation. It is both the start and finish line.
> The whole AI, and comp coginitive science search, at the least,
> explanation for explanation, and a part of it is rather convincing
> imo. Here you beg the question by extending a lot your "don't ask"
> philosophy, I think.

I'm not saying don't ask at all - by all means, ask away...but what is
"ask" made of in the first place?

It makes sense to me that comp explanations should make almost perfect
sense. They make as much sense of the universe as you can make without
factoring in sense itself. Once you factor in actual presentation of
concrete experience, you should see that there can be nothing that it
can logically supervene upon. In order for it to supervene on
arithmetic truth, you would have to show actual presentation through
arithmetic alone without any matter or energy at all to ground it in a
timespace experience within the comsos.

Arithmetic has no way to get to timespace without inventing it for no
arithmetic purpose. Arithmetic can't justify sense, it assumes sense
behind numbers and from the start and begs the question of AI by
extending the "it can't be that simple" philosophy.

> >>>> BBp means that the same universal machine now utters Bp.
> >>>> For any arithmetic (or equivalent) proposition, Bp > BBp, means
> >>>> that
> >>>> if that machine utters p, it will soon or later utters Bp.
> >>> So if I utter 'Toast is square', that means that eventually I will
> >>> utter 'I utter Toast is square' and then 'I utter I utter I utter I
> >>> utter Toast is squalre'?
> >> In principle, except that all universal machine get bored and stop
> >> for
> >> contingent reason. But to do the math, some simplification are in
> >> order.
> > If I'm a UM though, I don't seem to be doing that. I don't seem to be
> > recapitulating the recapitulation of everything I've ever done
> > continuously.
> You took my words too much literally. "B" is really "believable", not
> "believed".

So I am continuously making my beliefs that my beliefs that my beliefs
are believable?

> >>>> And that is
> >>>> a theorem of arithmetic, making it true independently of you and
> >>>> me.
> >>> I never argue that sense is dependent on human consciousness at all.
> >>> Sense is universal and literally older than time itself.
> >> I have no clue what is that "sense" and how it related to the use of
> >> the word "sense".
> > Sense should be self defining, but to be technical I'll say that it is
> > detection, participation, and organizing relations between anything
> > and everything.
> That's OK. But why believe a priori that machines can't do that.

Because machines aren't detecting, participating, and organizing their
own relations, they are driven only by agendas external to the
assembly as a whole, which ride on top of the natural low level
agendas of the groups of molecules, their relation to other objects,
the planet, sun, etc. It's the symbol grounding problem. Metal boxes
don't feel animal joy and suffering. They may feel electromotive
enthusiasm or tactile-acoustic collision, etc, but they have no
history as biological organisms that have proven their desire to

> >>>> You confuse arithmetic and the human's apprehension of arithmetic.
> >>> Not at all. You are assuming that arithmetic is conceivable
> >>> outside of
> >>> some kind of sense faculty
> >> That would not make ... sense. You need a conceptor to conceive. But
> >> you don't need one to make a proposition true or false.
> > You need a conceptor to even make a proposition in the first place.
> Sure, but the truth of the proposition does not depend on the
> existence of the sentence possibly used to express that proposition
> later. The proposition "the Moon is a satellite of Earth" was arguably
> true before humans assert propositions.

I would argue that proposition is true if and only if there is some
awareness of Moonness, Earthness, and a relation between them as well.
If there was nothing outside of the Moon and Earth, the Earths
universe would consist of only the feeling of being the Earth and
detecting the Moon. It could not see itself as a planet unless it
figured it out through the experience of the revolving rotating moon
(forget that there would be no light without the sun) and a leap of
faith rooted in metaphor that perhaps what is inside is like what is

That would forever be a mystery however unless there is a third
similar object, so that either of the other two can confidently infer
that they are all similar objects in similar relation. You would need
that third subject to make the proposition "the Moon is a satellite of
Earth" true.

> > True or false is a second order logic on top of that. The idea that
> > you don't need a subject to make a proposition true or false is no
> > different to me than the assumption of primitive matter. True to who?
> > In what context? If you get rid of all of the matter and energy in the
> > cosmos, what truth there be? Truth about what? Emptiness?
> Numbers, for instance. I don't think that a proposition like "17 is
> prime" needs any physical reality to be true or false. Truth is not
> knowledge. It does not need a knower.

