2012/8/16 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> > > On 15 Aug 2012, at 15:14, Alberto G. Corona wrote: > > I ´m seduced and intrigued by the Bruno´s final conclussións of the COMP > hypothesis. But I had a certain disconfort with the idea of a simulation of > the reality by means of an algorithm for reasons I will describe later. > > > Comp is "I am a machine". It is NOT "reality is a machine". > > If comp is true, both reality and physical reality are NOT machine, for > the output of the many self-multiplication is NOT emulable by a Turing > machine. You might not yet grasp fully the impact of the first person > indeterminacy. > > In a sense: "I am a machine" implies that everything else is not. > > Indeed, the apparent computability of nature might in fine be a problem > for comp. It is behind the whole measure problem. > > > It is not emulable, I suppose, for the reason that if the physical reality has a underlying mathematical structure, if this is continuous it can not be emulable but in a discrete approximation. This emulation at the substitution level is what may be a physical reality indistinguishableness from the mathematical reality.

## Advertising

> > > > I found that either if the nature of our perception of reality) can be of > the thesis of a simulation at a certain level of substitution of a phisical > or mathematical reality, this simulation is, and only is, a discrete > manifold, with discreteness defined by the substitution level, which is a > subset of a continuous manifold that is the equation M of superstring > theory of wathever mathematical structure that describe the universe. The > equivalence may be shown as follows: > > A imperative computation is equivalent to a mathematical structure thanks > to the work on denotational semantics > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denotational_semantics>and the application > of category theory to it > <https://www.google.es/search?q=denotational+semantics+imperative+monads&sugexp=chrome,mod=11&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8#hl=en&sugexp=efrsh&gs_nf=1&tok=VMyaXoMGarRPPBvFsyx1Cg&pq=denotational%20semantics%20imperative%20monads&cp=49&gs_id=1q&xhr=t&q=denotational+semantics+imperative+category+theory&pf=p&safe=off&sclient=psy-ab&oq=denotational+semantics+imperative+category+theory&gs_l=&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_cp.r_qf.&fp=4beb944d59246923&biw=1092&bih=514> > . > > > Or just by definition. > > > > > Suppose that we know the M theory equation. > > > You are still assuming a physical reality. > I assume a mathematical reality > If the M theory equation is correct, it has to be derived from addition > and multiplication > ? , and comp at the metalevel. But it has to admit non computable solution, because with comp the physical reality is not computable, a priori. a continuous reality is uncomputable, but this is not a problem for someone who assume a mathematical reality. > > > > > A particular simulation can be obtained in a straighfordward way by means > of an algorithm that compute a sequence of positions and the respective > values in the M equation (which must specify wether there is a particle, > its nature and state at this point or more precisely the value of the wave > equation at this N-position or wathever are the relevant parameters at this > level of substitution), perhaps the sucession of points can be let´s say in > a progression of concentric n-dimensional circles around the singularity. > this algoritm is equivalent to the ordered set obtained by the combination > of two kind of functions (1) for obtaining sucessive N-dimensional > positions and (2) the function M(pos) itself for that particular point. The > simulation then is a mathematical structure composed by the ordered set of > these points, which is a subset of the manifold described by the M > equation. (When a computation is pure, like this, the arrows between > categories are functions). > > Suppose that we do not know the equation fo the M theory, and maybe it > does not exist, but COMP holds and we start with the dovetailer algoritm > at a fortunate substitution level. > > > The universal dovetailer simulates all the level, and below a level, we > can see only the result of a statistics beaing on infinities of > computation. This is NOT simulable by any algorithm, a priori. > > > It don´t have to be a single equation. But it is a mathematical structure, given the above said. > > Then we are sure that a complete mathematical description of reality exist > (perhaps not the more concrete for our local universe), since the > imperative algoritm can be (tanks to denotational semantics) described in > terms of category theory. > > > Not really. The reality we see result from our first person indeterminacy. > You cannot simulate it, and it is not describable by any equation. > > again it may be aproximated exactly, but discretely, by a mathematical structure. the dovetailer algorithm. At least one of the infinite superpositions that predict the Everett interpretation. Surely, there is a mathematical structure that integrate the infinite set of algoritms for all the superpositions. > > > > In any case, I believe, similar conclussion holds. Although in the > consequence of machine psychology in the case of COMP, the mind imposes a > fortunate and robust algoritm as description of our local universe, > > > Not really, for the reason above. We belongs to infinities of > computations, and the physical reality is a sum on all those computations > existing below our substitution level. QM confirms this. > > If I understand, the self computing universe is still a physicalist view. It is a reification of objects that compute, the elementary particles But really for you what computes the infinity of computations that make us and the reality that we perceive ( including the elementary particles) is a different , more basic substance, unknow to us. But still even if this is true, the study of the (then apparent) mathematical nature of the phisical reality and their implications is legitimate. > > > and in the case of a mathematical universe this requirement is substituted > by a fortunate and coherent mathematical structure. Anyhow, both are > equivalent since one implies the other. Both of them reject phisicalism and > the mind stablish requirement for the nature of what we call Physics. > Perhaps one may be more general, and the other may bring more details > > A question open is the nature of time and the progression of the > simulation of the points. Theoretically, for obtaining a subset of the > points of a mathematical structure, the simulation can proceed in any > direction, independent on the gradient of entropy. It can proceed backwards > or laterally, since the value of a ndimensional point does not depend on > any other point, if we have the M equation. Moreover, time is local, there > is no meaning of absolute time for the universe, so the simulation can not > progress with a uniform notion of time. A local portion of the universe > does make sense to have an uniform time, but the level of substitution > necessary may force the locality of time to be very small. At the limit, > the simulation may be forced to be massively parallel with as many local > times as particles, and the model becomes the one of a self computing > universe. > > > > With comp physical reality, and even more the whole of reality (physical + > theological) is even beyond the whole of mathematics. All physical and > psychological notion, like perhaps time and surely space, have to be > derived from the logic of self-reference only. Subjective time is explained > by the Bp & p modality, but physical time seems to vanish completely (a bit > like in Wheeler Dewitt equation H = 0). Obviously, there are tuns of open > problem to proceed. > > To sum up again: IF I am a machine, then whatever I am confront too cannot > be a machine. A bit like the arithmetical truth cannot be defined in > arithmetic. The same for arithmetical knowledge and arithmetical > observability. Arithmetic viewed from inside is *vastly bigger* than third > person describable Arithmetic, which is already far beyond algorithm. It is > a sort of "Skolem paradox". It is not easy to explain to non logicians. > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.