On 10 Aug 2012, at 14:53, Roger wrote:

Hi Russell Standish

But Dennet has no agent to react to all of those signals.
To perceive. To judge. To cause action.

To do those, an agent has to be unified and singular -- a point of focus-- and there's no propect for such in current neuroscience/ neurophilosophy.

I insist. The self is what computer science handles the best.

I agree with you that it is immaterial, and beyond space and time, which are construct of souls




Hence I follow Leibniz, even though he's difficult and some say
contradictory.

It is factually contradictory. Leibniz is coherent as he seems to recognize changing his mind on that issue. Different theories are not necessarily contradictory, when they are not mixed together. On the contrary Leibniz is rather very coherent in each of its different approach, but some followers mix them.



That agent or soul or self you have is your
monad, the only (alhough indirectly) perceiving/acting/feeling
agent in all of us, but currently missing in neuroscience and
neurophilosophy.

But not in computer science, which is indeed not very well known by neuroscientists.

Bruno





Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/10/2012
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Russell Standish
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-10, 08:04:44
Subject: Re: Libet's experimental result re-evaluated!

On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 12:10:43PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 10 Aug 2012, at 00:23, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> >
> >It is plain to me that thoughts can be either conscious or
> >unconscious, and the conscious component is a strict minority of the
> >total.
>
> This is not obvious for me, and I have to say that it is a point
> which is put in doubt by the salvia divinorum reports (including
> mine). When you dissociate the brain in parts, perhaps many parts,
> you realise that they might all be conscious. In fact the very idea
> of non-consciousness might be a construct of consciousness, and be
> realized by partial amnesia. I dunno. For the same reason I have
> stopped to believe that we can be unconscious during sleep. I think
> that we can only be amnesic-of-'previous-consciousness'.
>

With due respect to your salvia experiences, which I dare not follow,
I'm still more presuaded by the likes of Daniel Dennett, and his
"pandemonia" theory of the mind. In that idea, many subconscious
process, working disparately, solve different aspects of the problems
at hand, or provide different courses of action. The purpose of
consciousness is to select from among the course of action
presented by the pandemonium of subconscious processes - admittedly
consciousness per se may not be necessary for this role - any unifying
(aka reductive) process may be sufficient.

The reason I like this, is that it echoes an essentially Darwinian
process of random variation that is selected upon. Dawinian evolution
is the key to any form of creative process.

Cheers

--

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to