17 needs an objective reality that behaves like countable static
units. 17 puffs of smoke is no different than one puff. Prime requires
something to compare number sequences and read patterns into them.
It's true that an individual knower does not make something true or
false for others, but truth or falsehood in general cannot exist
outside of perception. Numbers are features of perception, but
perception is not a feature of numbers. Numbers are metaphysical to
any particular object because they are a language common to both
subjective and objective phenomena, but they are a low level language,
incapable of handling deep qualitative richness. This doesn't mean
that numbers are independent of objects and subjects in general
though. Numbers are clearly subjective contents, both for us, and I
think for everything else that can be enumerated in the
panprotopsychic universe.

> >>> and I don't see any reason to agree with
> >>> that. It doesn't have to be human apprehension at all, it could be
> >>> anything from a single atom to the totality of all mass-energy of
> >>> the
> >>> cosmos as a single unit...or even some other sensible-but-real
> >>> entity
> >>> beyond our ability to conceive through human sense. All of it has to
> >>> make sense in some way to some thing. Something has to detect
> >>> something.
> >> This explain what you start from an observer perspective. I don't buy
> >> this if the price is that machine can't think.
> > Why do you want machines to think?
> I don't want that. I find it plausible, and refutable. That is why I
> study the consequences of that hypothesis. With Gödel and QM, the
> evidences are big in favor of comp, though.

What specifically do you find plausible about it?

> >> Not really. If I am a machine, then "physics is in my head". I can
> >> take a look, and compare with facts, so I can test mechanism. I don't
> >> see how your theory (assuming there is one) is testable. It just look
> >> as an negative assertion on a class of possible individuals.
> > But the facts are in your head too, as are the results of any test you
> > could perform. You can see that this is the case from our dreams. One
> > minute we can be sitting on the couch reading the tax code and the
> > next we can be floating down a stream of carrots. There's no test I
> > can perform on the carrots that will wake me up.
> Why not. Lucidity in dreams is often a consequence of some reality
> check.

But the same reality check can just as easily lead you into another

> >>>> As I already told you, to make this false, you need to build an
> >>>> explicit non computable and non Turing recoverable function
> >>>> having a
> >>>> genuine role for the mind.
> >>> I don't need to build it, I am living in it already,
> >> How do you know that?
> >> How do you justify that?
> > In all kinds of ways. If I weren't, I could look at a graphic display
> > of the contents of an mp3 file and experience it the same way as
> > listening to the song. Nobody would have ever felt that machines were
> > inherently different from living organisms - that they were in any way
> > cold or unfeeling. CGI would look warm, real and tangible rather than
> > ephemeral and simulated. Higher math would be easier to learn than
> > emotions for infants. I don't think the burden of proof lies on my
> > end. What is one example of a Turing machine's behavior that suggests
> > feeling?
> The existence of S4Grz and the X logics, in AUDA.
> But less technically, the fact that molecular biology shows life to be
> Turing mechanical, + the facts that mammals seem emotional.
> For a computationalist, humanity illustrates the fact that machine can
> be very emotional.

But molecular biology can't see any feeling in life either. The
computational approach is blind to life and feeling. That's why we
feel and live and a compution does not. A living organism can and does
compute, but only because has other senses first. A computation can't
live because it has no other senses to locate the physical cosmos

> >>> you just aren't
> >>> admitting that it is the case.
> >> I am neutral. I just try to make sense of your prejudice against
> >> machine, a priori.
> > It's not pre-judice, it's post-judice. I have seen machines and I see
> > no reason to assume that they feel anything. They don't deserve the
> > benefit of the doubt because I know their history originates
> > inorganically. There is no more reason to think a computer can feel
> > than I would think a cartoon can feel.
> How can you see the difference between a machine and a non machine.

Lots of ways. A machine is assembled from parts intentionally. A non
machine assembles itself intuitively. A machine can't depart
meaningfully from it's program. A non-machine invents and discovers
novelty. A machine can be made to perform a monotonous task reliably
and automatically for an indefinite time, non-machines get tired,
angry, make mistakes, etc.

