Roger,
In string theory the monads are responsible for the creation of space via
compactification of the extra dimensions of space. I have never understood
why, especially on the Mind/Brain forum where we already went thru all of
you present thinking, why you never accepted the compact manifolds of
string theory as the basis of Leibniz's monads. Instead you just decided
the monads were mathematical and not substantial.
Richard

On Sat, Aug 18, 2012 at 10:41 AM, Roger <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:

>  Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> Admittedly, the more I dig into Leibniz, the more questions I have.
> But I won't abandon him yet, thinking I misunderstood one of his
> statements.  Or perhaps Russell misunderstood what Leibniz meant.
>
> According to Russell, "Complete set of predicates"
> means "sufficient, complete in a minimal sense".
> Like "sufficient reason" I suppose. Or Occam's razor. Or the truth should
> be simple. Thus "Socrates was a man" is a proposition which is, as a
> proposition,
> thus a substance. This is tied into necessary reason, always either true
> or false.
> So I think the better definition is "Complete and unchanging set of
> predicates"
>
> So because "The horse was lame" may not always have been true,
> it is possibly contingent (is only a current fact), so as a proposition
> it cannot be a substance as far as we know.
>
>  None of this can be true, however, since most things will change with
> time.
> The conclusion is that Russell may be wrong, that nothing be a
> substance.
> Yet Leibniz says the universe is made up
> entirely of monads, and monads are substances by definition.
>
> "For *Leibniz*, the universe is *made* up of an infinite number of simple
> substances *...* "
>
> Perhaps Leibniz meant "the world I refer to in my philosophy..."
> He did not count time and space for excample as monads.
>
>
>
> Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
> 8/18/2012
> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
> everything could function."
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> *From:* Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> *Time:* 2012-08-18, 09:51:15
> *Subject:* Re: Cs. Knowing that one knows.
>
>
>  On 18 Aug 2012, at 14:47, Roger wrote:
>
>  Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> Being might be defined as =, meaning "is". It is a state, not a thing.
> Then if a state, it is a state relative to some other state. L says that a
> more
> dominant monad (superior state) will act on and will always act on a
> less dominant monad.  Darwinism, if you like, before Darwin.
> Survival of the fittest.
>
>
> Hmm... May be the monads would be better described by the universal
> numbers/machines. But it is only in a very local sense, embedded in some
> computation(s), than we can give sense to "survival" of the fittest.
>
>
>
>  There may indeed be problems with understanding what Leibniz's substance
> is.
>
> Benson Mates, in his book "The Philosophy of Leibniz"  says that he,
> Mates, does
> not understand what Leibniz's substance is ! Mates teaches philosophy at
> Berkeley.
>
>
> OK.
>
>
>
>
>
> What is certain is that L's substance is not physical, it is logical, but
> points to something
> outside of itself. So "mind" as a word is a substance, it is real pointing
> to the phenomenal mind,
> the phenomenal mind being the experiencing consciousness.
>
>
>
> OK.
>
>
>
> Bertrand Russell has written a book on Leibniz's logic, and I think he
> defines substance there as
> anything with a complete set of predicates.  IMHO Easy  to say, hard to
> kanow when you have a complete set.
>
>
> Complete in which sense?
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> Also, predicates such as "man" in "Socrates was a man" are said to be
> (logically ) inside the subject "Socrates" .
>
> Also, a subject or substance cannot be a predicagte, a predicate cannot be
> a subject.
>
> I tend to think of substances as kingdoms. Complete in their own selves.
>
>
> Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
> 8/18/2012
> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
> everything could function."
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> *From:* Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> *Time:* 2012-08-18, 06:51:36
> *Subject:* Re: Cs. Knowing that one knows.
>
>
>  On 17 Aug 2012, at 22:26, Roger wrote:
>
>
> 1)  For wine-tasting -- What one must have is knowing that one knows that
> the wine tastes good.
>
>     Such as one can prove that 1+1 =2 but one still has to accept that as
> true.
>
>
> Yes. In fact the proof that "1+1=2" will lead to the truth of "1+1=2", for
> you, if you agree on the truth of the axioms you  re using, and if you
> believe that the rules of inference of your theory preserves truth.
