On 18 Aug 2012, at 16:41, Roger wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

Admittedly, the more I dig into Leibniz, the more questions I have.
But I won't abandon him yet, thinking I misunderstood one of his
statements.  Or perhaps Russell misunderstood what Leibniz meant.

According to Russell, "Complete set of predicates" means "sufficient, complete in a minimal sense". Like "sufficient reason" I suppose. Or Occam's razor. Or the truth should be simple. Thus "Socrates was a man" is a proposition which is, as a proposition, thus a substance. This is tied into necessary reason, always either true or false. So I think the better definition is "Complete and unchanging set of predicates"

So because "The horse was lame" may not always have been true,
it is possibly contingent (is only a current fact), so as a proposition
it cannot be a substance as far as we know.

None of this can be true, however, since most things will change with time. The conclusion is that Russell may be wrong, that nothing be a substance.
Yet Leibniz says the universe is made up
entirely of monads, and monads are substances by definition.

"For Leibniz, the universe is made up of an infinite number of simple substances ... "

Perhaps Leibniz meant "the world I refer to in my philosophy..."
He did not count time and space for excample as monads.


Russell was still believing that the mathematical reality was axiomatizable.

Gôdel did not just destroyed Hilbert's program, but also a large part of the antic conception of platonism, including a large part of Russelm's conception. After Gödel and Turing, after Post and Kleene, we know that the arithmetical Platonia is *full* of life, but also typhoons, black holes, and many things.

There is a "Skolem paradox", which needs model theory to be made precise: arithmetic is enumerable, nevertheless, when seen by machines from inside, it is not. It is *very* big.

I respect a lot people like Leibniz and Russell. Leibniz, by many token, was closer to the discovery of the universal numbers/machines than Russell, despite Babbage. Comp is still close to Russell's philosophy of numbers but departs from his philosophy of sets. Leibniz needs just to be relativized, imo, by allowing accessibilty relations, or neighborhood relations between worlds/realities (shared dream/vido-game, somehow). Comp does not let much choice in the matter, anyway. We are confronted with a big problem, but we can, actually we have to, translate it in arithmetic, once we assume comp.

Bruno








Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/18/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
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Subject: Re: Cs. Knowing that one knows.


On 18 Aug 2012, at 14:47, Roger wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

Being might be defined as =, meaning "is". It is a state, not a thing. Then if a state, it is a state relative to some other state. L says that a more
dominant monad (superior state) will act on and will always act on a
less dominant monad.  Darwinism, if you like, before Darwin.
Survival of the fittest.

Hmm... May be the monads would be better described by the universal numbers/machines. But it is only in a very local sense, embedded in some computation(s), than we can give sense to "survival" of the fittest.



There may indeed be problems with understanding what Leibniz's substance is.

Benson Mates, in his book "The Philosophy of Leibniz" says that he, Mates, does

not understand what Leibniz's substance is ! Mates teaches philosophy at Berkeley.

OK.





What is certain is that L's substance is not physical, it is logical, but points to something outside of itself. So "mind" as a word is a substance, it is real pointing to the phenomenal mind,
the phenomenal mind being the experiencing consciousness.


OK.



Bertrand Russell has written a book on Leibniz's logic, and I think he defines substance there as anything with a complete set of predicates. IMHO Easy to say, hard to kanow when you have a complete set.

Complete in which sense?

Bruno



Also, predicates such as "man" in "Socrates was a man" are said to be (logically ) inside the subject "Socrates" .

Also, a subject or substance cannot be a predicagte, a predicate cannot be a subject.

I tend to think of substances as kingdoms. Complete in their own selves.


Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/18/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
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Subject: Re: Cs. Knowing that one knows.


On 17 Aug 2012, at 22:26, Roger wrote:


1) For wine-tasting -- What one must have is knowing that one knows that the wine tastes good.

Such as one can prove that 1+1 =2 but one still has to accept that as true.

Yes. In fact the proof that "1+1=2" will lead to the truth of "1+1=2", for you, if you agree on the truth of the axioms you re using, and if you believe that the rules of inference of your theory preserves truth.





2) mo穘ad  (mnd)
n.
1. Philosophy An indivisible, impenetrable unit of substance viewed as the basic constituent element of physical reality in the metaphysics of Leibniz.


Substance: A being that subsists by itself; a separate or distinct thing.

OK, but what is a being? This notion of subtance beg the question.




Contingent truth: A truth whose opposite is possible

OK. In modal logic p is contingent will be written p & D~p. (or p & <> ~p (~ = NOT)).
Or p & ~Bp (p & ~[]p)


Entelechy: Something having in it "a certain perfection", a completeness- a term taken from Aristotle's definition of the soul

Hmm... "certain perfection" is rather fuzzy.


Appetition: The internal principle which prepares for change; rudimentary "desire". Monad: The simple substance. Blind and passive by itself, but obtains its perceptions
from God who also can animate it and cause it to feel.

I can make sense of this, perhaps in too much incompatible ways, in comp. But OK.

Bruno





Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/17/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
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Time: 2012-08-16, 11:40:34
Subject: Re: ?


On 16 Aug 2012, at 16:21, Roger wrote:


BRUNO: I meant that some fixed hardware computer can emulate a virtual self-modifying version of itself, so that your point is not valid.

ROGER: What point ? And emulate in what sense ? Ie could a computer ever be a good wine taster ?

As I said, it seems they are. the french have succeeded in making a wine testing machine which according to experts in the field is better than the average qualified wine tester. Does such machine get the human qualia of drinking wine. i doubt so, for this you need to have a longer human history, and higher reflexive abilities. But there is no reason why machine could'n get them in principle (obvious for a computationalist which bet that he is himself a machine relatively to its more probable neighborhood).




BRUNO: If not you introduce a notion of living matter leading to an infinite regression.

ROGER: Infinite regression of what ? Consciousness ? The monad does away with that problem,
except of course it's just philosophy, not hardware.

It might be math, also. Could you explain what a monad is without too much jargon?



BRUNO: It might have a solution, but it begs the question of comp/ non-comp, and you are just saying (without arguing) that machines cannot think, and that souls are substantial actual infinities.

ROGER: I think I said and believe what you said I said, but I don't understand your main point just above, even vaguely. At any rate, emulation is not the real thing.

If the brain is a universal emulator, as it surely is at least, then when a computer emulates an emulation done by the brain, at the right level, emulation is the real thing.

Bruno







Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/16/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
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Time: 2012-08-15, 03:53:59
Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computersinAIordescribing life


On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:47, Roger wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

You say, "a non living computer can supported a living self- developing life form"

Do you mean support instead of supported ? Or what do you mean ?

I mean "support". Sorry.
I meant that some fixed hardware computer can emulate a virtual self-modifying version of itself, so that your point is not valid. If not you introduce a notion of living matter leading to an infinite regression. It might have a solution, but it beg the question of comp/non-comp, and you are just saying (without arguing) that machines cannot think, and that souls are substantial actual infinities.

Bruno





Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
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Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers inAIordescribing life


On 11 Aug 2012, at 13:07, Roger wrote:

Hi Russell Standish

When I "gave in" to the AI point of view that computers can posess intelligence, I had overlooked the world of experience, which is not quantitative. Only
living things can experience the world.


You are right. But a non living computer can supported a living self-developing life form, unless you postulate that infinitely complex substances are at play in the mind.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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