On May 18, 8:02 pm, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Sat, May 19, 2012 at 1:03 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> You haven't understood a basic point, which is important independently
> >> of the current discussion. This point is that if we live in a
> >> perfectly deterministic multiverse, our subjective experience will be
> >> probabilistic. This is because it is impossible for a being embedded
> >> in the multiverse to know in which branch he will end up. The
> >> impossibility is logical, not merely empirical.
> > If I decide to type this sentence, the probability of both of us
> > ending up in a branch of the multiverse in which this sentence appears
> > before you on your screen is close to 100%. How does that work
> > exactly?
> > Since I know that it will appear in both of our universes, not merely
> > logically or empirically but intuitively and unquestionably, does that
> > mean that MWI is cannot be viable?
> In a branching multiverse where all possibilities happen at a decision
> point, some versions of you decide to type the sentence and others do
> not. This could be completely deterministic for the multiverse as a
> whole: x versions of you will definitely type it, y versions of you
> will definitely not.

I understand the theory, but my example shows how that appears not to
be the case, since my experience of intending to do something almost
always results in an experience where I do what I intended. I can
control the probability range that it will happen through the strength
of my motive and the clarity of my sense.

> However, from your point of view, you don't know
> which version of you you will experience, so your future is
> indeterminate /  random / probabilistic, not deterministic.

So you say. How much do you want to bet that I'm going to sleep in my
bed tonight? How about for the rest of my life not including
vacations? That's a lot of universe where I sleep under a bush or on
the roof or in Jellystone Park.

> It's
> impossible - logically impossible, impossible even if you know every
> deterministic detail of the multiverse's future history - for you to
> know which version will be the "real" you, since all versions have
> equal claim to being the "real" you. This is a quite simple, but
> counterintuitive idea.

No I understand the idea completely, I just think it's an obvious plug
for the inconsistencies of QM. Like Dark matter dark energy,
superposition, emergence, and entanglement. It's all phlogiston,
libido, elan vital, animal magnetism, etc. It's quite nice in theory,
but it sodomizes one side of Occam's Razor with the other. It's
counter intuitive because it's an absurd way of explaining the
universe in terms of nearly infinite nearly nonsensical universes.
Every grain of sand on every planet in the cosmos having it's own set
of universes customized to fit every pebble collision and sea tousled
movement? Seriously? With sense as a primitive you don't need any of
that. The universe is one thing with different views of itself. Each
view doesn't need to be a creator of literal separate universes.


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