On 5/22/2012 11:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 May 2012, at 14:36, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 5/21/2012 6:26 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, May 21, 2012 at 07:42:01AM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 5/21/2012 12:33 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, May 20, 2012 at 12:06:05PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/20/2012 9:27 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
4) What is the cardinality of "all computations"?
Actually, it is aleph_0. The set of all computations is
countable. OTOH, the set of all experiences (under COMP) is uncountable
(2^\aleph_0 in fact), which only equals \aleph_1 if the continuity
Interesting. Do you have any thoughts on what would follow from
not holding the continuity (Cantor's continuum?) hypothesis?
No - its not my field. My understanding is that the CH has bugger all
impact on quotidian mathematics - the stuff physicists use,
basically. But it has a profound effect on the properties of
transfinite sets. And nobody can decide whether CH should be true or
false (both possibilities produce consistent results).
I once thought that consistency, in mathematics, was the
indication of existence but situations like this make that idea a
point of contention... CH and AoC
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom_of_choice> are two axioms
associated with ZF set theory that have lead some people (including
me) to consider a wider interpretation of mathematics. What if all
possible consistent mathematical theories must somehow exist?
Its one reason why Bruno would like to restrict ontology to machines,
or at most integers - echoing Kronecker's quotable "God made the
integers, all else is the work of man".
I understand that, but this choice to restrict makes Bruno's
It is not idealism. It is neutral monism. Idealism would makes mind or
ideas primitive, which is not the case.
No, Bruno, it is not Neutral monism as such cannot assume any
particular as primitive, even if it is quantity itself, for to do such
is to violate the very notion of neutrality itself. You might like to
spend some time reading Spinoza
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza/> and Bertrand Russell's
discussions of this. I did not invent this line of reasoning.
even more perplexing to me; how is it that the Integers are given
such special status,
Because of "digital" in digital mechanism. It is not so much an
emphasis on numbers, than on finite.
So how do you justify finiteness? I have been accused of having
the "everything disease" whose symptom is "the inability to conceive
anything but infinite, ill defined ensembles", but in my defense I must
state that what I am conceiving is an over-abundance of very precisely
defined ensembles. My disease is the inability to properly articulate a
especially when we cast aside all possibility (within our ontology)
of the "reality" of the physical world?
Not at all. Only "primitively physical" reality is put in doubt.
Not me. I already came to the conclusion that reality cannot be
Without the physical world to act as a "selection" mechanism for what
This contradicts your neutral monism.
No, it does not. Please see my discussion of neutral monism above.
why the bias for integers?
Because comp = machine, and machine are supposed to be of the type
This is true only after the possibility of determining differences
is stipulated. One cannot assume a neutral monism that stipulates a
non-neutral stance, to do so it a contradiction.
This has been a question that I have tried to get answered to no avail.
You don't listen. This has been repeated very often. When you say
"yes" to the doctor, you accept that you survive with a computer
executing a code. A code is mainly a natural number, up to computable
isomorphism. Comp refers to computer science, which study the
computable function, which can always be recasted in term of
computable function from N to N.
And there are no other theory of computability, on reals or whatever,
or if you prefer, there are too many, without any Church thesis or
genuine universality notion. (Cf Pour-Hel, Blum Shub and Smale, etc.)
I do listen and read as well. Now it is your turn. The entire
theory of computation rests upon the ability to distinguish quantity
from non-quantity, even to the point of the possibility of the act of
making a distinction. When you propose a primitive ground that assumes a
prior distinction and negates the prior act that generated the result,
you are demanding the belief in fiat acts. This is familiar to me from
my childhood days of sitting in the pew of my father's church. It is an
act of blind faith, not evidence based science. Please stop pretending
"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon
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