On 5/22/2012 6:01 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/5/22 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net
No, Bruno, it is not Neutral monism as such cannot assume any
particular as primitive, even if it is quantity itself, for to do
such is to violate the very notion of neutrality itself. You might
like to spend some time reading Spinoza
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza/> and Bertrand
Russell's discussions of this. I did not invent this line of
*Neutral monism*, in philosophy
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy>, is the metaphysical
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics> view that the mental and
the physical are two ways of organizing or describing the same
elements, which are themselves "neutral," that is, neither physical
I don't see how taking N,+,* as primitive is not neutral monism. It is
neither physical nor mental.
If mathematical "objects" are not within the category of Mental
then that is news to philosophers...
even more perplexing to me; how is it that the Integers are
given such special status,
Because of "digital" in digital mechanism. It is not so much an
emphasis on numbers, than on finite.
So how do you justify finiteness? I have been accused of
having the "everything disease" whose symptom is "the inability to
conceive anything but infinite, ill defined ensembles", but in my
defense I must state that what I am conceiving is an
over-abundance of very precisely defined ensembles. My disease is
the inability to properly articulate a written description.
especially when we cast aside all possibility (within our
ontology) of the "reality" of the physical world?
Not at all. Only "primitively physical" reality is put in doubt.
Not me. I already came to the conclusion that reality cannot
be primitively physical.
You are unclear on what you posit. You always came back to the
"physical reality" point, so I don't know what more to say... either
you agree physical reality is not ontologically primitive or you
don't, there's no in between position.
We have to start at the physical reality that we individually
experience, it is, aside from our awareness, the most "real" thing we
have to stand upon philosophically. From there we venture out in our
speculations as to our ontology. cosmogony and epistemology. is there an
Without the physical world to act as a "selection" mechanism for
what is "Real",
This contradicts your neutral monism.
No, it does not. Please see my discussion of neutral monism
Yes it does, reading you, you posit a physical material reality as
primitive, which is not neutral...
No, I posit the physical and the mental as "real" in the sense that
I am experiencing them. Telescoping out to the farthest point of
abstraction we have ideas like Bruno's. I guess that I need to draw
why the bias for integers?
Because comp = machine, and machine are supposed to be of the
type "finitely describable".
This is true only after the possibility of determining
differences is stipulated. One cannot assume a neutral monism that
stipulates a non-neutral stance, to do so it a contradiction.
Computationalism is the theory that your consciousness can be emulated
on a turing machine, a program is a finite object and can be described
by an integer. I don't see a contradiction.
I am with Penrose in claiming that consciousness is not emulable by
a finite machine.
This has been a question that I have tried to get answered to no
You don't listen. This has been repeated very often. When you say
"yes" to the doctor, you accept that you survive with a computer
executing a code. A code is mainly a natural number, up to
computable isomorphism. Comp refers to computer science, which
study the computable function, which can always be recasted in
term of computable function from N to N.
And there are no other theory of computability, on reals or
whatever, or if you prefer, there are too many, without any
Church thesis or genuine universality notion. (Cf Pour-Hel, Blum
Shub and Smale, etc.)
I do listen and read as well. Now it is your turn. The entire
theory of computation rests upon the ability to distinguish
quantity from non-quantity, even to the point of the possibility
of the act of making a distinction. When you propose a primitive
ground that assumes a prior distinction and negates the prior act
that generated the result, you are demanding the belief in fiat
acts. This is familiar to me from my childhood days of sitting in
the pew of my father's church. It is an act of blind faith, not
evidence based science. Please stop pretending otherwise.
"evidence based science" ??
Yes, like not rejecting the physical necessity involved in a
computation. I reject Platonism on these grounds; it is anti-empirical.
"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon
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