On 5/22/2012 6:01 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


2012/5/22 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>>


     No, Bruno, it is not Neutral monism as such cannot assume any
    particular as primitive, even if it is quantity itself, for to do
    such is to violate the very notion of neutrality itself. You might
    like to spend some time reading Spinoza
    <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza/> and Bertrand
    Russell's discussions of this. I did not invent this line of
    reasoning.


*Neutral monism*, in philosophy <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy>, is the metaphysical <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics> view that the mental and the physical are two ways of organizing or describing the same elements, which are themselves "neutral," that is, neither physical nor mental.

I don't see how taking N,+,* as primitive is not neutral monism. It is neither physical nor mental.

If mathematical "objects" are not within the category of Mental then that is news to philosophers...






    even more perplexing to me; how is it that the Integers are
    given such special status,

    Because of "digital" in digital mechanism. It is not so much an
    emphasis on numbers, than on finite.

        So how do you justify finiteness?  I have been accused of
    having the "everything disease" whose symptom is "the inability to
    conceive anything but infinite, ill defined ensembles", but in my
    defense I must state that what I am conceiving is an
    over-abundance of very precisely defined ensembles. My disease is
    the inability to properly articulate a written description.


    especially when we cast aside all possibility (within our
    ontology) of the "reality" of the physical world?

    Not at all. Only "primitively physical" reality is put in doubt.

        Not me. I already came to the conclusion that reality cannot
    be primitively physical.


You are unclear on what you posit. You always came back to the "physical reality" point, so I don't know what more to say... either you agree physical reality is not ontologically primitive or you don't, there's no in between position.

We have to start at the physical reality that we individually experience, it is, aside from our awareness, the most "real" thing we have to stand upon philosophically. From there we venture out in our speculations as to our ontology. cosmogony and epistemology. is there an alternative?





    Without the physical world to act as a "selection" mechanism for
    what is "Real",

    This contradicts your neutral monism.

        No, it does not. Please see my discussion of neutral monism
    above.


Yes it does, reading you, you posit a physical material reality as primitive, which is not neutral...

No, I posit the physical and the mental as "real" in the sense that I am experiencing them. Telescoping out to the farthest point of abstraction we have ideas like Bruno's. I guess that I need to draw some diagrams...





    why the bias for integers?

    Because comp = machine, and machine are supposed to be of the
    type "finitely describable".

        This is true only after the possibility of determining
    differences is stipulated. One cannot assume a neutral monism that
    stipulates a non-neutral stance, to do so it a contradiction.

Computationalism is the theory that your consciousness can be emulated on a turing machine, a program is a finite object and can be described by an integer. I don't see a contradiction.

I am with Penrose in claiming that consciousness is not emulable by a finite machine.





    This has been a question that I have tried to get answered to no
    avail.

    You don't listen. This has been repeated very often. When you say
    "yes" to the doctor, you accept that you survive with a computer
    executing a code. A code is mainly a natural number, up to
    computable isomorphism. Comp refers to computer science, which
    study the computable function, which can always be recasted in
    term of computable function from N to N.
    And there are no other theory of computability, on reals or
    whatever, or if you prefer, there are too many, without any
    Church thesis or genuine universality notion. (Cf Pour-Hel, Blum
    Shub and Smale, etc.)

        I do listen and read as well. Now it is your turn. The entire
    theory of computation rests upon the ability to distinguish
    quantity from non-quantity, even to the point of the possibility
    of the act of making a distinction. When you propose a primitive
    ground that assumes a prior distinction and negates the prior act
    that generated the result, you are demanding the belief in fiat
    acts. This is familiar to me from my childhood days of sitting in
    the pew of my father's church. It is an act of blind faith, not
    evidence based science. Please stop pretending otherwise.

"evidence based science" ??

Yes, like not rejecting the physical necessity involved in a computation. I reject Platonism on these grounds; it is anti-empirical.


--
Onward!

Stephen

"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon

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