On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 8:13 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, August 11, 2012 3:01:41 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>>
>> Roger,
>>
>> You say computers are quantitative instruments which cannot have a self
>> or feelings, but might you be attributing things at the wrong level?  For
>> example, a computer can simulate some particle interactions, a sufficiently
>> big computer could simulate the behavior of any arbitrarily large amount of
>> matter.  The matter in the simulation could be arranged in the form of a
>> human being sitting in a room.
>>
>
> Does that mean that if I carefully scooped some salt or iron filings into
> a cymatic pattern <http://www.unitedearth.com.au/HJsand.jpg>, that we
> should have an expectation of a sound being produced automatically?
>

No, but it means if I replaced part of your auditory cortex with mechanical
parts that provided the same electrochemical signals to the neurons that
interfaced with your old auditory cortex, you would be able to hear.  At
what point could I stop replacing neighboring neurons with mechanical
parts?  Could I replace all but one neuron?  What happens if I replace that
last one?


>
>
>>
>> Do you think this simulated human made of simulated matter, all run
>> within the computer not have a self, feelings, and intuition?
>>
>
> The simulated human won't even have an 'it'-ness. The simulation only
> exists for us because it is designed specifically to exploit our
> expectations. There is no simulation, just millions of little salt scoopers.
>

So a computer that is adding is not really adding?  You suggest that a
computer is only adding if it outputs the numbers in a way humans can look
at it and interpret it as addition?



>
>
>>  After all, we are made up of material which lacks feelings, nonetheless,
>> we have feelings.
>>
>
> That's like saying that a photograph is made up of pixels which lack
> image. Since the nature of consciousness is privacy, we are not the best
> judge of non-human consciousness. There is no reason to trust our naive
> realism in assuming that non-humans lack proto-feelings.
>

Do electrons posses proto-feelings for every possible human emotion?  If
not, when or where do these more complex feelings come in?

Jason


>
> "Complex behavior is not confined to metazoans. Both amoebae and ciliates
> show purposive coordinated behaviour, as do individual human cells, such as
> macrophages. The multi-nucleate slime mould *Physarum polycephalum* can
> solve shortest path mazes and demonstrate a memory of a rhythmic series of
> stimuli, apparently using a biological clock to predict the next pulse
> (Nakagaki et. al. 2000, Ball 2008)." -
> http://www.dhushara.com/cosfcos/cosfcos2.html
>
>
>
>
>>  Where do you believe these feelings originate?
>>
>
> Feelings may not originate, but like the colors of the spectrum are
> accessed privately but have no public origination. As long as we assume
> that experience is something which occurs as the product of a mechanism,
> then we are limited to making sense of the universe as a meaningless
> mechanism of objects. If we think of time and space as the experiential
> cancellations, I think we have a better chance of understanding how it all
> fits together.
>
> Craig
>
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