William,

On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:02, William R. Buckley wrote:

Bruno:

You’ve turned things around. The implication is context to information, not information to context.

And, I suggest you think very long and carefully about my statement regarding the computational omniscience of the Turing machine. Yes, you may call it universality but that word is in fact too
strong; omniscience is more accurate.

Omniscience concerns beliefs or knowledge, mainly propositions. This can be proved to be always incomplete for machine (and plausibly humans), never "omni". Universality concerns functions, or computations. By a sort of miracle (Church's thesis) this can be universal.

Put differently: procedural 'knowledge' can be universal. Assertive knowledge is always incomplete.

Bruno





Also, read Jesper Hoffmeyer’s book Biosemiotics.

wrb

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com ] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 2:39 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

Hi William,

On 14 Aug 2012, at 02:09, William R. Buckley wrote:


Bruno:

From the perspective of semiotic theory, a subjective universe
seems rather obvious.

I don't think anything is obvious here.
What do you mean by a subjective universe? Do you mean that we are dreaming? What is your theory of dream? What is your theory of mind?




Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient

I guess you mean universal. But universality is incompatible with omniscience, even restricted to number relations. Computational universality entails the impossibility of omniscience.




solely as a consequence of its construction, and yet, it can hardly
be said that the engineer who designed the Turing machine (why,
Turing, himself!) intentioned to put into that machine as computable
computations.

?




Somehow, where information is concerned, context
is king.

I agree with this. I would say that information is really context selection.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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