On 15 Aug 2012, at 15:14, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

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I ´m seduced and intrigued by the Bruno´s final conclussións of theCOMP hypothesis. But I had a certain disconfort with the idea of asimulation of the reality by means of an algorithm for reasons Iwill describe later.

Comp is "I am a machine". It is NOT "reality is a machine".

`If comp is true, both reality and physical reality are NOT machine,`

`for the output of the many self-multiplication is NOT emulable by a`

`Turing machine. You might not yet grasp fully the impact of the first`

`person indeterminacy.`

In a sense: "I am a machine" implies that everything else is not.

`Indeed, the apparent computability of nature might in fine be a`

`problem for comp. It is behind the whole measure problem.`

I found that either if the nature of our perception of reality) canbe of the thesis of a simulation at a certain level of substitutionof a phisical or mathematical reality, this simulation is, and onlyis, a discrete manifold, with discreteness defined by thesubstitution level, which is a subset of a continuous manifold thatis the equation M of superstring theory of wathever mathematicalstructure that describe the universe. The equivalence may be shownas follows:A imperative computation is equivalent to a mathematical structurethanks to the work on denotational semantics and the application ofcategory theory to it .

Or just by definition.

Suppose that we know the M theory equation.

`You are still assuming a physical reality. If the M theory equation is`

`correct, it has to be derived from addition and multiplication, and`

`comp at the metalevel. But it has to admit non computable solution,`

`because with comp the physical reality is not computable, a priori.`

A particular simulation can be obtained in a straighfordward way bymeans of an algorithm that compute a sequence of positions and therespective values in the M equation (which must specify wether thereis a particle, its nature and state at this point or more preciselythe value of the wave equation at this N-position or wathever arethe relevant parameters at this level of substitution), perhaps thesucession of points can be let´s say in a progression of concentricn-dimensional circles around the singularity. this algoritm isequivalent to the ordered set obtained by the combination of twokind of functions (1) for obtaining sucessive N-dimensionalpositions and (2) the function M(pos) itself for that particularpoint. The simulation then is a mathematical structure composed bythe ordered set of these points, which is a subset of the manifolddescribed by the M equation. (When a computation is pure, like this,the arrows between categories are functions).Suppose that we do not know the equation fo the M theory, and maybeit does not exist, but COMP holds and we start with the dovetaileralgoritm at a fortunate substitution level.

`The universal dovetailer simulates all the level, and below a level,`

`we can see only the result of a statistics beaing on infinities of`

`computation. This is NOT simulable by any algorithm, a priori.`

Then we are sure that a complete mathematical description of realityexist (perhaps not the more concrete for our local universe), sincethe imperative algoritm can be (tanks to denotational semantics)described in terms of category theory.

`Not really. The reality we see result from our first person`

`indeterminacy. You cannot simulate it, and it is not describable by`

`any equation.`

In any case, I believe, similar conclussion holds. Although in theconsequence of machine psychology in the case of COMP, the mindimposes a fortunate and robust algoritm as description of our localuniverse,

`Not really, for the reason above. We belongs to infinities of`

`computations, and the physical reality is a sum on all those`

`computations existing below our substitution level. QM confirms this.`

and in the case of a mathematical universe this requirement issubstituted by a fortunate and coherent mathematical structure.Anyhow, both are equivalent since one implies the other. Both ofthem reject phisicalism and the mind stablish requirement for thenature of what we call Physics. Perhaps one may be more general, andthe other may bring more detailsA question open is the nature of time and the progression of thesimulation of the points. Theoretically, for obtaining a subset ofthe points of a mathematical structure, the simulation can proceedin any direction, independent on the gradient of entropy. It canproceed backwards or laterally, since the value of a ndimensionalpoint does not depend on any other point, if we have the M equation.Moreover, time is local, there is no meaning of absolute time forthe universe, so the simulation can not progress with a uniformnotion of time. A local portion of the universe does make sense tohave an uniform time, but the level of substitution necessary mayforce the locality of time to be very small. At the limit, thesimulation may be forced to be massively parallel with as many localtimes as particles, and the model becomes the one of a selfcomputing universe.

`With comp physical reality, and even more the whole of reality`

`(physical + theological) is even beyond the whole of mathematics. All`

`physical and psychological notion, like perhaps time and surely space,`

`have to be derived from the logic of self-reference only. Subjective`

`time is explained by the Bp & p modality, but physical time seems to`

`vanish completely (a bit like in Wheeler Dewitt equation H = 0).`

`Obviously, there are tuns of open problem to proceed.`

`To sum up again: IF I am a machine, then whatever I am confront too`

`cannot be a machine. A bit like the arithmetical truth cannot be`

`defined in arithmetic. The same for arithmetical knowledge and`

`arithmetical observability. Arithmetic viewed from inside is *vastly`

`bigger* than third person describable Arithmetic, which is already far`

`beyond algorithm. It is a sort of "Skolem paradox". It is not easy to`

`explain to non logicians.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.