On 14 Aug 2012, at 18:43, Roger wrote:



Memory may be physical, but the experience of memory is not physical.

memory is not physical. Some memories look physical in some arithmetical situation. Keep in mind that mechanism does not allow any notion of primitive physicalness. That's the point I proved. Some people keep pretending seeing a flaw, but when asked, and when they comply, they make simple error in logic, or just assert their philosophical disbelief.

Matter is a myth. ('Matter' = primary matter).

Bruno





Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-11, 12:00:54
Subject: Re: Libet's experimental result re-evaluated!


On 10 Aug 2012, at 18:18, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/10/2012 3:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

This is not obvious for me, and I have to say that it is a point which is put in doubt by the salvia divinorum reports (including mine). When you dissociate the brain in parts, perhaps many parts, you realise that they might all be conscious. In fact the very idea of non-consciousness might be a construct of consciousness, and be realized by partial amnesia. I dunno. For the same reason I have stopped to believe that we can be unconscious during sleep. I think that we can only be amnesic-of-'previous-consciousness'.

I have never supposed that asleep=unconscious. When one is asleep, one is still perceptive; just trying whispering a sleeping person's name near them. This is quite different from being unconscious due to a concussion.

OK.
But I think we remain conscious after concussion, except that the first person go through amnesia or sequence of amnesia, and also that the notion of you can momentarily change a lot, and this followed by amnesia.



I agree that being unconscious might be a combination of loss of all bodily control plus a loss of memory.

I am not sure. It is conceivable that we can remain conscious and lost all memories. But I thought before that we were still obliged to have a short term memory of the immediate conscious experience itself, so that consciousness implies a short term memory of elementary time events, but I am no more sure about this. Like Brouwer I related strongly consciousness with subjective time, but I am relinquishing that link since more recently. That's just more doubts and foods for thought!





But that seems an unlikely coincidence. Rather it is evidence that memory is physical

?


and that consciousness requires memory.

The conscious feeling of identity requires memory, but I am not sure that consciousness needs more "memory" than the minimal number of flip-flop needed to get a universal system, to which I begin to think has already a disconnected form of consciousness. Again, it is not the system itself which is conscious it is the abstract person it represents, or can represent.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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