> Machine cannot see the difference between a god and a more complex
> machine than themselves. You refer to a personal conviction, and you
> seem unable to doubt it. That looks like pseudo-religion to me, if you
> indulge my frankness.

You don't think that the idea of machine theology and numbers having
dreams sounds like a pseudo-religion to some people?

> >>> How does it follow from numbers though that they necessarily develop
> >>> anything at all?
> >> That is a good question. It is not obvious at all. But Gödel and
> >> others found this.
> > Can you explain it in English?
> Addition and multiplication, once defined, are enough, together with
> some logic, to program all computable functions, and execute those
> programs. So if you agree that "17 is prime", independently of you and
> me and universe, you can see that the existence of all computations is
> as much independent.

17 is prime only because of the sense that whole integers make. You
could make a number system which calls 17 Waldo and includes a number
for 8.5 called Ralph, then Waldo would not be prime because it is
divisible by one and Ralph. It's only the sense of the numerical
schema which results in the tautological truths of that schema. It's
not a truth that is independent of sense or the universe at all, it's
just that it's truths extend beyond our personal capacity to make
human sense out of it in a convenient amount of time. 17 is prime is
like DNA is organic. The truth of it is contingent upon the
assumptions that define it. 17 walnuts don't know they are in a group
of 17 or that 17 is prime. A universe of nothing but walnuts would not
necessarily include any possible reference to prime.

> Then you can define, still in arithmetic, notion
> of believability and study how, in arithmetic, numbers develop
> beliefs, on knowledge, observations, and physical universe. The
> arithmetical reality is very rich, especially as seen from inside, by
> (relative) numbers, but you have to keep into account the different
> person points of view.

How are you defining a belief that a number develops?

> >>> You are suggesting that bytes are alive and do things
> >>> on their own, yet we have never seen that to be the case nor does it
> >>> make intuitive sense.
> >> It certainly does, once you assume comp.
> > Comp is not intuitive though.
> Comp itself is rather intuitive. Its consequences are not. That's
> already the case for arithmetic.

How is comp intuitive when every culture on Earth begins with non-comp

> >> And it certainly does from a
> >> third person perspective when you look at the arithmetical relations.
> >> Some emulate the galaxy, with all its inhabitants, and in principle,
> >> you can look at them, even talk with them.
> > Why should they emulate anything?
> Because arithmetic 'contains' all possible computations.

What makes a computation define itself as an emulation though?

> >>> If that were true, we should see that Bugs Bunny
> >>> is having new adventures behind our back on 60 year old celluloid
> >>> reels by now. The internet would be haunted by autonomous entities
> >>> that we should be looking for like SETI.
> >> You drive conclusion too much quickly. I use math to have very high
> >> level perspective on arithmetic, something infinite, you seems to
> >> look
> >> just under a tree, and then conclude that there is no mushroom in the
> >> whole forest.
> > I don't need to look under even one tree to know that there is no
> > talking mushroom in the whole forest.
> Yes, but you need to look everywhere in the forest to know that there
> is no mushroom in it.
> When I talk about machine, I talk about a notion which can be defined
> in arithmetic. I am not talking about my fridge or any actual
> machines. I refer to the concept.

I understand, but the concept is just a representation of common
principles found in buildable machines. The concept of machine can't
build an actual machine by itself.

> >>>> Arithmetical truth itself is far beyond of numbers,
> >>> Why should that be and how could that be the case? At what point can
> >>> numbers no longer tolerate being numbers and suddenly become...what?
> >>> From where?
> >> This is again not easy to explain in few line. It is related to
> >> Tarski, and other, who prove this. After Gödel discover than we can
> >> define arithmetical provability *in* arithmetic, it was soon (if not
> >> earlier) discovered that truth and knowledge by numbers and about
> >> numbers, cannot be defined by numbers.
> >> That is why arithmetic is a good ontology, because it is naturally
> >> creative from inside.
> > To me " truth and knowledge by numbers and about  numbers, cannot be
> > defined by numbers." should suggest that arithmetic truth fails to
> > define the whole of the cosmos in the same way that numbers fail to
> > define arithmetic truth.
> No, for I cannot conceive something greater than arithmetical truth
> seen from inside. It plays the role of God, in machine's theology, not
> of a finite 'terrestrial' creature. The cosmos is a tiny part of that
> picture (in the comp theory), yet no machine can seen it entirely too.

