On 16 Aug 2012, at 18:42, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/16/2012 7:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
One must assume a mereology (whole-part relational scheme) in any
ontological theory or else there is no way to explain or
communicate it or about it.
That is exactly what I told you. Any universal system has a
mereology. But your existence theory has not, as you disallow
properties for your "neutral" existence. So you are making my point
here. Numbers have a rich mereology, actually infinitely many.
Let me ask a question: Is there a name in your repertoire that
denotes the totality of all that exists?
The usual name is N.
What exist primitively in the fixed theory is 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc.
Nothing else exist ontologically.
I denote this as Existence it-self or Dasein.
Dasein is fuzzy. It is closer to the 1-view.
Does it have any particular properties or is the question of it
having (or not having) properties simply inappropriate? How do you
believe properties come to be associated with objects, concepts,
things, entities, etc.
By the passage from N to P(N), done at the epistemological level.
There is no unique canonical labeling set of entities. There is
(at least!) an uncountable infinite equivalence class of them.
Labels and valuations cannot be considered as separable from the
entities that they act on as valuation. Therefore we cannot think
of them as uniquely ontologically primitive.
The proof that I can point to is derived from the theorems of
quantum mechanics and the experimental evidence supporting them.
Objects in the world simply cannot be said to have a particular set
of properties associated with them and not the complementary set of
properties. We can at best say that they have a superposition of all
possible properties. Why would abstract objects be any different?
So you do postulate QM. I don't, and can't in the comp theory, as UDA
explains in detail.
As long as you don't present your theory, it makes not much sense to
discuss, given that I work in a theory.
[SPK] You do not have an explanation of interactions in COMP
I have only the quantum logic. This does not change the vaility of
the reasoning. You reason like that, Darwin theory fail to predict
the mass of the boson, and string theory ignore the problem of how
doing a tasting pizza, so those theories are flawed. Comp explains
already the quanta and the qualia, but not yet time, space, real
numbers, nor pizza and boson. Works for next generations.
Your example of Darwin's theory is deeply flawed, if only because
Darwin's theory does not implicitly or explicitly make claims about
the ontological status of entities.
? (animals exist in darwin, plants too, ...).
Only on the terms used in the theory. That is minimal conditional
commitment, and is done in all theories using numbers (that is all
physical theories for example).
You claim that you don't need to postulate a physical world and yet
the presentation of the theory itself requires a physical world, at
least to communicate it between our minds.
Level confusion. We have already discuss this. The theory does not
assume a physical reality, but explain its appearance, and thus the
communication of it.
A physical world provides the means to communicate between us,
without it nothing occurs.
This argument needs non-comp, as UDA proved.
There are no interactions definable without it and therefore comp's
explanations are void and muted by your insistence that matter and
physicality has to be primitive to be involved.
Not primitive. I guess this is a typo. I prove that that physicality
cannot be primitive to be involved. It is involved without being
primitive: that is the point.
I am only asking you to consider the possibility that both matter
and numbers are on the same (non-primitive) level.
In comp, matter and physical laws are an emerging pattern in the
numbers psychological experience.
You contradict your own statement that matter is not primitive. It is
harder and harder to follow you.
"primitiveness of X" means that we accept the existence, and some
property of X in the starting assumption we make for a theory.
Dear Roger and Bruno,
I must point out that this definition assumes the prior
existence and definiteness of the entities that are defining the
Same level confusion as above.
This makes the theory contingent upon those priors in the sense that
the theory should not be assumed to have meaningful content in the
absence of those priors.
But it has. Or comp and even Church's thesis stop to make any sense.
The beliefs of the physicalist are contingent upon and even
supervene upon the prior existence and definiteness of properties of
the entities capable of being labeled as physicalist (or some
alternative). This is true for all entities capable of having a
meaningful notion of belief. It would be a self-contradiction to
propose a theory that disallows for the existence and definiteness
of the entity that proposed the theory. This error is known as self-
In arithmetic, we usually take as primitive the number zero, and
accept axiom like "0 ≠ s(x), for all x", with the intended meaning
that 0 is not a successor of any number. But note that the proofs
will not rely on any intended meaning.
But arithmetic, as a theory, does not float free of the minds
(and brains) of those that understand it.
You mean 17 was not a prime number 10^(-35) second after the big bang?
The idea that arithmetic or any other abstract object or relation
cannot have meaningful content in the absence of a means for it to
be both believed to possibly be true (or false) and communicated
about. Otherwise it is at best a delusion in the mind of a single
Then the comp theory does not make sense, and we should better avoid
artificial brain. But then we are outside of my working hypothesis.
Aristotle simply was being consistent. He and many other
philosophers do not take their own existence and definiteness for
granted. Just as primitiveness is often a tacit or unstated axiom of
a theory, its justification is obvious: without the assumption of a
object of a theory, there is no theory.
As I said. But this contradicts your notion of neutrality, not mine.
But the followers of Aristotle will tend to reify it, and that will
lead to the modern physicalism. But such physicalism is
problematical once we bet that we are digital machine. At least,
that is what I am arguing.
Maybe you are arguing against the positivist and empiricists
that would claim no curiosity as to the ontological implications and
content of the theories that they use to make predictions.
Positivism is a metaphysical self-defeating position. You don't need
comp to argue against it. No, my argument shows that comp is
incompatible with weak materialism. The doctrine that Matter exists.
Matter = primitive matter. I explain that with comp, physics is a
branch of arithmetic, or computer science (which can be embedded in
arithmetic). It makes comp empirically testable.
The difficulty is that you seem to argue philosophically against
scientific results, instead of their possible interpretations (which I
avoid). This is really confusing. You look a little bit like Goethe
against Newton, or Bergson against Einstein. You cite scientific
papers, but avoid to study and criticize the one who address the mind
body problem with the scientific methodology. I'm afraid your problem
is not dyslexia but philosophy.
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