>
>
>
>
>
> *2) mo穘ad  (mnd)*
> *n.*
> *1. Philosophy An indivisible, impenetrable unit of substance viewed as
> the basic constituent element of physical reality in the metaphysics of
> Leibniz.*
> **
> **
> *Substance:* A being that subsists by itself; a separate or distinct
> thing.
>
>
> OK, but what is a being? This notion of subtance beg the question.
>
>
>
>
> *Contingent truth:* A truth whose opposite is possible
>
>
> OK. In modal logic p is contingent will be written p & D~p. (or p & <> ~p
>     (~ =  NOT)).
> Or p & ~Bp (p & ~[]p)
>
>
> *Entelechy:* Something having in it "a certain perfection", a
> completeness- a term taken from Aristotle's definition of the soul
>
>
> Hmm... "certain perfection" is rather fuzzy.
>
>
>   *Appetition: *The internal principle which prepares for change;
> rudimentary "desire".
> *Monad:* The simple substance. Blind and passive by itself, but obtains
> its perceptions
> from God who also can animate it and cause it to feel.
>
>
> I can make sense of this, perhaps in too much incompatible ways, in comp.
> But OK.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
> 8/17/2012
> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
> everything could function."
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> *From:* Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> *Time:* 2012-08-16, 11:40:34
> *Subject:* Re: ?
>
>
>  On 16 Aug 2012, at 16:21, Roger wrote:
>
>
>  BRUNO: I meant that some fixed hardware computer can emulate a virtual
> self-modifying version of itself, so that your point is not valid.
>
> ROGER: What point ?  And emulate in what sense ? Ie could a computer ever
> be a good wine taster ?
>
>
> As I said, it seems they are. the french have succeeded in making a wine
> testing machine which according to experts in the field is better than the
> average qualified wine tester.
> Does such machine get the human qualia of drinking wine. i doubt so, for
> this you need to have a longer human history, and higher reflexive
> abilities. But there is no reason why machine could'n get them in principle
> (obvious for a computationalist which bet that he is himself a machine
> relatively to its more probable neighborhood).
>
>
>
>
> BRUNO: If not you introduce a notion of living matter leading to an
> infinite regression.
>
> ROGER: Infinite regression of what ? Consciousness  ? The monad does away
> with that problem,
> except of course it's just philosophy, not hardware.
>
>
> It might be math, also. Could you explain what a monad is without too much
> jargon?
>
>
>
> BRUNO: It might have a solution, but it begs the question of
> comp/non-comp, and you are just saying
> (without arguing) that machines cannot think, and that souls are
> substantial actual infinities.
>
> ROGER: I think I said and believe what you said I said, but I don't
> understand your main point
> just above, even vaguely. At any rate, emulation is not the real thing.
>
>
> If the brain is a universal emulator, as it surely is at least, then when
> a computer emulates an emulation done by the brain, at the right level,
> emulation is the real thing.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
> 8/16/2012
> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
> everything could function."
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> *From:* Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> *Time:* 2012-08-15, 03:53:59
> *Subject:* Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to
> computersinAIordescribing life
>
>
>  On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:47, Roger wrote:
>
>  Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> You say, "a non living computer can supported a living self-developing
> life form"
>
> Do you mean support instead of supported ? Or what do you mean ?
>
>
> I mean "support". Sorry.
> I meant that some fixed hardware computer can emulate a virtual
> self-modifying version of itself, so that your point is not valid.
> If not you introduce a notion of living matter leading to an infinite
> regression. It might have a solution, but it beg the question of
> comp/non-comp, and you are just saying (without arguing) that machines
> cannot think, and that souls are substantial actual infinities.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
> 8/14/2012
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> *From:* Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> *Time:* 2012-08-12, 05:17:45
> *Subject:* Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers
> inAIordescribing life
>
>
>  On 11 Aug 2012, at 13:07, Roger wrote:
>
>  Hi Russell Standish
>
> When I "gave in" to the AI point of view that computers can posess
> intelligence,
> I had overlooked the world of experience, which is not quantitative. Only
> living things can experience the world.
>
>
>
> You are right. But a non living computer can supported a living
> self-developing life form, unless you postulate that infinitely complex
> substances are at play in the mind.
>
> Bruno
>
>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
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