I can conceive that arithmetical truth can only seem great by virtue
of its association to non-comp qualities, which are misattributed as
the consequence of numbers rather than the cause. Numbers are only
figures. Sense includes everything literal and figurative, including

> >>>> yet numbers can
> >>>> relatively develop some intuition about those kind of things.
> >>>> You just seems stuck in a reductionist conception of numbers and
> >>>> machines. We know such conception are wrong.
> >>> You confuse your conception of numbers with the reality of (non-
> >>> human)
> >>> sense in general.
> >> Oh? Why not? Why adding something which seems more complex that what
> >> we try to understand. it looks like the God of the gap.
> > I'm not adding sense, you are. I claim sense from the start. You
> > smuggle it in as an unexplained addition on to arithmetic.
> Because there are nice candidate playing that role. (like the UDA
> first person notion, or its AUDA counterpart: Bp & p, Bp & Dp & p,
> etc.).

That's not sense, it's a schematic of one of the behaviors found in
sense. Saying that a notion of first person experience covers sense is
like saying if you look at the blueprints of an airport in China that
you have climbed Mt. Everest.

> >>> Because we know that we have different channels of sense and we know
> >>> that it is not necessary for a computer to have multiple sense
> >>> channels, and that in fact, all data must be compiled into a one
> >>> dimensional binary stream.
> >> The cerebral stems also simplifies a lot. But adding complexity does
> >> not solve the problem, per se. In the worst case, it dilutes it.
> > Which problem?
> The mind body problem, or the sense problem.

But having to account for the complexity does help solve the mind body
problem, since it makes no sense under comp.

> >>> Our senses multiply the richness of our
> >>> experience, and even simple sensations like a circle quickly invite
> >>> imaginative elaboration. If a person is dizzy, they will complain. A
> >>> computer will never complain even if it is inside of a washing
> >>> machine
> >>> that never turns off.
> >> It depend which one.
> > None of them will complain unless someone programs it to do so.
> How can you be sure?

I don't need to be sure, I only need to observe the universality of
the lack of machines that have ever existed thus far in the history of
the world, and to understand that it makes perfect sense that they do
because the have no personal preference to ground a complaint in. I
don't have to be sure that all scissors cut to know that they don't
drive a bus in their spare time.

> >>>> That the existence of universal numbers, and their many dreams,
> >>>> is a
> >>>> consequence of logic and arithmetic.
> >>> Which is a consequence of sense and motive.
> >> Arithmetic cannot be a consequence of anything, except if it assumed
> >> it (or equivalent) already.
> > What makes you think that?
> That can be proved, and is part of the history of logic (failure of
> logicism).

Don't you recognize the incestuous nature of using logic to prove
arithmetic and vice versa? Arithmetic cannot prove feeling, but all
arithmetic can only be proved through feeling and first hand sense
making experience.

> > Some people can do arithmetic better than
> > others, the ability to understand arithmetic develops at certain ages
> > and not others. In people we see clearly that arithmetic understanding
> > is a consequence of physiological development.
> This suggests only that physiology is more complex than arithmetic,
> not simpler.

No, it proves that one particular physiology develops gestural
emotional sense before cognitive symbolic sense. It doesn't say that
physiology as a whole is more complex than arithmetic as a whole. It
does imply though that numbers are a more complex sense experience
than feelings involving more levels of abstraction.

> That's obvious, a bacteria, at the molecular level is already
> equivalent, for computability, to Robinson Arithmetic.

That's only what we see as a bacteria. If an alien astronomer looked
at New York through a telescope, New York would seem equivalent to
Robinson Arithmetic too.

> >>> How can something be determined to be true without something else
> >>> making sense of it as being true?
> >> It can be true without anybody capable of determine if it is true or
> >> not. That's the point of being realist.
> > I would say that the capacity to determine truth or not (sense) is the
> > only independently valid condition. Truth is a second order logic of
> > sense.
> That is the solipsist slope.

