2012/5/23 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>

>  On 5/22/2012 6:01 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> 2012/5/22 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
>
>>
>>   No, Bruno, it is not Neutral monism as such cannot assume any
>> particular as primitive, even if it is quantity itself, for to do such is
>> to violate the very notion of neutrality itself. You might like to spend
>> some time reading Spinoza <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza/>and 
>> Bertrand Russell's discussions of this. I did not invent this line of
>> reasoning.
>>
>
>  *Neutral monism*, in philosophy <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy>,
> is the metaphysical <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics> view that
> the mental and the physical are two ways of organizing or describing the
> same elements, which are themselves "neutral," that is, neither physical
> nor mental.
>
> I don't see how taking N,+,* as primitive is not neutral monism. It is
> neither physical nor mental.
>
>
>     If mathematical "objects" are not within the category of Mental then
> that is news to philosophers...
>


If numbers (accepting arithmetical realism) are independent of you, the
universe, any mind, it is difficult to see how then can be mental object...
the way we discover mathematics is through our mind, that doesn't mean
mathematical object are mind object... I discover the physical world
through my mind, that doesn't mean the physical world is a mental object.


>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  even more perplexing to me; how is it that the Integers are given such
>> special status,
>>
>>
>>  Because of "digital" in digital mechanism. It is not so much an
>> emphasis on numbers, than on finite.
>>
>>
>>      So how do you justify finiteness?  I have been accused of having the
>> "everything disease" whose symptom is "the inability to conceive anything
>> but infinite, ill defined ensembles", but in my defense I must state that
>> what I am conceiving is an over-abundance of very precisely defined
>> ensembles. My disease is the inability to properly articulate a written
>> description.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> especially when we cast aside all possibility (within our ontology) of
>> the "reality" of the physical world?
>>
>>
>>  Not at all. Only "primitively physical" reality is put in doubt.
>>
>>
>>      Not me. I already came to the conclusion that reality cannot be
>> primitively physical.
>>
>>
> You are unclear on what you posit. You always came back to the "physical
> reality" point, so I don't know what more to say... either you agree
> physical reality is not ontologically primitive or you don't, there's no in
> between position.
>
>
>     We have to start at the physical reality that we individually
> experience, it is, aside from our awareness, the most "real" thing we have
> to stand upon philosophically.
>

If you start from physicality it is hardly neutral monism.


> From there we venture out in our speculations as to our ontology.
> cosmogony and epistemology. is there an alternative?
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  Without the physical world to act as a "selection" mechanism for what
>> is "Real",
>>
>>
>>  This contradicts your neutral monism.
>>
>>
>>
>      No, it does not. Please see my discussion of neutral monism above.
>>
>
> Yes it does, reading you, you posit a physical material reality as
> primitive, which is not neutral...
>
>
>     No, I posit the physical and the mental as "real" in the sense that I
> am experiencing them. Telescoping out to the farthest point of abstraction
> we have ideas like Bruno's.  I guess that I need to draw some diagrams...
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>  why the bias for integers?
>>
>>
>>  Because comp = machine, and machine are supposed to be of the type
>> "finitely describable".
>>
>>
>>      This is true only after the possibility of determining differences
>> is stipulated. One cannot assume a neutral monism that stipulates a
>> non-neutral stance, to do so it a contradiction.
>>
>>   Computationalism is the theory that your consciousness can be emulated
> on a turing machine, a program is a finite object and can be described by
> an integer. I don't see a contradiction.
>
>
>     I am with Penrose in claiming that consciousness is not emulable by a
> finite machine.
>
>
You claim what you want, you simply reject computationalism then, but I
have not to accept your claim without you backing it.

Regards,
Quentin


>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  This has been a question that I have tried to get answered to no avail.
>>
>>
>>  You don't listen. This has been repeated very often. When you say "yes"
>> to the doctor, you accept that you survive with a computer executing a
>> code. A code is mainly a natural number, up to computable isomorphism. Comp
>> refers to computer science, which study the computable function, which can
>> always be recasted in term of computable function from N to N.
>> And there are no other theory of computability, on reals or whatever, or
>> if you prefer, there are too many, without any Church thesis or genuine
>> universality notion. (Cf Pour-Hel, Blum Shub and Smale, etc.)
>>
>>
>>      I do listen and read as well. Now it is your turn. The entire theory
>> of computation rests upon the ability to distinguish quantity from
>> non-quantity, even to the point of the possibility of the act of making a
>> distinction. When you propose a primitive ground that assumes a prior
>> distinction and negates the prior act that generated the result, you are
>> demanding the belief in fiat acts. This is familiar to me from my childhood
>> days of sitting in the pew of my father's church. It is an act of blind
>> faith, not evidence based science. Please stop pretending otherwise.
>>
>>   "evidence based science" ??
>
>
>     Yes, like not rejecting the physical necessity involved in a
> computation. I reject Platonism on these grounds; it is anti-empirical.
>
>
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
> "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
> ~ Francis Bacon
>
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