On 23 May 2012, at 01:22, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 5/22/2012 6:01 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/5/22 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
No, Bruno, it is not Neutral monism as such cannot assume any
particular as primitive, even if it is quantity itself, for to do
such is to violate the very notion of neutrality itself. You might
like to spend some time reading Spinoza and Bertrand Russell's
discussions of this. I did not invent this line of reasoning.
Neutral monism, in philosophy, is the metaphysical view that the
mental and the physical are two ways of organizing or describing
the same elements, which are themselves "neutral," that is, neither
physical nor mental.
I don't see how taking N,+,* as primitive is not neutral monism. It
is neither physical nor mental.
If mathematical "objects" are not within the category of Mental
then that is news to philosophers...
If mathematical "objects" are within the category of Mental then that
is news to mathematicians...
And it is disastrous for those who want study the mental by defining
it by the mathematical, as in computer science, cognitive science,
artificial intelligence, etc;
even more perplexing to me; how is it that the Integers are given
such special status,
Because of "digital" in digital mechanism. It is not so much an
emphasis on numbers, than on finite.
So how do you justify finiteness? I have been accused of
having the "everything disease" whose symptom is "the inability to
conceive anything but infinite, ill defined ensembles", but in my
defense I must state that what I am conceiving is an over-abundance
of very precisely defined ensembles. My disease is the inability to
properly articulate a written description.
especially when we cast aside all possibility (within our
ontology) of the "reality" of the physical world?
Not at all. Only "primitively physical" reality is put in doubt.
Not me. I already came to the conclusion that reality cannot be
You are unclear on what you posit. You always came back to the
"physical reality" point, so I don't know what more to say...
either you agree physical reality is not ontologically primitive or
you don't, there's no in between position.
We have to start at the physical reality that we individually
experience, it is, aside from our awareness, the most "real" thing
we have to stand upon philosophically.
The most "real" things might be consciousness, here and now. And this
doesn't make consciousness primitive, but invite us to be
methodologically skeptical on the physical, as we know since the
From there we venture out in our speculations as to our ontology.
cosmogony and epistemology. is there an alternative?
So you start from physics? This contradicts your neutral monism.
Without the physical world to act as a "selection" mechanism for
what is "Real",
This contradicts your neutral monism.
No, it does not. Please see my discussion of neutral monism
Yes it does, reading you, you posit a physical material reality as
primitive, which is not neutral...
No, I posit the physical and the mental as "real" in the sense
that I am experiencing them.
You can't experience the physical. The physical is inferred from
theory, even if automated by years of evolution.
Telescoping out to the farthest point of abstraction we have ideas
like Bruno's. I guess that I need to draw some diagrams...
Not ideas. Universal truth following a deduction in a theoretical
frame. It is just a theorem in applied logic: if we are digital
machine, then physics (whatever inferable from observable) is
derivable from arithmetic. Adding anything to it, *cannot* be of any
use (cf UDA step 7 and 8).
You are free to use any philosophy you want to *find* a flaw in the
reasoning, but a philosophical conviction does not refute it by itself.
If you think there is a loophole, just show it to us.
why the bias for integers?
Because comp = machine, and machine are supposed to be of the type
This is true only after the possibility of determining
differences is stipulated. One cannot assume a neutral monism that
stipulates a non-neutral stance, to do so it a contradiction.
Computationalism is the theory that your consciousness can be
emulated on a turing machine, a program is a finite object and can
be described by an integer. I don't see a contradiction.
I am with Penrose in claiming that consciousness is not emulable
by a finite machine.
This contradicts your statement that your theory is consistent with
comp (as it is not, as I argue to you). You are making my point. It
This has been a question that I have tried to get answered to no
You don't listen. This has been repeated very often. When you say
"yes" to the doctor, you accept that you survive with a computer
executing a code. A code is mainly a natural number, up to
computable isomorphism. Comp refers to computer science, which
study the computable function, which can always be recasted in
term of computable function from N to N.
And there are no other theory of computability, on reals or
whatever, or if you prefer, there are too many, without any Church
thesis or genuine universality notion. (Cf Pour-Hel, Blum Shub and
I do listen and read as well. Now it is your turn. The entire
theory of computation rests upon the ability to distinguish
quantity from non-quantity, even to the point of the possibility of
the act of making a distinction. When you propose a primitive
ground that assumes a prior distinction and negates the prior act
that generated the result, you are demanding the belief in fiat
acts. This is familiar to me from my childhood days of sitting in
the pew of my father's church. It is an act of blind faith, not
evidence based science. Please stop pretending otherwise.
"evidence based science" ??
Yes, like not rejecting the physical necessity involved in a
There is no physical necessity involved in a computation, no more than
in an addition or multiplication. You will not find a book on
computation referring to any physical notion in the definition. This
exists only in philosophical defense on physicalism. The notion of
physical computation is complex, and there is no unanimity on whether
such notion makes sense or not. With comp, it is an open problem, but
it does a priori make sense.
I reject Platonism on these grounds; it is anti-empirical.
As Brent pointed out, it depends on the theory. Comp is platonist, but
makes precise prediction (indeed, that the whole of physics is given
by precise theories based on self-reference). This illustrates that
platonism can be empirical.
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