The cosmos is solipsistic. Solipsism is only problematic because
multiple solipsistic entities have to relate to each other in order to
maintain the integrity of the overall solipsism.

> >>>> A billion digit numbers can be prime without
> >>>> us being able to know it.
> >>> Sure, but if nothing is ever able to know it, then it isn't
> >>> something
> >>> real, it's only an idea of what could be real.
> >> ?
> > There is no factory making numbers in reality. Numbers are
> > hypothetical.
> Everything is, except consciousness here and now.

But through consciousness here and now you can extend your sense
experience into memory or mental and physical action in the world. You
can't access a non-hypothetical instance of a number though. There is
nothing a number by itself can do to threaten you or move your body.

> > Like Zeno's paradox - the idea that something would be
> > impeded from moving because it would first have to move halfway is a
> > fallacy because 'halfway' is an intellectual interpretation with
> > intellectual consequences. It has no causally efficacious consequence
> > on its own.
> I can agree with this.
> >>> I agree, but the ability to experience any of them, including
> >>> numbers,
> >>> is more primitive.
> >> Well, it certainly is, with comp, for it relies in the additive and
> >> multiplicative of numbers. But you want them to be primary, and thus
> >> unexplainable. This makes your approach a bit too much like "don't
> >> ask". But even machine will ask, so I search for more understandable
> >> theories.
> > It's only unexplainable because it is explanation itself. Why would
> > you need further explanation?
> Because it does not put any light on what interests me.

I think it should though.

> >>>>> In your logopomorphic theory of comp.
> >>>> Be polite!
> >>>> :)
> >>> Hah. I wasn't trying to be pejorative, just saying that your view
> >>> makes sense in my view but my view doesn't make sense in yours.
> >> On the contrary. As I told you, you just reify the first person point
> >> of view. I already know why machine want to do that. The illusion is
> >> true and genuinely felt by them, yet illusory. (in the comp theory).
> > And as I have told you, you just reify the logomorphic point of view.
> > I too know why mathematicians and logicians want to to that. The
> > illusion is true and logically proved by them, yet (relatively)
> > illusory.
> ?

If you have only a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

> >>>> It develops from intuition.
> >>> That's sense!
> >> OK. For machine, it is what depend on both the machine beliefs, and
> >> (arithmetical) truth.
> > AKA, what (hypothetically) makes sense to a machine.
> Sure.

Ok, so that's what I'm saying, beliefs and truths supervene on sense.

> >> At the ontological level only. Not for the epistemology, which is on
> >> the contrary vaccinated against reductionism.
> > The ontological level is all that I care about. I am trying to
> > describe the universe, not engineer within it.
> I don't buy the myth of the (ontological) universe. It is incompatible
> with comp, but even without comp, I take it as a fertile simplication
> in the natural sciences, but nothing more. I have always intuited that
> such metaphysical assumption tend to eliminate sense and persons.
> You do better by securing sense in putting it in the ontology, and I
> appreciate that, but this does not make much sense to me, especially
> if it makes machines into puppets.  It is a far too carbon centered
> conception of life, mind and even humans.

If you can make and control a machine made out of living cells, then
you have a good change of doing the same thing you could do with
silicon or ping pong balls. If there is no important difference then
you should have no problem making a machine like that.

> >>> This is what
> >>> counting is; an abstraction layer which we use to identify or
> >>> mention
> >>> *that* things are, but it doesn't address the actual experience of
> >>> what it is to be presented with those things. We count five apples
> >>> but
> >>> the number five tells us nothing about apples.
> >>> What the logomorphic perspective does is invite an elevation of
> >>> truth
> >>> values and universality at the direct expense of qualitatively rich
> >>> experience and specificity. It amputates the protocol stack of
> >>> humans,
> >>> animals, organisms, chemicals, even physics and leaves only a
> >>> mathematical stump.
> >> Not at all. comp explains entirely whay arithmetic, seen from inside,
> >> look even beyond the mathematical (and why machine naturally develop
> >> theologies, which goes beyond what they can rationally justified).
> >> What you accuse comp of doing, is what you do on machines. you
> >> amputate their qualitatively super rich epistemological realities by
> >> looking only to the third description of the computations or
> >> arithmetical relations.
> > We don't have direct access to any super rich qualities of comp, they
> > all are inferred through our natively super rich qualities of
> > cognition.
> That is locally true, but globally wrong (in the comp theory).

How can numbers be numbers but also be super rich qualities. Wouldn't
the qualities be the more completed description of what they are?

> >> The whole complete theology of any universal machine is beyond any
> >> human conceivable domain.
> > The sense of the totality-singularity is beyond any conceivable
> > theology.
> >> But we can get nice big picture of it, in
> >> the study of fixed little a priori correct machine; it is already
> >> quite a mess full of things that *we* can name, in more powerful
> >> theories than arithmetic, and we can see why the machine cannot get
> >> those names, and the catastrophes which can occur if they
> >> inadvertantly give a name to those things. Then we can lift such
> >> theologies for us, with the proviso that we can only bet on our
> >> correctness, and that eventually, we need to refer to truly unameable
> >> things to ensure such theologies makes sense.
> >> You are the reductionist, and this to claim that we (who exactly?)
> >> have something that a vast class of creature cannot have according to
> >> your feeling.
> > They aren't creatures though, they are ideas of creatures. Ideas don't
> > create things, creators create using ideas.
> Well, the one who says "yes" to the digitalist surgeon, refutes this.
> But that's coherent with your saying "no".
> >> I can understand that before Gödel, we might have tought mechanism is
> >> a reductionism, but after Gödel, mechanism appears to be a vaccine
> >> against reductionism. The self-referentially correct machine is bound
> >> up to be a universal dissident.
> >> If she succeed in never exchanging an atom of security for an atom of
> >> liberty, she can go to heaven (Dt and Co.), if not she can go to hell
> >> (Bf and Co.). Despite it is hard to imagine something less
> >> deterministic than arithmetic, from inside, it is looks like we surf
> >> on a frontier between security (below universality, or sigma_1
> >> completeness, we can control our submachines), and liberty (you can
> >> be
> >> become whichever machine you want, you are (at different levels)
> >> Turing universal, or sigma_1 complete. Universal machines, in a
> >> sense,
> >> have already a sort of free will possibility, because they are
> >> initial
> >> segment of the all histories, or subjective experience, dreams, or
> >> the
> >> comp first person experiences.
> > The desire to go to heaven and avoid hell is sense. It doesn't emerge
> > logically from arithmetic.
> How do you know that?

What kind of a number is heaven and why would one want to "go there"
if there were no sense or motive?

> > What do numbers care about heaven and hell?
> By definition, they fear and hate hell, and desire heaven. Hell is
> pain, and pain is what they have to avoid so that they consciousness
> flux maximize the long term consistent histories. In the comp theology
> "absolute Hell" is the constant false. Like in Plotinus, it does not
> exist. But already for the ideally simple correct machine, lies,
> error, dreams abound, and they are of the type Bf (or BBf, BDt,
> etc.).  They can approach "hell". With B and D variants of the
> Gödelian arithmetical B and D.

It sounds interesting, and I wish I could follow you into an
arithmetic divinity at least for the alchemical correspondences alone,
but it all seems like an arbitrarily fantastic scenario that projects
obviously anthropological level sense onto one dimensional recursive

> Now, here, even in the toy case, there are *many* open problems. And
> before proceeding, we should need to agree on many definitions. To be
> clear.

I don't doubt it.

> >>> The assumption is that using the splinters of the
> >>> stump, we must be able to build the entire tree, but what keeps
> >>> happening is that we get only a Turing Frankentree and splinters in
> >>> our hands.
> >> Possible. But I bet on the contrary. I don't feel superior, and it is
> >> also a hope, and a fear. Typically I dunno. But it is a simple and
> >> elegant hypothesis, with an "effective everything" (the UD, made
> >> solid
> >> by Church thesis), and which leads to a physics that we can tested.
> > That's ok but it doesn't lead to the untestable first hand experience
> > of reality.
> If comp is correct, it does. Indeed, it defines your here and now
> domain of first person indeterminacy. Singular, and plural, and sorts
> of intermediates. It is complex.

But a singular what? Who is the first person? It's an empty chair that
has an X where the self is supposed to go, but that doesn't make it a
real person.

> >>> The danger is that rather than seeing this a sign to
> >>> understand the tree as a unique top-down event in the cosmos as well
> >>> as a bottom up assembled machine, we become even more fascinated by
> >>> the challenge of transmuting AI gold from leaden code and pursue it
> >>> even more avidly and obsessively.
> >> It is not without danger. The only danger, both for comp and non-
> >> comp,
> >> would be in pretending to know the truth about that. Comp is a type
> >> of
> >> technological religion, and the question is really "can your daughter
> >> marry a guy who bet on comp?".
> > Betting on comp is ok, I just think that betting on sense makes more
> > sense.
> It is certainly better than eliminating sense. We agree on this. But I
> do think there is an explanation of how they emerge from number's
> introspection.

To me, any sort of introspection is already sense. Sense doesn't need
sense to explain sense, it just experiences directly.

> The universal numbers already "behave" like if they
> sense their relationships with variate universal numbers.
> Arithmetic is full of life.

It would take me a full lifetime to learn to see much real life in
arithmetic. Skeletons of life, sure.

> >> Just make clearer all your terms, learn a bit of logic, and build a
> >> "real" non-comp theory of reality. But the math needed to handle non
> >> comp entities is basically the same than the math for comp, and you
> >> have to conceive quite complex (but existing) entities to escape the
> >> mathematical theologies of the self-referentially correct entity.
> >> Another solution, is that you stop pretending that your theory of
> >> reality decides between comp and non-comp, for you do have some
> >> intuition comparable ... to the machine's intuition. The first person
> >> of the machine already don't believe she is a machine.
> > Does the first person machine also believe that her world is a
> > machine?
> Only the dumb one.

But aren't you a first person a machine who says I should believe our
world is a machine?

> The one who have not yet understood that if they
> are machine, then "reality (God included)" cannot be a machine.

How could reality not be a machine when it is made up completely of 3-
p machines?

> It is
> almost a triviality. Above the treshold of sigma_1 completeness, you
> need explore the whole arithmetical and analytical hierarchy to just
> learn on the sigma_1. That is perhaps why Emile Post, called its
> Turing universal sets the creative sets, because sigma_1 complete set,
> creative set, or universal "machine" or number are explosively
> creative, but they can reason, and thay can understand that IF they
> are machine (which they cannot know) then, whatever whole exist, it
> can't be a machine.
> >>> This is what is going on in Big
> >>> Physics (mechanemorphism) now as well, and in fundamentalist
> >>> revivals
> >>> (Big Religion, anthropomorphism) around the world and Big Business
> >>> (technemorphism).
> >> Business and religion are wonderful things, like money, which is the
> >> blood of economy, unless it is captured by special interest and will
> >> in control. So the state has to be independent of them, or it leads
> >> to
> >> Big Gangsterism (current situation, btw).
> >>> All four points on the compass are hyperextended
> >>> into pathology until unity can be reconciled.
> >> That happens all the time with the liars.
> >> The role of the lies in life and in matter is still unclear for me.
> > That's what I was trying to get at with numbers being constrained by
> > truth. A sense based model means that fiction is primary, fiction is
> > the whole or ultimate truth, while fact is a quality of fiction
> > reliably presented as non-fiction.
> I can give sense to that. That is why I use so often the term dream.
> Awake of sleeping, we feel only the result of the brain information
> processing, and as such awakeness, if that exist, can only be dream,
> but well connected to some other (most probable) universal numbers.
> Awakeness on p is dream on p + p is true, somehow.
> But this does not dilute awakeness, although it might relativize it.

Awakeness on p is (sense-motive) dream on p + consensus of
constructively interfering dreams in a given inertial frame
(spatiotemporal) radius of the dreamers.

> >>>> Because truth extend logics, and number are constrained by truth,
> >>>> before what they can believe.
> >>> I get that truth extends logic, and that numbers are constrained by
> >>> truth (which I say is lowest common denominator sense) but I don't
> >>> get
> >>> the last part. Why does truth have to discover itself?
> >> I am not sure truth can discover itself. Truth from inside divides
> >> into different perspectives, like the provable, the knowable, the
> >> observable, the sensible. Necessarily when in the case of the "eyes
> >> of
> >> a universal machine", with the classical definition. Truth itself,
> >> from inside is not nameable.
> > It's not nameable but it is experienced through sense.
> Yes.


> >>>>> In our development as children, do we not discover logic out
> >>>>> of the chaos of infancy rather than the other way around? Do we
> >>>>> not
> >>>>> learn numbers rather than learn feelings?
> >>>> Because we have brains which sum up millions years of teaching in
> >>>> nine
> >>>> month, making us believe that walking and seeing is simpler than
> >>>> trigonometry. Later we can understand that is the contrary.
> >>> You are right in one sense, but that sense doesn't exist until
> >>> 'later'. Trigonometry is indeed simpler mathematics than the
> >>> mathematics underlying human walking and seeing, but the sense
> >>> underlying trigonometry is even simpler. That sense is the same
> >>> common
> >>> denominator that makes us a single walking seeing person - it's the
> >>> absolute common denominator, simplicity itself - unity, totality,
> >>> wholeness, being. It makes no distinction between now and forever,
> >>> between everything and nothing. It is the greatest and least
> >>> inertial
> >>> frame possible. For this not to be the case, there would have to be
> >>> something preventing it. Some limitation inherent that does not
> >>> allow
> >>> everything to be one thing on some level. Sense does this
> >>> temporarily,
> >>> I think literally, it does it through time.
> >> Ok, but then you reduce the ontology to the arithmetical sense. That
> >> makes sense, even with comp.
> > It reduces to sense but why say that it's arithmetic sense?
> Because we study the comp theory, which is plausible from molecular
> biology, or any physical theory (except those using ad hoc selection
> principle).
> And if it is false, may be we can refute it.
> And if it is false, to make sense of its falsity, we will still need
> the comp theory.

You can still study comp theory without giving consciousness and
matter supervenience on it. They can all three be part of the same

> >>>>>> Then the comp act of faith
> >>>>>> appears to be the simplest way to restore logic, except for that
> >>>>>> act
> >>>>>> of faith and the belief in addition and multiplication.
> >>>>> What kind of faith does a Turing machine have?
> >>>> If she is correct, it looks like it is plotinian sort of faith.
> >>>> But a
> >>>> machine can also develop a faith in mechanism, by surviving back-
> >>>> up,
> >>>> and be led, with occam, to a more pythagorean sort of faith.
> >>> Sounds like a very Greco-Anglican faith. Where are the Vedic
> >>> machines?
> >> Very close. I have a craving for the study of the relation between
> >> Greeks theologies and Eastern "theologies", it is a rich subject. My
> >> favorite text is the question of king Milinda. The arithmetical
> >> interpretation of Plotinus comes from an earlier arithmetical
> >> interpretation of Lao-Tseu.
> >> I mean all correct machines seems quite Vedic to me.
> >> With comp, the outer-god, the One, cannot recognize itself, but the
> >> inner-god, the soul, the first person, can.
> > That makes sense in my terms too. That necessity to project an
> > interior that projects an exterior is the same thing as metaphor. I
> > think it's fundamental architecture of sense. The Big Diffraction
> > means that this can only be accomplished by masking the self into
> > partitions, so it's not really a projection as a gated filter on a
> > sense of everything which in turn filters itself into a sense of self
> > and other things. Metaphor is how awareness bleeds through the
> > partitions, across levels vertically, ie in defiance of strict logic
> > (horizontal sense within one channel of sense).
> Nice we might agree, but you get me lost here.
> It *looks* like 1004 type of over- specified terms in a vague context.
> Sorry.

Yeah got a little too run together there, sorry. Just saying how
metaphor is a big deal because it associates figures by making the
boundary between inner and outer realities porous in one sense and
solid in another. Diffusion of meaning through the semi-permeable
mindbrain if you will.


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